Bloody Sunday and the Report of the Widgery Tribunal – The Irish Government’s Assessment of the New Material Presented to the British Government in June 1997
30 January, 1997 marked the 25th anniversary of the killing of thirteen
people and the wounding of a further fourteen (one of whom was to die shortly
afterwards) in Derry in 1972 by the British Army. The passage of those years has
not lessened the meaning of what happened on that day, summed up by the term
synonymous with it, “Bloody Sunday”, the trauma of which sent shock
waves of anger, grief and indignation that were felt throughout the island of
Ireland, the wider Irish community abroad and the international community.
The passage of twenty five years has not dimmed the memories of that day for
those who were present and particularly for those who lost loved ones. Memories
are vividly recalled with deeply felt emotion about lost fathers, sons and
brothers. The Government is acutely aware that time has not diminished this
sense of pain and loss. It is also aware that their grief has been deepened by
their belief, widely shared, that the events of Bloody Sunday have yet to be set
out in a truthful and credible official account. The Bloody Sunday relatives
believe that the Report of Lord Widgery was a deliberately incomplete and
wilfully misleading official version of events designed for the sole purpose of
exculpating the actions of the British Army.
The Government has long shared the widespread view that the Widgery Report
was unsatisfactory and that it did not represent the truth of what happened on
that day. Indeed, the very disregard with which the Widgery Report was viewed by
nationalists, particularly those in Derry, has meant that they have largely
ignored it, so far removed was its version of events from the reality of what
they believed happened in Derry on 30 January 1972. On the other hand, for the
British authorities, the Widgery Report remains the official version of events.
On the basis of the Widgery Report, compensation was granted to the next of kin
in 1974 and in 1992 the British confirmed the innocence of those killed by
reference to the Report’s finding that none were found guilty.
The emergence of new material and the re-evaluation of the available evidence
which coincided with the twenty fifth anniversary of Bloody Sunday has refocused
attention on the events of that day and on the Widgery Report. It has reawakened
and deepened the long standing doubts about the Widgery Report and suggested a
dramatically different version of events to that offered in the official
account. The Government believed that this new material, the very serious issues
raised by the emerging picture of what actually happened on Bloody Sunday and
the long standing concerns of the Bloody Sunday relatives, warranted, in the
first instance, a clear and thorough assessment of the material which has
emerged recently, particularly in terms of its implications for the credibility
of the Widgery Report. The Government has, accordingly, had such an assessment
prepared by its officials.
The Government has been very conscious of the power of the events of Bloody
Sunday and the Widgery Report to evoke deep emotions so evidently reflected in
the commemorations twenty five years later. It has been very aware of and, it
hopes, sensitive to the wishes and feelings of the Bloody Sunday relatives, as
it has regarding all the victims of violence in Northern Ireland. The Government
believes that the process of healing, reconciliation and ultimately of peace is
advanced by a willingness on all sides and on behalf of all victims to
acknowledge the over-riding values of truth and justice. These considerations
have formed the basis of the Government’s approach in seeking to assess the
significance of the new material regarding Bloody Sunday and particularly its
significance for the Report of the Widgery Tribunal of Inquiry.
1. The new material which formed the basis of the Government’s assessment can
be summarised as follows:
- Eyewitness Bloody Sunday, The Truth, edited by Don Mullan (1997): thispublishes a selection of civilian eyewitness statements drawn from over 500accounts given to the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association and theNational Council for Civil Liberties (hereafter NICRA/NCCL) which weresubmitted to the Widgery Tribunal but not substantively considered by it. Inaddition to these, the book contains accounts of recently released archivalmaterial, an assessment of the significance of intercepted Army and RUCradio messages, and preliminary medical and ballistic reassessments. Thematerial combines to form a profoundly different and vividly portrayedversion of events which is distinctly at odds with that presented by theWidgery Report. It strongly indicates that the Widgery Inquiry was partisanand selective in the evidence which it chose to consider and accept.
Significantly, Don Mullan concludes on the basis of a variety of sources
that shots were fired by the British Army from the vicinity of Derry Walls,
that these shots hit a number of civilians and that the evidence of three of
the fatalities indicates that they died as a result of these shots. Lord
Widgery never considered such a possibility despite evidence to that effect
having been available to him.
- The Bloody Sunday Tribunal of Inquiry, a resounding defeat for truth,justice and the rule of lawby Professor Dermot Walsh (1997): thisincludes an analysis of recently released statements made by soldiersinitially to the Military Police and later to the Treasury Solicitors on andafter 30 January 1972 which were not made available at the time to Counselfor the next of kin. The study has found that these statements containedsubstantial and material inconsistencies, discrepancies and alterations.While the disparities between the statements by and between the soldierswere plainly evident to the staff of the Tribunal, they were not madeavailable to Counsel for the next of kin despite their obvious materialrelevance both individually and collectively. Prof. Walsh argues that thisfailure, an effective concealment of relevant material by the Tribunal,
undermined the cross examination process and rendered the Widgery Report
fatally flawed. Prof. Walsh also considers the significance of other
archival material, recently released by the British Public Record Office,
relating to the operation of the Tribunal and concludes that its operation
was inherently biased against the victims and in favour of the British Army.
He also provides an analysis of the other features of the Inquiry, most
notably the fact that it derogated from the recommendations of the Salmon
Report on fair legal representation, which helped undermine its fairness and
balance toward the victims and their relatives.
- Channel Four News has broadcast a number of interviews with individualswhom Channel Four believe to have been soldiers on duty in Derry on BloodySunday. These interviews support allegations that shots were fired from thevicinity of Derry Walls by the British Army, make claims that militarycommand and control was absent for a period in which “shameful anddisgraceful acts” were being perpetrated, and contain assertions thatofficials working for Lord Widgery changed the version of events presentedby at least one soldier.
- A Dublin newspaper, the Sunday Business Post, published extractsfrom a very disturbing account, reputedly by a member of 1 Para, of theactions of members of his unit in Rossville Street and Glenfada Park whichincluded the deliberate killing, variously, of unarmed and fleeingcivilians, some of whom had already been wounded by British Army fire. Theaccount also claims that the staff of the Widgery Tribunal fabricatedaspects of this soldier’s statement in an apparent attempt to justify thekillings. The Government was given a copy of this document which included,inter alia, the names of individual soldiers not revealed in the publishedversion.
- The Government undertook an extensive search of its files relating toBloody Sunday. Among those files were 101 statements by eyewitnesses whichwere collected by the Government in 1972. Many of those who gave statementsto the Government also gave statements to the Northern Ireland Civil RightsAssociation (NICRA) and the National Council for Civil Liberties (NCCL)which subsequently formed the basis of Don Mullan’s Eyewitness BloodySunday. Extracts from these unpublished eyewitness accounts have been usedin this assessment.
2. In describing the material which has emerged as ‘new’ care must be
exercised. Some of the material is genuinely new, such as the claims made on
Channel Four that members of the security forces now verify that shots were
fired from the vicinity of Derry Walls by the British Army. Some, such as the
civilian eyewitness statements contained in Eyewitness Bloody Sunday, is not new
in that it was available to the Tribunal at the time. However, the publication
now of the civilian eyewitness accounts reveals afresh their compelling nature
as a body of evidence dramatically at odds with the findings of the Widgery
Report. Their restatement in conjunction with other material adds forcefully to
the long-held doubts about the Report as an accurate and complete version of
events. Some of the material, such as the statements made initially by the
soldiers to the Military Police and subsequently to the Treasury Solicitors, was
available to the official side of the Tribunal but would have been new to
Counsel for the next of kin. It emerges now as new to the public. Indeed, this
body of material derives its force from the very fact that it and the
inconsistencies and alterations on the part of the implicated soldiers it
reveals, were available to Counsel for the Tribunal but effectively concealed
from Counsel for the next of kin despite their obvious relevance, particularly
in the context of an adversarially based Inquiry. In other words, it is the fact
of the material being “old” which gives it its devastating force as a
critique of the Widgery Report.
3. New ballistics and medical evidence from independent expert sources has
also emerged which supports Don Mullan’s thesis that three of the victims of
Bloody Sunday died as a result of British Army fire from the vicinity of Derry
Walls.
4. In the course of this analysis, a number of comments and inferences are
made solely on the basis of the content of the Widgery Report itself. They are
based on the contradictions and failures in logic and purpose which are found
throughout the Report. These are a legitimate source of criticism and so obvious
that comment could not reasonably have been avoided. The Widgery Report has in
the past been subject to detailed critiques, most notably those by Prof. Samuel
Dash and Bryan McMahon, both of which have been used where appropriate in the
course of this assessment.
5. Having considered the new material under three headings – Summary, New
Material? and Significance – the assessment turns to the Widgery Report itself
and subjects it to a detailed deconstruction in the light of the new material.
The assessment closes with a conclusion based on this assessment and a
recommendation on how the issue of Bloody Sunday should be taken forward.
Summary and Significance of New Material
Summary
6. Over 500 witness statements were recorded by the Northern Ireland Civil
Rights Association and the National Council for Civil Liberties shortly after
Bloody Sunday and presented to the Widgery Tribunal in March 1972. Of these, 114
were selected for publication in Don Mullan’s Eyewitness Bloody Sunday, The
Truth which was published in January 1997. None of the statements were edited
(save for minor spelling errors etc.). These statements portray a vivid picture
of physical brutality and the deliberate use of lethal force without
justification by the British Army. According to the statements, the British Army
deployed in a very fast and aggressive manner into Rossville Street/Glenfada
Park, took no obvious precautions against return IRA fire and shot unarmed
civilians, often with lethal intent. Incidences of brutality are frequently
recounted in these statements, often involving references to the abuse of those
who attempted to render assistance – including uniformed members of the Order of
Malta. They also contain claims that a number of the wounded were deliberately
killed. Don Mullan proposes the thesis in his book, based on these eyewitness
statements and other evidence (particularly ballistics and medical) that British
Army snipers fired shots from the vicinity of Derry Walls which proved fatal in
three instances.
New Material?
7. The eyewitness statements are not new and were in fact available to the
Widgery Tribunal. According to Lord Widgery “the Northern Ireland Civil
Rights Association collected a large number of statements from people in
Londonderry said to be willing to give evidence. These statements reached me at
an advanced stage in the Inquiry. In so far as they contained new material, not
traversing ground already familiar from evidence given before me, I have made
use of them.”
8. It is also evident from a recently released memorandum written by the
Tribunal’s secretary on 10 March 1972 that the statements were considered in
some manner by either the Treasury Solicitor’s Office and/or Counsel for the
Tribunal, Mr. Stocker. Mr. Stocker in fact selected 15 statements which he
thought worthwhile bringing to Lord Widgery’s attention. Mr. Hall of the
Treasury Solicitor’s Office believed there were four statements which, according
to the memorandum, he would like to have seen given in evidence. The Tribunal’s
secretary, W.J. Smith, believed that evidence from some of these witnesses
should have been taken “since it was clear that if this was not done there
would subsequently be heavy criticism.”
9. The memorandum records that Lord Widgery believed that the statements were
submitted at a “late stage” to cause him “maximum
embarrassment” and that there was little choice but to call either none or
a substantial number which he was not prepared to do at that stage. He did not
believe that the statements brought anything new to the proceedings. It is very
difficult to see how Lord Widgery could have arrived at that judgement in an
objective and balanced way if he had read a substantial portion of the
statements. His negative response to them seems to indicate that he did indeed
view them as coming from “the other side”.
10. The eyewitness statements as published by Don Mullan are new to the
public at large and in their consistency and clarity have provided a
disturbingly vivid description of what happened on Bloody Sunday. This view of
events is diametrically opposed to that offered in the official version of
events by Lord Widgery and in that manner have resurrected the long held
concerns that the Widgery Tribunal and its Report frustrated the objective for
which it was established. Furthermore, the publication of the eyewitness
accounts by Don Mullan has provided the foundation for the emergence of other
information, including archival material and what are believed to be new
eyewitnesses from the security forces.
Significance
11. Lord Widgery’s failure to use this evidence, to adequately consider the
information contained in their statements which challenged assertions made by
the military witnesses at the Tribunal in general as well as key instances, or
to call a reasonable number of the civilian eyewitnesses was significant in the
following terms:
– A major body of evidence which directly contradicted the evidence
presented by the implicated soldiers (on which Lord Widgery based his
findings) was effectively ignored.
– The bulk of the eyewitness evidence was not available therefore for use
in cross examination of the testimony of the soldiers, testimony which was
directly at odds with these statements; the proceedings were, by all accounts,
intensely adversarial, thus enhancing the importance of the cross examination
process and the significance of any and all failures to present relevant
evidence.
– British Army assertions in the course of the Inquiry that some of the
victims had been firing weapons or handling bombs were allowed credence by the
absence of the bulk of eyewitness statements to the contrary.
– The possibility of criminal prosecutions against certain soldiers, which
existed prima facie on the basis of several eyewitness statements, was
ultimately denied since Lord Widgery felt free to conclude – on the basis of
the restricted range of evidence that was considered – that the implicated
soldiers were generally telling the truth.
– The possibility, suggested by a number of civilian eyewitnesses and
supported by ballistics and medical evidence, that fire was directed into the
Bogside from the vicinity of Derry Walls and that some of it hit and killed
several victims was not given proper consideration and does not feature in the
Widgery Report.
– A version of events was presented in the Widgery Report which was seen as
so perversely at odds with that of the civilian eyewitnesses (including
journalists) that any remaining public confidence in the Widgery Tribunal’s
methods, conclusions and ultimately motives was undermined.
12. Lord Widgery’s dismissive approach to the statements, his failure to see
them as a crucial repository of valuable – not to say indispensable – evidence
and his belief that their arrival was intended to cause him embarrassment were
at odds with his own emphasis on the importance of eyewitness accounts and
seemed to run directly counter to the very remit of his Inquiry which was, if
nothing else, to establish what happened.
13. According to the terms of the 1921 Act which governed the Widgery
Tribunal, Lord Widgery in his role as chairman decided procedure, rules of
evidence and what was and was not to be considered. The 1921 Act conferred on
him the powers, rights and privileges of a High Court or a judge of the High
Court in terms of compelling witnesses to attend (and to be cross examined) and
the production of documents. However, such a role is predicated on the notion
that the chair will use its powers
to locate, consider and present all the
relevant evidence which assists in uncovering the truth i.e. that the chairman
is actually intent on discovering the truth. That a chairman would use his
powers to suppress relevant evidence or to fail to consider evidence presented
to him fairly is so patently at odds with the functions of a tribunal, indeed
its raison d’etre, that statutory safeguards do not exist to prevent this
occurring.
14. The argument that full consideration of this evidence would have caused
undue delay in producing the Report carries little weight in light of the
seriousness of what the Inquiry was established to determine. Indeed, the very
speed with which the Tribunal was concluded added profoundly to the widespread
belief that it was not primarily concerned with establishing the full truth.
15. Without additional testimony by the eyewitnesses and the elucidation of
their contribution to the Inquiry by cross examination, much vital information
was not elicited such as the precise identity of the victims alluded to and the
sequence of events. The true evidentiary value, therefore, of the eyewitness
statements was never fully explored through cross examination and their
contribution to the process of determining what happened and to whom was never
properly or fully utilised. This will continue to remain the case until the true
value of these eyewitness accounts is fully explored and corroborated by other
forms of evidence in the appropriate forum. The full significance of these
statements and their potential evidentiary value at the time emerges in the
course of the deconstruction of the Widgery Report which follows.
Statements given to the Government
Summary
16. The Government collected 101 statements by eyewitnesses which it
considered reflected the events on the ground from the civilian perspective.
These confirm and in many instances add to the overall picture presented by
eyewitness statements published by Don Mullan. They add further details, often
significant, to the descriptions in Eyewitness Bloody Sunday of how many of the
victims were killed or wounded. Several of these accounts attest to fire coming
from the vicinity of Derry Walls. They also provide graphic accounts of the
brutality inflicted on civilians by British soldiers, including accounts by
members of the Order of Malta. Many of those who provided these accounts also
gave statements to the NICRA/NCCL.
New Material?
17. Since Lord Widgery decided not to give any significant consideration to
the civilian eyewitness accounts, whether the information contained in the
statements given to the Government could be considered ‘new’ is rather moot.
They would certainly be new to the public today in terms of the additional
details and perspectives they offer from the civilian side.
Significance
18. Information provided in these statements does not in general terms alter
the description of events offered in Eyewitness Bloody Sunday; they offer
further corroboration about the eyewitness descriptions already published. In
several instances, they augment these with significant additional detail about
the deaths which occurred.
Soldiers’ Statements -Report by Prof. Walsh
Summary
19. Professor Dermot Walsh of the Law Department at the University of
Limerick has studied a series of documents relating to the Tribunal and released
by the Public Record Office in 1996. These have been published as The Bloody
Sunday Tribunal of Inquiry, a resounding defeat for truth, justice and the rule
of law which is a comprehensive critique of the Widgery Tribunal, its motives,
methods and conclusions. Central to Prof. Walsh’s analysis is his study of the
recently released documents, in particular 28 statements made by soldiers to the
Military Police on the night of 30/31 January and 13 supplementaries shortly
thereafter (i.e. 41 statements in all; statements made by other soldiers and
police personnel to the Military Police were not released.)
20. These statements contain, according to Prof. Walsh’s study, “serious
and relevant discrepancies” when compared with statements subsequently made
to the Treasury Solicitors for the purpose of the Inquiry. This applies to
almost every soldier who fired one or more shots. While available to the Counsel
to the Tribunal and Counsel for the Army, the earlier statements were not
available to Counsel for the next of kin. As Walsh states, “the reality is
that the soldiers were never exposed to the sort of cross examination to which
they would have been exposed had the contents of their earlier statements been
disclosed to Counsel for the deceased.”
21. Prof. Walsh notes that it is “hardly coincidence that in many
instances the effect of the changes was to convert what had originally amounted
to an unlawful or reckless shooting to a more justifiable one.” He also
points out that changes had the effect of reducing some of the conflicts in the
versions presented by different soldiers.
22. Furthermore, and perhaps most damning of all to the credibility of the
Tribunal, Prof. Walsh points out that “even when the solicitor for the Army
asserted in his closing address that the evidence given by the soldiers to the
Tribunal did not differ from their original statements, apart from one instance,
Counsel for the Tribunal remained silent.” Prof. Walsh concludes that not
only did the Tribunal ignore evidence available to it which clearly damaged the
reliability of statements made by the soldiers in the witness box but by
remaining silent “actively concealed the existence of the evidence which
renders the basis of its own findings unreliable.”
New Material?
23. The initial statements made by the soldiers to the Military Police are
not new since they were available to the Tribunal. However, their existence is
new to the public now and would have been new to both the public at the time
and, crucially, to Counsel for the next of kin. What is new about this material
is the revelation that the Tribunal deliberately failed to reveal evidence
available to it which undermined the reliability of statements made by the
implicated soldiers in the witness box and which ultimately formed the basis for
the Tribunal’s report. In other words, it is from its very vintage that the
material derives its power to invalidate the grounds on which the Widgery Report
was based.
Significance
24. In terms of the credibility of the Tribunal as impartial and the validity
of the Report as a version of events, this material is highly significant and
profoundly damaging;
– The statements of the soldiers made to the Military Police, so soon after
the events, clearly constitute material evidence in and of themselves and as
such ought to have been available to Counsel for the next of kin. Furthermore,
the fact that they contain serious and relevant material discrepancies and
differences as against subsequent written and oral statements made by these
same soldiers to the Tribunal substantively altered and enhanced their value
for the purposes of cross examination. That they were not made available to
Counsel for the next of kin for this purpose rendered the process of cross
examination fundamentally flawed.
– That the Tribunal chose not to disclose these statements at any time to
Counsel for the next of kin raises serious questions about the impartiality of
the proceedings of the Widgery Tribunal. That the Tribunal chose to accept the
integrity of the soldiers’ subsequent statements, despite its knowledge that
earlier statements made by them were significantly altered, casts serious
doubt about the commitment of the Tribunal and its staff to oversee a fair and
impartial Inquiry.
– Lord Widgery wrote in his Report that he was impressed with the demeanour
of the soldiers: they gave their evidence “with confidence and without
hesitation or prevarication and withstood a rigorous cross-examination without
contradicting themselves or each other”. He accepted that with one or two
exceptions they were telling the truth as they remembered it. If Lord Widgery
was aware of the significance of the earlier statements by the soldiers, this
judgement must be regarded as at best inherently unsound and at worst a wilful
act of partiality and bias. On that basis, his judgement must be set aside.
Equally, if he was unaware of the significance of the statements, then he
simply was not in a position to make that judgment and it must accordingly be
set aside.
– Since the reliability of the soldiers’ statements in and of themselves
(i.e. even without reference to the facts and evidence to the contrary) cannot
be sustained, the Widgery Report must now be set aside as seriously flawed
since it based its findings largely on the accounts provided by those soldiers
and on a cross examination that was inherently seriously deficient in that it
took place without knowledge, on the side of Counsel for the next of kin, of
extremely relevant evidentiary material.
Summary
25. Prof. Walsh’s Report also analyses archival material released by the
British Public Record Office in 1995 and 1996. He concludes that this provides
“compelling and disturbing support” for the suspicion that the
Tribunal was, as he puts it, “in favour of clearing the Army of any serious
wrongdoing”. There are two sources for this conclusion – a record of a
meeting between the Prime Minister and Lord Chief Justice Widgery and a number
of documents which reveal the important role played by the Secretary to the
Tribunal.
26. The memorandum of the meeting between Prime Minister Heath, Lord
Chancellor Hailsham and Lord Widgery, which occurred at 10 Downing Street on 31
January 1972, records that the Prime Minister advised that the Inquiry had no
precedent as to its subject, “nor perhaps was it the sort of subject that
those who designed the 1921 Act originally had in mind”. He stated further
that it followed that “the recommendations on procedure made by Lord Salmon
might not necessarily be relevant in this case.” The Prime Minister also
advised Lord Widgery that “it had to be remembered that we are in Northern
Ireland fighting not only a military war but a propaganda war”. Finally,
the Lord Chancellor suggested “that the Treasury Solicitor would need to
brief Counsel for the army.” As Walsh points out, “it would be
difficult to imagine a more clear-cut conflict of interest than having a
solicitor to an independent Tribunal briefing Counsel for the very party whose
actions were supposed to be investigated by that Tribunal.”
27. While it was to be expected that W.J. Smith as Secretary to the Tribunal
would provide valuable assistance to Lord Widgery throughout the Tribunal,
recently published material has provided evidence of the disproportionate and
apparently prejudicial influence exerted by him. The material suggests that his
influence was substantial, was taken on board by Lord Widgery and tended
throughout to favour a version exonerating the Army:
– The Secretary identified discrepancies in the different statements given
by Soldier F, which he stated Lord Widgery should “deal with”. The
Secretary noted that later Lord Widgery accepted this point.
– He added in comments favourable to the Army in the summing up by Counsel
for the Tribunal and offered drafts to Lord Widgery, again favourable to the
Army, with regard to the supposed weapons used by the protesters.
– He provided a draft to Lord Widgery of the final point of his conclusions
to the effect that there was no general breakdown in discipline among the Army
and further apportioning blame to those in Northern Ireland “who
systematically employ violence to try to make their views prevail”. He
also made suggestions for strengthening the conclusions.
28. Prof. Walsh’s concerns in this regard focus on two issues. Firstly, that
this influence by the Secretary was not evident to those involved in the
Tribunal (other than those working directly with Lord Widgery). Secondly, the
obvious conclusion is that the Secretary would appear to be primarily motivated
by a desire to present the Army’s case in a more favourable light. On this
basis, the Tribunal failed to deliver on its obligation to be totally impartial
in ascertaining and presenting the full truth of what happened.
29. Prof. Walsh believes that the phrase ‘LCJ will pile up the case against
the deceased’ “could be interpreted as evidence that the Lord Chief Justice
himself was intent on presenting the case against the deceased in the strongest
possible terms; i.e. that he was consciously biased in favour of the Army.”
At the least, Walsh writes, it “suggests that Lord Widgery innocently, and
presumably under the influence of the Secretary’s memo, adopted an unfair
approach to the presentation of evidence upon which he based his
conclusions.” Prof. Walsh submits that “this appearance is sufficient
in itself to impugn the credibility of the Tribunal’s Report.”
New Material?
30. As it is based on archival documents, this is new material only in the
sense that it is new to the public. However, it does shed new light on the
establishment and operation of the Inquiry. In that it was private, available
only to the Tribunal and not to Counsel for the next of kin, it could in that
sense also be considered new. It cannot be ruled out that further archival
material may emerge which would throw further light on the circumstances and
conduct of the Tribunal and, indeed, on the events of Bloody Sunday itself.
Significance
31. The archival material on the circumstances of the establishment of the
Tribunal and its operation supports suggestions of a bias in favour of
exonerating the Army. It reinforces the belief that the Tribunal accepted
evidence supporting the Army’s version of events while frustrating the
presentation of other crucial evidence contradicting that version and supporting
that offered by civilians. It would be reasonable to assume that the effort to
“pile up the case against the deceased” is a sinister phrase
indicative of a bias against them. This interpretation is clearly borne out by
the Report itself as emerges later in this assessment.
Transcript of Statements by Para AA
Summary
32. Portions of two transcripts of statements by Para AA (name supplied),
purporting to be his account of service with the anti-tank platoon of 1st
Battalion, Parachute Regiment in Northern Ireland in 1971-72 [and giving his
service no. (supplied)] were forwarded by a journalist, Mr. Tom McGurk, to the
Government on 26 February 1997. The contents of the transcripts are grim and, at
points, grisly. They allege that members of Para AA’s unit engaged in the
robbery, beatings (“beastings”), torture, mutilation and murder of
civilians in Northern Ireland. On Bloody Sunday, they allege that the anti-tank
platoon of Support Company had, on the previous day, been encouraged by its
Lieutenant to get some “kills”, that they had their own supply of
ammunition, that they used dum-dum bullets on the day, that Paras deliberately
shot at unarmed civilians in Rossville Street, that named members of the
anti-tank platoon entered Glenfada Park and that Para AA witnessed some of them
unlawfully kill four demonstrably unarmed civilians there, including at least
one who was already wounded, that soldiers lied to the Tribunal and that members
of the Tribunal altered Para AA’s statement so that it “bore no relation to
fact and [I] was told with a smile that this is the statement I would use when
going on the stand.”
Publication
33. Portions of the material relating to Bloody Sunday were published on 16
March last by the Sunday Business Post. On Tuesday, 18 March, Channel Four News
broadcast an interview with a paratrooper in which he said that “shameful
and disgraceful acts” were committed, that there was no order to fire to
his knowledge, and that the Widgery Tribunal staff tended to ignore what he said
which was not in accord with the line they wished to take, took his statement
away and returned with another version. In the course of the programme, a
reporter outlined a sequence of events in Glenfada Park which bears similarities
with the account given in the Para AA document. The similarities between the
account given by Para AA and the albeit less explicit account by the paratrooper
to Channel Four are striking. It is not unlikely that the author of the
transcript and the paratrooper who appeared on the Channel Four programme are
one and the same, though this has not yet been established.
Authenticity
34. If Para AA does come forward and claim authorship, then the authenticity
of the document can be conclusively established. Additional information may come
to light, such as to whom the interviews, accounts or transcripts were given (if
anyone), who transcribed the document, who has been in possession of copies and
who passed a copy to Mr. McGurk. Obviously that would not establish that the
contents are factually accurate. However, given the volume of verifiable facts
within the document, this question can presumably be answered at least in part
through either research or official confirmation by the British authorities.
35. It should also be noted that incidents described in the Para AA document
reflect the contents of the civilian eyewitness statements published by Don
Mullan and those contained in Irish Government files. The account given by Para
AA of what happened in Glenfada Park is eerily similar, albeit from the
soldier’s perspective, to that offered by the NICRA/NCCL eyewitness statements.
36. One claim in the document appears to have been verified: Para AA claimed
in it that he was given the number 027 for the purpose of giving statements to
the Widgery Tribunal. In the soldiers’ statements made to the authorities and
recently released by the British Public Record Office, there is in fact a
statement by a soldier with the number 027. The account provided by 027 appears
to correspond closely to that described in the Para AA document.
Significance
37. If the transcript is authenticated, then it represents the most
significant new evidence yet to come to light regarding the actions of soldiers
on the ground during Bloody Sunday, particularly what happened in Glenfada Park,
and the nature of the Widgery Tribunal. The allegation that Counsel for the
Tribunal fabricated evidence, if verified, would represent a fatal blow to the
Tribunal’s credibility.
38. In the transcript, Para AA states that an original statement was torn up
by the staff of the Tribunal and another statement taken. In the records
released by the British Public Record Office and used as the basis for Professor
Walsh’s report, there is a statement by a soldier 027 which tallies with
information given in the Para AA document. Significantly, the
“approved” version by 027 contains the following alternative version
of what happened in Glenfada Park:
“I was a short distance behind them [soldiers E, F, G, and H] and as
they went out of my view round the corner I heard several SLR shots. I cannot
say who fired and neither can I say what target they engaged. However, as I
reached the corner of the building I saw a crowd of about 40 civilians at the
far end of the park. They appeared to be leaving through an exit in the NW
corner of the area. Then I saw a male civilian in his early twenties wearing
blue clothing and with long hair lighting something in his hand. I then heard
someone say drop it but I do not know who said that or whether it was directed
at the youth holding the petrol bomb. As he attempted to throw the bomb ‘E’
knelt and fired at the youth at an estimated range of 20 metres. I saw the youth
fall to the ground as the petrol bomb exploded near by.”
39. This is in startling contrast to the version presented in the transcript.
It removes Para AA/027 from view and introduces a threatening civilian, armed
with a petrol bomb, to justify his killing. 027 was never called to give
testimony by Lord Widgery who relied on the testimony of the four soldiers who
actually fired i.e. the implicated soldiers.
40. If the Para AA document is authentic, then it appears that another
British Army witness was available and potentially willing to state what he saw
if encouraged to do so by the Widgery Tribunal rather than be presented with a
fabricated exculpatory account as claimed in the Para AA document.
41. Para AA’s claim that each soldier had a personal supply of bullets
appears to accord with eyewitness statements on the volume of fire and, if
verified, makes something of a mockery of Lord Widgery’s apparent assiduousness
in accounting for rounds expended. The use of dum-dum bullets was and is
contrary to the Geneva Convention. The claim that dum-dums were fired appears to
accord with the nature of the wound inflicted on at least one of the victims in
Rossville Street, Bernard McGuigan.
42. There are other disturbing indications in the Para AA transcript which
suggest that the level of excessive – not to say lethal – force was sanctioned
by the British Army i.e. the briefing by the officer commanding the unit on the
previous day seeking some “kills”, the degree of aggression and
expectation that the unit was about to engage the IRA and the presence on the
ground of what appears to have been plain-clothes British operatives and a
“P.R.” man. It has long been suggested that the presence on the day in
Derry of the officer commanding land forces in Northern Ireland, General Ford,
indicated that the British Army had planned a more significant operation than
mere containment and arrest. If true, the Para AA account would clearly suggest
that elements of 1 Para were intent on more than arrest and containment.
Summary
43. In his introduction to Eyewitness Bloody Sunday, Don Mullan draws
particular attention to the trajectory of the wounds of three of the victims
(William Nash, Michael McDaid and John Young), all killed at the Rossville
Street barricade. He notes that Dr. John Press, who carried out all the post
mortem examinations on 31 January, recorded that the trajectory of the wounds of
all three victims were 45 degrees to the horizontal plane. Mullan says that as a
lay person, it seemed “highly unlikely that a cluster of ten to twelve
bullets, fired from any one of seven soldiers (as Lord Widgery would have us
believe), all of varying heights in varying firing positions and all at ground
level, could have produced such remarkably similar 45 degree downward
trajectories.”
44. Appendix 3 to the book contains a statement from Dr. Raymond McClean of 6
November 1996 which states that “the conclusion to be drawn from the
forensic evidence, allied to the eyewitness account [i.e. that of Denis
McLaughlin], suggests the likelihood that William Nash was killed by a bullet
fired from the vicinity of the Derry Walls.”
New Material?
45. The post mortem results are not new and were available to the Tribunal.
However, McClean’s statement of 6 November 1996 is new in that it combines the
medical evidence with the eyewitness evidence that shots were fired from the
Walls. It is the combination of eyewitness evidence, recent statements by
witnesses believed to be soldiers and medical evidence such as that indicated by
Dr. McClean, that opens again the question of who shot and killed a number of
the victims and from where.
Significance
46. This material is significant in that it directly contradicts the findings
of the Widgery Report relating to a number of deaths. It highlights the failure
of the Tribunal to consider the medical evidence in and of itself. The Tribunal
determined that all the Army shots were fired by the soldiers advancing up
Rossville Street toward the barricade and at targets facing them rather than
fleeing. Evidence which suggested that the shots were fired from any other
direction was therefore discounted, irrespective of its merits. In that respect,
Lord Widgery either disregarded or failed to explore fully the medical evidence
given by Dr. John Press (Assistant State Pathologist) on the trajectory of the
wounds of the three fatalities at the Rossville Street barricade. Furthermore,
Lord Widgery failed to call Dr. McClean to testify despite the obvious and
possibly critical contribution he could have made regarding the medical
evidence. If shots were fired from the Walls, then the medical evidence from the
bodies of Nash, McDaid and Young would appear to correlate with such shots. The
Tribunal failed, therefore, to provide a full or credible account for the deaths
of a number of the victims.
47. If the Mullan thesis is correct that shots were indeed fired from the
Walls and hit and possibly killed a number of the victims of Bloody Sunday, then
on this point alone the Widgery Report must be characterised as incomplete and
inherently flawed. Furthermore, since it would conflict with the professed
intention of the British Army to mount an arrest operation, firing from the
Walls would profoundly alter perceptions about what happened on Bloody Sunday.
48. The full disclosure of all relevant medical records regarding the victims
(dead and wounded) would undoubtedly help clarify many of the outstanding
questions regarding the direction from which shots were fired.
New Ballistics Information
Summary
49. In his introduction to Eyewitness, Bloody Sunday, Don Mullan records his
discussion with Robert Breglio, an independent ballistics consultant who had
spent twenty five years as a detective in the New York Police Department’s
ballistics squad. Having reviewed photographs, statements and inquest reports,
Mr. Breglio stated that it was his opinion that “the angles of trajectory
of bullet wounds of three deceased named: William Nash, John Young and Michael
McDaid, originated from an area in the vicinity of Derry Walls and from a height
that would inflict wounds of this angle trajectory (sic).”
50. Having undertaken further field research, Mr. Breglio published his
conclusions in March 1997. He arrived at the following conclusion:
(That impact marks on the gable at the entrance to Glenfada Park and
Rossville Street) were made by being struck by high velocity projectiles that
were fired from a high powered weapon. The trajectory of these projectiles is
incoming from east to west and probably a north west direction. I will
conclude that in my professional opinion these projectiles were fired from a
position located up in the area of Derry Walls.
51. The Breglio Report also contains a medical report by Dr. Raymond McClean
which states that:
- The conclusion to be drawn from the forensic evidence, allied to theeyewitness accounts, suggests the likelihood that William Nash was killed bya bullet fired from the vicinity of Derry Walls. There is also thepossibility that Michael McDaid and John Young may have been shot from asimilar firing position.
- The similarity of the trajectory lines through the three bodies wouldsuggest that this was not haphazard shooting from different soldiers, atdifferent angles, at ground level. The evidence as established wouldindicate that these men were shot from a location above them, and possiblyby a marksman or marksmen, firing from the same position.
52. In a Channel Four News broadcast on 17 January 1997, Dr. Hugh Thomas, a
consultant surgeon at Prince Charles Hospital (Merthyr Tydfil, Wales), stated
the following:
53. These shots could only have come from a higher level. It would be almost
impossible for those three men in the few seconds available to them to bend to
exactly the same angle and face exactly the same way and be shot in exactly the
same fashion. It would be extraordinary and almost unheard of. So, I would say
definitely not.
New Material?
54. This clearly constitutes new evidence from three eminent and independent
expert sources. It suggests that other relevant evidence exists within official
British archives which could help resolve the questions raised about shooting
from elevated positions.
Significance
55. The significance of this material can be judged by the fact that new
ballistics evidence would be regarded as sufficient to warrant an appeal in a
criminal conviction.
56. In terms of the Widgery Report, it would mean that a significant portion
of it would have to be dismissed (e.g. in terms of its accounts of the deaths of
some of the victims and its version of events at the Rossville Street barricade)
and, further, that an area of significant activity on the part of the British
Army in the vicinity of the Walls was simply ignored in the official version of
events.
57. In confirming the value and veracity of the civilian eyewitness accounts,
this material reinforces the concerns regarding the balance of treatment
afforded to eyewitnesses as between civilian and military. Had Lord Widgery been
so minded, he could have explored the full potential of the ballistics, medical
and forensic evidence to help him decide between the veracity of the various
contending eyewitness accounts. That he failed to do so – even to the point of
not calling medical expert witnesses, such as Dr. McClean, or of ignoring their
testimony, such as Dr. Press, both of whom were present at the post mortem
examinations – allowed him to avoid drawing what is now the obvious conclusion,
that the ballistics, medical and forensic evidence corroborated the version of
events presented by the civilian eyewitnesses rather than that offered by the
implicated soldiers and other military witnesses.
Summary
58. James A.W. Porter recorded British Army and RUC radio messages on 30
January. Despite their obvious relevance, they were ruled inadmissible as
evidence by Lord Widgery on the grounds that they had been obtained illicitly.
Mr. Porter has made copies of these tapes and transcripts available to the
Government. As Don Mullan points out, these messages indicate that the British
Army was in fact firing from the Walls. He also points out that “nowhere in
the transcripts is there any report of nail bomb or petrol bomb
explosions.”
New Material?
59. This is not new material in that its existence was known to the Tribunal.
Significance
60. The significance of these intercepts is problematic. On the one hand they
recorded contemporaneous British Army and RUC messages which make clear that
shots were fired from Derry Walls. In conjunction with other new material, it
would appear to provide additional evidence not considered by Lord Widgery
though clearly available to him at the time. Yet the messages were relayed
openly and were known therefore to be liable to interception and recording. This
raises the possibility that they may have been used to convey misinformation
e.g. that shots were fired at the Walls, to which shots were returned.
Furthermore, the messages in themselves do not reflect in a convincing or
complete way the events as they unfolded. This is partially explained by the
fact that operational messages had been switched to the secure link. It is the
log of exchanges on the secure link which would provide a much clearer picture
of the British Army’s movements and actions on the ground. If the radio messages
were used to convey misinformation on fire at the security forces, then it is
difficult to invoke them as proof that fire was actually returned from the Army
on the Walls. The significance of the radio intercepts may rest therefore in
being an example of deliberate misinformation about coming under fire rather
than in what they purport to relate about actual events.
61. Nonetheless, Lord Widgery’s decision, on indeterminate legal grounds,
that these intercepts were illicitly obtained seems perverse. They clearly had
some relevance, for example in raising for further consideration the possibility
of British Army fire from the vicinity of the Walls or in demonstrating the
possible significance of other radio messages such as those on the secure link.
The failure to consider the intercepts underlines the significance of the
absence of any consideration by Lord Widgery of the actions and intent of
British Army units on duty at and around the Walls and believed responsible for
shots, some of which may have been fatal to a number of innocent civilians. They
further underline his failure to convincingly account for the intentions and
actions of British Army units not involved in the arrest operation but evidently
involved in the events of Bloody Sunday.
Summary
62. On 17 January 1997, Channel Four News broadcast a major investigative
report, drawing on eyewitness statements, the Porter intercepts and the opinion
of a medical expert, Dr. Thomas, in which it was asserted that the British Army
fired from the Walls and from that position a marksman hit and killed Young,
Nash and McDaid.
63. On 29 January 1997, Channel Four News reported that as a result of the
broadcast of 17 January 1997, a former soldier with the Royal Anglian Regiment
had come forward and, while he refused to be identified or filmed, confirmed
that shots were fired from the vicinity of the Walls and that hits were claimed
by at least one Army sniper in a derelict terrace adjacent to the Walls who, he
said, shouted “He’s got a gun….Bloody hell, I’ve got two with three
shots.” He also thought it possible that in the confusion the British Army
sniper fired without being fired upon.
New Material?
64. This is clearly new material. Whether it will constitute new evidence
will turn on whether those making the statements to Channel Four are prepared to
come forward.
Significance
65. This material, if and when its source were to come forward and confirm
this account, would be highly significant evidence that British Army snipers
fired from around the Walls and claimed hits. It would considerably boost the
argument that the Widgery Report failed to account for a significant aspect of
the killings and the possibility that some deaths were as a result of fire from
soldiers other than the paratroopers.
Testimony of Soldiers on Derry Walls
Summary
66. Don Mullan has examined statements recently released by the British
Public Record Office made by four soldiers who were stationed on Derry’s Walls
which appear to confirm that snipers were positioned on or near the Walls
overlooking the Bogside. He examines claims in these statements that shots were
fired at the Walls and concludes that these are not credible. For example, in
three of the soldiers’ testimonies there is no mention of coming under civilian
fire. Soldier 156 claimed that two bullets struck the Walls at 4.15 pm which he
presumed to have come from St. Columb’s Wells. Mullan dismisses this as
“fantasy” since the crowd assembling at this time in the area of the
supposed gunmen remained relaxed. Had a gunman, he argues, been operating, the
mood would have been very different. Mullan asks whether the three sniper shots
fired from the derelict houses near the Walls, as related by soldier 156, might
have hit Young, Nash and McDaid.
New Material?
67. While this material was available to the Tribunal, it was not available
to the Counsel for the next of kin or to the public.
Significance
68. Its significance lies in the fact that it may help to confirm from
British Army sources that shots were in fact fired from the vicinity of the
Walls. However, the testimonies of the soldiers were completely unreliable in
numerous instances and any faith in them as accurate source material is highly
suspect. Given their unreliability, clear corroboration is required. At least in
terms of these testimonies and what they say of fire returned from the vicinity
of the Walls by the British Army, there now exists corroboration from other
sources of evidence as already described here.
The Widgery Report and the New Material
The Widgery Report and the ‘New’ Material
69. The following is a deconstruction of the Widgery Report, drawing on the
different sources of new material already outlined. Its purpose is to assess, on
the basis of a prima facie examination, the significance of the new material for
the credibility of the Widgery Report (extracts of which are reproduced in
italics).
Terms of Reference
Para 2. The terms of reference of the Inquiry were as stated in the
Parliamentary Resolutions and the Warrants of Appointment. At a preliminary
hearing on 14 February I explained that my interpretation of those terms of
reference was that the Inquiry was essentially a fact finding exercise, by which
I meant that its purpose was to reconstruct, with as much detail as was
necessary, the events which led to the shooting of a number of people in the
streets of Londonderry on the afternoon of Sunday 30 January. The Tribunal was
not concerned with making moral judgements; its task was to try to form an
objective view of the events and the sequence in which they occurred. The
Tribunal would therefore listen to witnesses who were present on the occasion
and who could assist in reconstructing the events from the evidence of what they
saw with their own eyes or heard with their own ears. I wished to hear evidence
from people who supported each of the versions of the events of 30 January which
had been given currency.
70. In light of the new material, virtually all of the main points of this
paragraph are open to contradiction. Not all of the relevant facts available to
the Tribunal were taken into account. Nor were the facts which were dealt with
by the Tribunal considered adequately or in a balanced way. The determination of
what was and was not a fact was highly questionable. A precise reconstruction
with necessary and germane detail was not attempted and in the case of Glenfada
Park avoided. The Tribunal did not visit the scene of any of the shootings.
71. Lord Widgery failed to adhere to his stricture not to make moral
judgements. Time and again throughout the Report, he pronounced at length on the
nefarious motives of elements within the civil rights march
(“hooligans” aiding and abetting the IRA) and the honourable motives
of the soldiers (“the intention of the senior Army officers to use 1 Para
as an arrest force and not for offensive purposes was sincere” and
“there is no reason to suppose that the soldiers would have opened fire if
they had not been fired upon first.”). Lord Widgery did, then, make
“moral” judgements, most significantly in his first conclusion that no
deaths would have occurred “if those who organised the illegal march had
not thereby created a highly dangerous situation in which a clash between
demonstrators and the security forces was almost inevitable.”
72. Where there were conflicts in the evidence, the Report persistently
supported the version offered by the soldiers involved in firing and whose
interests in concealment were obvious rather than those with greater claims to
objectivity (e.g. civilian eyewitnesses, journalists, ex-service men, soldiers
and officers who were not implicated). In failing to reveal the inconsistencies
and alterations in the earlier statements of the soldiers, the Tribunal
prejudicially sustained the credibility of the testimony offered by the soldiers
at the Inquiry and thereby actively aided the presentation of a misleading
version of events.
73. Despite Lord Widgery’s emphasis on the importance of eyewitnesses, the
Tribunal failed to give substantive consideration to the eyewitness statements
taken and submitted by the NICRA/NCCL. Lord Widgery did not call even a
significant minority of the hundreds of civilian eyewitnesses who made known
through their NICRA/NCCL statements the relevance of what they had witnessed and
the fact that they were prepared to testify (or even those few witnesses deemed
by his staff worthy of giving testimony). Nor did he call many witnesses who
were demonstrably relevant to his Inquiry and who could have assisted in a
reconstruction of what happened, most notably six of those wounded and prepared
to testify.
Para 3. I emphasised the narrowness of the confines of the Inquiry, the
value of which would largely depend on its being conducted and concluded
expeditiously. If considerations not directly relevant to the matters under
review were allowed to take up time, the production of the Tribunal’s Report
would be delayed. The limits of the Inquiry in space were the streets of
Londonderry in which the disturbances and the shooting took place; in time the
period beginning with the moment when the march first became involved in
violence and ending with the deaths of the deceased and the conclusion of the
affair.
Para 4. At the first substantive hearing I explained that the emphasis on the
importance of eye witnesses did not exclude evidence such as that of
pathologists. Nor did it exclude consideration of the orders given to the Army
before the march. The officers who conceived the orders and made the plans,
including those for the employment of the 1st Battalion of the Parachute
Regiment, would appear before me.
74. The salient points of these paragraphs are all open to question. The
value placed by Lord Widgery on an expeditious Inquiry is simply not explained.
If it was a genuine consideration and if it was the genuine reason for the
short-cuts taken by Lord Widgery (such as the failure to consider the NICRA/NCCL
statements), it was a profound error of judgement since it resulted in
frustrating the primary purpose of the Inquiry as defined by Lord Widgery
himself. It is impossible to accept any argument that eyewitness statements,
including by those wounded, were not directly and indeed crucially relevant to
the matters under review. As Prof. Walsh points out, the Scarman Tribunal of
Inquiry took ten times longer than the Widgery Inquiry, despite the fact that
Lord Widgery was investigating far more serious incidents.
75. In light of the new material, setting the limits in space as those
streets in which the disturbances and the shooting took place, now emerges as a
fundamental error. The new material strongly suggests that shots were fired from
the vicinity of Derry Walls which possibly resulted in deaths and/or injuries in
the area of the Rossville Street barricade. The Report, by its own unduly
restricted interpretation of the terms of reference of the Inquiry, failed to
account for a major and directly relevant aspect of the events of that day. It
should also be noted that many of the eyewitness statements at the time attested
to shots having been fired from the vicinity of Derry Walls.
76. Lord Widgery’s limit in time is extraordinary, not least in that it was
not adhered to in the Report itself. It was breached when Lord Widgery set an
extensive and partisan context to the situation in which the march occurred but
which failed to mention internment, the very reason for the march and a major
factor which had contributed to the deterioration in relations between the
nationalist community and the security forces. Yet Lord Widgery observed the
limit when he failed to thoroughly examine the role the civil and military
authorities played in planning and organising the response of the security
forces to the march. He abstained from tracing the origins of the Operation
Order which purported to define the British Army’s plan for its activities that
day (including the provision for an arrest operation by 1 Para) despite his own
acknowledgement that the final decision on it was taken by a higher authority
than General Ford and the Chief Constable. This failure is all the more
remarkable when one considers that the Report concludes that had the arrest
operation not been launched, “the day might have passed without serious
incident”.
77. The limitation in time has now been further called into question by the
Para AA document which alleges that 1 Para were given a briefing by a Para
Lieutenant on the day before the march which encouraged the soldiers to
“get some kills”. The nature of this alleged briefing and whether, for
example, it formed part of a military operation to flush out and destroy members
of the IRA, goes to the heart of the British Army’s role in the events of Bloody
Sunday. The allegation, the source from which it comes, the context in which the
Operation Order and the inclusion of 1 Para arose, and the failure of 1 Para to
adhere to its role and area of activity as defined by that Order, are matters
which fundamentally undermine the efficacy of Lord Widgery’s approach in his
Report.
Choice of Location
Para 5. My original intention was to hold the Inquiry in
Londonderry…..For reasons of security and convenience I reluctantly concluded
that other possibilities would have to be considered…..I decided on Coleraine.
78. The emergence of archival material relating to the establishment of the
Widgery Inquiry has now given rise to important questions regarding the
political influence which may have been brought to bear on the nature of the
Inquiry itself and thus by implication on the Report. The release from archival
sources of a record of the meeting between Prime Minister Heath, Lord Hailsham
and Lord Widgery raises important questions about the degree of political
direction of the Inquiry from its outset.
79. According to the report of the meeting, the Prime Minister suggested that
the subject matter of the Inquiry was unprecedented and that therefore it might
not be “the sort of subject that those who had designed the 1921 Act
originally had in mind. It followed that the recommendations on procedure made
by Lord Salmon might not necessarily be relevant in this case.” Since any
matter requiring a Tribunal of Inquiry is almost by definition unprecedented, it
is unclear why the Prime Minister should stress the uniqueness of Lord Widgery’s
task. However, the Prime Minister’s suggestion that consequently the
recommendations of Lord Salmon “might not necessarily be relevant in this
case” is disturbing since the Salmon recommendations contained in the 1966
Report of the Royal Commission on Tribunals of Inquiry, as Prof. Walsh points
out, specifically addressed the problem that an Inquiry’s “inquisitorial
approach will result in serious allegations being made against an identifiable
individual during the proceedings, without that individual being afforded a
realistic opportunity to answer those allegations and generally defend his
reputation.” The failure to comply with the Salmon recommendations and
protect the reputations and character of the victims, through adequate and fair
legal representation, remains one of the enduring sources of grief and pain to
the relatives as well as being inherently unfair. This failure appears to have
originated, at least to some extent, from a suggestion by the Prime Minister. As
such, it suggests that a central feature of the Inquiry arose in a political
rather than legal context; and that the independence of the Inquiry was
compromised by political considerations from its outset.
80. The Prime Minister placed heavy and repeated emphasis on a speedy
outcome. Lord Widgery by his own account similarly emphasised the need for
expedition. Thus the speed with which the Inquiry was concluded, ultimately so
corrosive to a proper examination of all relevant evidence, again appears to
have arisen from political considerations offered at the highest levels.
81. The Prime Minister notes that “it had to be remembered that we were
in Northern Ireland fighting not only a military war but a propaganda war.”
The possible implications of this reference can hardly be benign vis a vis the
objective task of a Tribunal of Inquiry. The sentiment appears to suggest that
the possible outcome of the Inquiry, whatever it might be, had to be viewed in
the context of a propaganda war and the public debate which that entailed. It
suggests that the Inquiry’s outcome was conceived as a potential tool for either
side in that war. If one was fighting a propaganda war, as suggested by the
Prime Minister, a finding that the British Army was culpable for the deaths of
innocent civilians would clearly be unhelpful. Thus just as Lord Widgery
accepted the task allotted to him, he appears to have been explicitly warned
about the implications of a finding against the British Army. Coming from the
Prime Minister, the significance and influence of this advice on Lord Widgery’s
approach, and the officials assigned to the Inquiry, cannot be lightly
dismissed.
82. Lord Widgery himself says that “the Tribunal would be asked to
inquire into what happened, not into motives.” This seems extraordinarily
pre-emptory; by any standard of legal inquiry, motives would be considered
relevant. In fact, Widgery referred repeatedly to motives throughout his Report,
though without seeking to establish a rational basis for his views. His
judgements on motives invariably reflected well on the intentions of the
soldiers despite the evidence against them. He referred, for example, to the
sincerity of the motives behind using 1 Para as an arrest force. He not only
accepted the good intentions of the soldiers in opening fire but used that
assumption as a rationale to discount independent evidence to the contrary. On
the other hand, Lord Widgery assumed the most nefarious of motives on the part
of the civilians involved without establishing any basis for such assumptions.
Had Lord Widgery made an investigation of motives a clear objective as it
properly was and not taken such a pre-emptory stand, he might have approached
the Inquiry with greater consistency and balance on this critical point.
83. Lord Widgery also says that “it would help if the Inquiry could be
restricted to what actually happened in those minutes when men were shot and
killed; this would enable the Tribunal to confine evidence to
eyewitnesses.” With these words, Lord Widgery appeared to have decided from
the outset to limit the scope of the Inquiry to the events themselves, not to
investigate in any meaningful way how those events came about and not to
determine who might or might not have been responsible for decisions which
contributed to the killings other than those on the ground at the time of the
shootings. Furthermore, Lord Widgery appeared to have decided that eyewitnesses
– civilian versus military – would set the confines for the Inquiry’s
deliberations. That enabled him later to more readily dismiss crucial
corroborative evidence of a technical kind, most notably ballistics and medical
evidence. These were extraordinarily pre-emptory decisions.
84. Lord Chancellor Hailsham suggests a purpose for the Inquiry which appears
to be pre-emptive: “whether the Troops shot indiscriminately into a crowd
or deliberately at particular targets in self-defence.” Posing the purpose
of the Inquiry, which had yet to be established, in such stark and restrictive
terms clearly ruled out other possibilities, such as deliberately shooting at
targets but not in self-defence as appeared to many to have occurred or shooting
as part of a “flush out and destroy” operation referred to by Lord
Widgery himself in his Report. Since it is evident from the Report that the Lord
Chancellor’s view becomes the central and essential purpose of the Inquiry, one
can reasonably suggest that it was, self-evidently, an influential one.
85. The Prime Minister said that “it would have to be decided where the
Tribunal should sit. It probably ought to be somewhere near Londonderry; but the
Guildhall, which was the obvious place, might be thought to be on the wrong side
of the River Foyle. One possibility would be to fix a suitable meeting place a
little distance away from Londonderry.” Why there might be a “wrong
side” is not explained. However, it is clear that the Prime Minister
successfully steered Lord Widgery from siting the Tribunal in Derry itself,
despite Lord Widgery’s own comment to him that he thought it should be held
there “so that people were not inhibited from giving evidence”. In
other words, a very proper consideration by Lord Widgery was reversed and the
Tribunal’s location coincided with the views expressed from the outset by the
Prime Minister. It is now clear that Lord Widgery’s comment in his Report that
his reasons for not siting the Inquiry in Derry were “for reasons of
security and convenience” was a less than full and convincing explanation.
86. The Prime Minister suggested a departure from the previous practice in
which the Treasury Solicitors had gathered depositions and other evidence in
advance on the grounds that this made for “a long and cumbersome
procedure” and because “it was not clear whether some of the witnesses
who might otherwise give evidence would be prepared to comply with such a
procedure”. This rationale was hardly appropriate or convincing on either
count. That it might prove “long and cumbersome” was hardly a
consideration equivalent to the over-riding need to establish how thirteen
civilians had met their deaths at the hands of the British Army. If there were
doubts about the degree to which relevant eyewitnesses would cooperate, it would
seem more appropriate to attempt to allay those concerns and ensure that the
Tribunal was supplied with all the relevant evidence to properly carry out its
remit. The result of setting aside the previous practice of collating evidence
in advance was that a whole field of information was ignored – information that
would eventually challenge the statements put forward by the implicated members
of the British Army.
87. Despite the serious implications of this decision, the basis for the
Prime Minister’s views were not established or clarified in the record of the
meeting. While the record shows that the Prime Minister noted that it was a
decision for Lord Widgery, the latter replies that “it did not seem to him
to be the sort of Inquiry in which preliminary statements and depositions would
be called for.” The grounds on which Lord Widgery took such a profoundly
important view on the procedure to be followed – with such speed and in
compliance with the Prime Minister – are neither stated nor clear. One is simply
left with the fact that without recorded reasons, Lord Widgery complied with the
view of the Prime Minister on this critical point virtually immediately. It is
clearly open to the interpretation that it arose directly from the Prime
Minister’s suggestion and as such constituted political influence on a crucial
aspect of the Inquiry’s subsequent activities.
88. It is reasonable to assume that other material exists within the British
Government’s archives which would illustrate further the political context in
which the Widgery Inquiry was convened and operated. Until those archives are
released, that context can only be guessed at. However, the record of this
meeting and its self-evident influence on the nature and operation of the
Widgery Inquiry raises important and disturbing questions about untoward
political influence and the ostensible independence of that Inquiry in terms of
its remit, purpose, procedure and location.
Sessions of the Tribunal
Para 6. The witnesses…fell into six main groups: priests; other people
from Londonderry; press and television reporters, photographers, cameramen and
sound recordists; soldiers, including relevant officers; police officers;
doctors, forensic experts and pathologists.
89. Lord Widgery’s reference to “other people from Londonderry” was
a convenient rubric in that he did not claim civilian eyewitnesses, the value of
which he had emphasised at the outset of his report, as a distinct category. Nor
does he clarify that only soldiers – as opposed to NCO’s and officers – who
fired their weapons were called. The new material which has emerged clearly
demonstrates that the sessions of the Tribunal would have been immeasurably
enhanced had the list of witnesses called been as comprehensive as paragraph 6
sought to suggest.
Representation of Relatives’ Interests
Para 7. it was highly desirable that other interests should be represented
at the same level so that cross examination of the Army witnesses should not
devolve on the Counsel for the Tribunal. In the event, this need was met by my
granting legal representation to the relatives of the deceased and to those
injured in the shooting….
90. While Lord Widgery granted legal representation “at the same
level” – though not in accordance with the Salmon recommendations – he did
not accord that representation equal access to all relevant statements and
evidence. The significance of this failure is set out in Prof. Walsh’s study and
detailed throughout this Assessment.
Sources of Evidence
Para 8. The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association collected a large
number of statements from people in Londonderry said to be willing to give
evidence. These statements reached me at an advanced stage in the Inquiry. In so
far as they contained new material, not traversing ground already familiar from
evidence given before me, I have made use of them.
91. The publication of the eyewitness statements in Eyewitness Bloody Sunday
and the report by Prof. Walsh bear directly on this claim and, together,
completely undermine it as both spurious and misleading. In the course of the
Report, Lord Widgery made general references to accusations about the actions of
soldiers and cited six civilian sources on who fired first in the Rossville
Street courtyard. But even here, he did not subject them to any examination or
detailed comparison with the statements which ultimately he chose to accept
(i.e. by the soldiers who fired). Nor did he make that choice on any firm basis
but on a conclusion “gradually built up over the many days of listening to
evidence and watching the demeanour of witnesses under cross-examination.”
Apart from this instance, Lord Widgery did not clarify that the statements were
from civilian eyewitnesses and not as he vaguely termed them “people in
Londonderry”. These are merely “said to be willing to give
evidence” as if there remained any doubt about either the willingness of
civilian eyewitnesses to do so or about the status of the statements as evidence
in and of themselves. Lord Widgery made no reference to the fact that hundreds
of civilian eyewitnesses, in forwarding their statements to the Tribunal,
overcame their considerable reservations, not to say profound scepticism, about
the Inquiry as a proper and fair investigation into Bloody Sunday.
92. Lord Widgery’s statement that the Inquiry was at “an advanced
stage” when the statements were submitted can, on the face of it, be
questioned as more properly a secondary consideration to the actual import of
the statements. However, recently released archival material, published and
treated by both Mullan and Walsh, reveal more disturbing questions. To take one
example, the following points can be made based on an examination of a
memorandum by the Secretary to the Tribunal, W. J. Smith, dated 10 March on the
eyewitness statements:
– The statements were received on 3-4 March and Lord Widgery saw some of
the statements on 9 March: 15 had been brought to his attention. Since the
first hearing was convened on 21 February, there was hardly a sufficient time
lapse to justify Lord Widgery’s claim that the statements reached him at an
advanced stage. Furthermore, sessions of the Inquiry continued in Coleraine
until 14 March and further sessions were held in London up to and including 20
March. In other words, the Inquiry was actively involved in public hearings
during and well after the statements had been received. Moreover, by 9 March,
the statements had been sifted and 15 deemed worthy for consideration by Lord
Widgery.
– Lord Widgery was strongly advised by his own staff to take evidence from
some of these potential witnesses. Lord Widgery comments that he had no choice
but to take evidence from all or none. No reasons were recorded for this
view, nor for his judgement as recorded by the memorandum that “he did not
think that the people who wrote them could bring any new element to the
proceedings of the Tribunal” – a view diametrically at odds with his
emphasis in the Report on the value of eyewitnesses and with the fact that
the civilian eyewitnesses directly challenged the versions offered by the
implicated soldiers.
– Smith notes that two of the statements are in conflict with a witness, Ms
Richmond, but are in agreement with the forensic evidence and are deemed by
him “as probably much more reliable”. He comments that it is
important the report “should not include references to the deaths of
these four men [sic: he mentions only three, Gilmore, Doherty and McKinney (G)
but presumably is referring in addition to William McKinney] which could be
criticised as being contradicted by evidence which was available to the
Tribunal but not considered by it.” It is clear here that Smith was less
concerned with taking into account what he deemed more reliable statements and
more concerned with ensuring that the presentation of the case in the Report
be protected from criticism – criticism which by Smith’s own account could be
regarded as valid.
93. The memorandum suggests that the Secretary of the Tribunal appeared more
concerned with how to deal with the problematic existence of the NICRA/NCCL
statements in the Report, and consequently on advising Lord Widgery on how best
to do so, than with their intrinsic merit, implications or possible contribution
to the search for the truth. As Jane Winter of British Irish Rights Watch
comments in her foreword to Eyewitness Bloody Sunday, “the eyewitness
statements, collected with such care and recounted with such pain and terror,
were never given their due or proper consideration by the man bearing the
highest judicial office in the land, who clearly regarded their perusal as of no
great import and a task to be undertaken in the last resort”.
94. In and of itself, the failure to give substantive consideration to these
statements and the failure to call a reasonable number of witnesses
94. In and of itself, the failure to give substantive consideration to these
statements and the failure to call a reasonable number of witnesses from those
who made them to give evidence and thus make their own critical contribution (by
any measure essential but particularly so given the clear conflict of evidence
before the Inquiry) to establishing the facts and reconstructing what happened
constitutes a sufficient basis on which to discount the Widgery Report as
incomplete and unbalanced.
95. Prof. Walsh analyses in detail the significance of this and other
memoranda released by the British Public Record Office which illustrate the
substantive and guiding role of the Secretary to the Tribunal in the drafting
and direction of the Widgery Report. In Prof. Walsh’s assessment, Lord Widgery
accepted and acted upon the Secretary’s suggestions with the implication that
“the Tribunal’s findings have been influenced by arguments that were not
made in the course of its public hearings and tested in cross examination by the
parties affected”. Even more disturbing, Prof. Walsh writes, the impact of
the Secretary’s role was such as to present the British Army’s case “in a
more favourable light than might otherwise have been the case in Lord Widgery’s
drafts.”
96. Both Mullan and Walsh refer to the hand written statement by the
Secretary on one of these memoranda that the Lord Chief Justice “will pile
up the case against the deceased, including the forensic evidence and the
willingness of local people to remove guns, but will conclude that he cannot
find with certainty that anyone of 13 was a gunman”. There is by any
measure a sinister overtone to the notion of piling up the case against the
deceased with the express intention of imputing guilt but avoiding the direct
accusation. It strongly suggests that the Tribunal was motivated by objectives
other than an impartial search for the truth and that a core motive was to sully
the reputation of the victims in defence of the British Army’s actions. It is
difficult to arrive at any other reasonable interpretation of these remarks.
97. Given the ostensible and essential public function of an Inquiry, Prof.
Walsh comments that “there should be no role for the Secretary of the
Tribunal to work behind the scenes, hidden from public view and from Counsel for
the parties and the Tribunal itself, to seek to influence the Tribunal’s
interpretation of the evidence, the substance and presentation of the Report and
the Report’s conclusions. Such actions are hardly compatible with the
obligations placed on the Tribunal and the manner in which they are expected to
be discharged”. He concludes that “by accepting and acting upon the
Secretary’s recommendations, the Tribunal failed to deliver fully on its
obligations to be totally impartial in ascertaining and presenting the full
truth of what happened”. This is not to contest the legitimate role of
officials to advise and assist. However, the weight of the archival material
released thus far strongly suggests that the role assumed by the Secretary was,
on the face of it, prejudicial to a fair and objective outcome.
98. The failure to give substantive consideration to the eyewitness
statements rendered the Widgery Report incomplete and unbalanced. The manner in
which they were approached and the role played by the Secretary to the Tribunal
as detailed by Prof. Walsh support the allegation that the Report lacked
impartiality and transparency. That was widely suspected at the time. The
emergence of this new material now effectively confirms that suspicion.
Sources of Evidence
Para 8. I did not think it necessary to take evidence from those of the
wounded who were still in hospital…..
99. Even on a prima facie basis, there can be little confidence in this
audacious judgement. In light of the publication of the eyewitness statements
which clearly contradict statements by the soldiers, given Lord Widgery’s own
professed confusion about the four deaths in Glenfada Park, and since at the
time it was evident that those wounded could provide invaluable testimony, this
judgement has to be seriously open to the charge that it was self-serving rather
than objective. Lord Widgery’s decision in this regard amounted, frankly, to an
astonishing disregard for what contribution these crucial and indisputably
relevant eyewitnesses might have made to the Inquiry’s knowledge of the events
and actions as they unfolded. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that he
simply did not want to know what they witnessed.
Londonderry: The Physical Background
Para 9. The events with which the Tribunal was primarily concerned took
place on the west bank, and indeed wholly within an area about a quarter of a
mile square, bounded on the north by Great James Street, on the east by Strand
Road, Waterloo Place and the City Wall, on the south by Free Derry Corner and
Westland Street and on the west by Fahan Street West and the Little Diamond.
(Free Derry Corner is the name popularly given to the junction of Lecky Road,
Rossville Street and Fahan Street.) This area….in the north-east corner of the
Bogside district, is overlooked from the south-east side by the western section
of the City’s ancient Walls…
100. The area thus defined by Lord Widgery is now revealed as inadequate by
the emerging evidence that the British Army hit and killed a number of civilians
with shots fired from the vicinity of the Walls. The actions by the British Army
in the vicinity of Derry Walls are simply not dealt with by Lord Widgery despite
evidence from a number of different sources, as detailed by Mullan, available at
the time that firing by the British Army from the vicinity of the Walls into the
Bogside had in fact occurred. Furthermore, in setting such a tight geographical
constraint, Lord Widgery effectively ruled out a search for decisions and
actions on the part of the authorities which materially contributed to Bloody
Sunday, either directly or indirectly, but which were beyond his self-imposed
and restrictive horizons.
Security Background: Events in Londonderry during the previous six months
Paras 10, 11,12. At the beginning of July, however, gunmen appeared and
the IRA campaign began. Widespread violence ensued with the inevitable military
counter-action…the IRA tightened its grip on the district….So the law was
not effectively enforced in the area….At the end of October, 8 Infantry
Brigade…was given instructions progressively to regain the initiative from the
terrorists and reimpose the rule of law…..These operations hardened the
attitude of the community…..so that troops were operating in an entirely
hostile environment…..Many nail and petrol bombs were thrown during these
attacks. Gunmen made full use of the cover offered to them by the gangs of
youths, which made it more and more difficult to engage the youths at close
quarters and make arrests. The Creggan became almost a fortress….The
terrorists were still firmly in control.
101. These paragraphs contain Lord Widgery’s general account of the
circumstances prevailing in Creggan and the Bogside which he characterised as
one in which the IRA remained in control and acted in concert with
“hooligan gangs” to mount attacks on the security forces and were
threatening to expand their control beyond lines established by the security
forces. Army incursions, according to Lord Widgery, were likely to be met with
rioting hooligans giving cover for IRA attacks. As such, the context offered by
him was essentially that promoted by the British Army at the time. It was,
therefore, the view of only one side, that of the British Army, whose actions
the Inquiry had been established to investigate. As a description, it did not
seek to portray the situation as it was seen from the nationalist side, i.e. the
side from which all the victims came.
102. Astonishingly, as one legal commentator has pointed out, there is not a
single mention of internment, (nor for that matter of any political dimension to
the disturbances). Yet it was the imposition of internment on 9 August 1971
which precipitated the escalation of tension, which was a direct cause of the
serious deterioration in relations with the security forces and which was the
reason why there was a march on 30 January. As Prof. Dash pointed out,
“allegations against the military in Northern Ireland of physical brutality
in the treatment of internees were the subject of a highly publicised official
Home Office inquiry under the chairmanship of Sir Edmond Compton.”
103. Lord Widgery, in casting a moral judgement on the organisers of the
march by claiming that they were directly culpable for the deaths, made a
consideration of their motives and intentions a relevant one. Yet that
consideration was patently absent and as such was indicative of the partiality
of the context offered by Lord Widgery. The context offered by Lord Widgery,
rather than being studiously neutral or balanced, becomes in effect an apologia
for the decisions and actions of the authorities in dealing with the march with
such fatal consequences.
104. Lord Widgery did not seek to establish the intentions of the march
organisers and whether they had made bona fide efforts to ensure that there
would be no serious (i.e. IRA) violence accompanying it. He did not investigate
whether their approach had been tempered by the actions of members of the
Parachute Regiment in the violent clashes on Magilligan beach the previous week,
nor whether their anticipation that the Parachute Regiment would be on duty at
the internment march had encouraged them to ensure that the march pass off
peacefully.
105. On the other hand, neither did Lord Widgery seek to establish whether
the British Army’s claim that the IRA would be present was reasonable on the day
in question. He did not seek to establish whether Provisional IRA members and
most Official IRA units were out of the Bogside on Bloody Sunday (as was
believed widely at the time) and whether the British Army might have been aware
of this. Yet these considerations were all germane factors in any assessment of
what actions by the British Army could have been deemed to have been objectively
reasonable. And they were germane by Lord Widgery’s own terms e.g. the emphasis
on who fired first, the degree of danger anticipated by the soldiers and whether
they were justified in firing.
106. As is again made now clear by Don Mullan, the march was organised and
stewarded as a peaceful event and steps had been made to ensure that
paramilitary violence would not precipitate military action and endanger
civilians. This interpretation, known at the time, has never been challenged.
Indeed the very absence of any gunmen among the casualties or those arrested was
in itself a testament to the success of the march organisers in removing the
threat posed by the IRA to the security forces. Herein may lie the tragic folly
of the British Army’s actions and the most problematic issue for it once lethal
force was used against the civilians. Without IRA gunmen posing a significant
and active threat, the actions of the British Army became subsequently difficult
to explain, much less excuse.
Para 13. Early in 1972 the security authorities were concerned that the
violence was now spreading northwards from William Street, which was the line on
the northern fringe of the Bogside on which the troops had for some considerable
time taken their stand…..The local traders feared that the whole of this
shopping area would be extinguished within the next few months…..In the last
two weeks of January the IRA was particularly active. In 80 separate incidents
in Londonderry 319 shots were fired at the security forces and 84 nail bombs
were thrown at them; two men of the security forces were killed and two wounded.
107. This paragraph is inherently partisan in that it again omits any
reference to the march in question and whether it was or was not the intention
of the marchers to attempt to breach the line established by the security forces
at William Street but it implies that that was in fact the case. And it suggests
implicitly that the march was not concerned with demonstration as a political
act but was instead an event staged to precipitate disorder and destruction. The
partiality of this paragraph is further highlighted by the publication of the
eyewitness accounts and the failure of any evidence to emerge over time
validating Lord Widgery’s assessment of the degree of threat represented by the
march.
Para 14. At the beginning of 1972 Army foot patrols were not able to
operate south of William Street by day because of sniper fire…..The hooligan
gangs in Londonderry constituted a special threat to security. Their tactics
were to engineer daily breaches of law and order in the face of the security
forces, particularly in the William Street area, during which the lives of the
soldiers were at risk from attendant snipers and nail bombers. The hooligans
could be contained but not dispersed without serious risk to the troops.
108. The reference to sniper fire south of William Street during the day
appears to function as a rationale for a belief that IRA snipers might be
present on 30 January, that this expectation was a logical one for the Army and
a contributory factor in explaining the actions of individual soldiers on the
ground. However, Lord Widgery at no point attempted to establish whether this
was in fact the case on 30 January and did not examine whether it was a
reasonable or well-founded assumption. But more significantly, in describing an
affinity of purpose between “hooligans” and IRA snipers (i.e. to kill
British soldiers) he suggested that those causing minor disturbances (e.g. stone
throwing) were complicit in the danger, injuries and deaths suffered by British
soldiers at the hands of the IRA. In other words, Lord Widgery clearly defined
“hooligans” as a distinct entity serving as an adjunct of the IRA, and
a successful one at that.
109. Without establishing on an objective factual basis their role in IRA
tactics either generally or on 30 January 1972, Lord Widgery suggested that
anyone throwing a stone or bottle appeared reasonably to the soldiers to be de
facto a hooligan and therefore acting in support of the IRA. The apparent
licence granted post hoc by this rationale to the security forces in dealing
with even modest disturbances was, in those terms, obvious.
Para 15. It was the opinion of the Army commanders that if the march took
place, whatever the intentions of NICRA might be, the hooligans backed up by the
gunmen would take control. In the light of this view the security forces made
their plans to block the march.
110. The new material and the version of events suggested by it is
diametrically at odds with this ill-defined but portentous threat of the
hooligans and gunmen taking control as defined by the Army and presented without
challenge by Lord Widgery in his Report. The eyewitness accounts of the
circumstances in which lethal force was used against civilians completely
undermine the relevance of his description of the role of hooligans, if such a
role ever actually existed, to the events of 30 January. Moreover, it was
clearly not relevant to the events of the day since what disturbances occurred
were minor and there was no evidence to suggest that the role assigned to
hooligans by Lord Widgery existed in fact. This lack of relevance raises further
questions about the presumptions inherent in the context offered by him and why
they formed a part of the Report. It might well be asked why this context was
included in a Report whose remit in time Lord Widgery himself limited to the
moment when the march first became involved in violence. In short, the context
offered by Lord Widgery appears to function less as necessary background and
more as post hoc rationale for the acts of the British Army.
The Army Plan to Contain the March
Para 16. The proposed march placed the security forces in a dilemma. An
attempt to stop by force a crowd of 5,000 or more, perhaps as many as 20 or
25,000, might result in heavy casualties or even in the overrunning of the
troops by sheer weight of numbers. To allow such a well publicised march to take
place without opposition however would bring the law into disrepute and make
control of future marches impossible.
Points 111-150
111. The failure to provide an explanation to support his claim that allowing
the march against internment to proceed would make control of future marches
impossible was particularly cavalier not to say otiose in the circumstances of
the widespread civil unrest being experienced in Northern Ireland at the time.
From the nationalist perspective, the rule of law (i.e. a body of rules
containing individual rights as well as executive powers) was brought into
fundamental disrepute by the introduction of internment, an instrument of
arbitrary State power which effectively dispensed with the law and which was
directed overwhelmingly against nationalists. Had the repute of law been Lord
Widgery’s main concern, he might have alluded just once to the issue of
internment which prompted the march on Bloody Sunday. His facile reasoning was
all the more egregious since it was offered as justification for the ultimately
lethal approach adopted by the authorities toward the march. If, as suggested by
other contemporary sources, there was political involvement in the decision
making process prior to the events of the day which directly affected the
approach of the security forces, then Lord Widgery’s proffered explanation may
have concealed more than it revealed. If a significant degree of prior political
direction can be fully established, then Lord Widgery failed to account for the
actions and decisions of directly relevant and arguably responsible agencies.
Para 17. The final decision, which was taken by higher authority after
General Ford and the Chief Constable had been consulted, was to allow the march
to begin but to contain it within the general area of the Bogside and Creggan
Estate….On 25 January General Ford put the Commander 8 Infantry Brigade in
charge of the operation and ordered him to prepare a detailed plan. The plan is
8 Infantry Brigade Operation Order No 2/72 dated 27 January.
112. This paragraph contains one of the chief mysteries of Bloody Sunday; who
took the “final decision”? Speaking for the British Government at
Westmister on 1 February, 1972, Lord Balniel confirmed that “the arrest
operation was discussed by the Joint Security Council after decisions had been
taken by Ministers here.” While denying that the Widgery Report suggested
political pressure on the British Army, the Prime Minister, speaking in the
House of Commons on the publication of the Report, said that in relation to the
“higher authority” referred to by Lord Widgery, “the plan was
prepared by the Brigade Commander and went to the Commander Land Forces. It also
went to the General Officer Commanding, who discussed it with the Chief
Constable; and it was known to Ministers. That is what I meant by saying that it
was known to higher authority.” Lord Balniel before the Inquiry and the
Prime Minister after the publication of the Report identified, therefore, Lord
Widgery’s “higher authority” as Ministers. On this basis, there was
clearly political sanction for the operation. Despite the acknowledged
involvement by the Stormont and British Governments of the arrest operation in
advance of 30 January, Lord Widgery failed to investigate the facts surrounding
the political influence on the formulation of the British Army’s plan of action
or the political basis on which that plan was sanctioned.
Para 20. Under the heading of “Hooliganism” the Operation Order
provided:
“An arrest force is to be held centrally behind the check points and
launched in a scoop-up operation to arrest as many hooligans and rioters as
possible.”
This links up with the specific task allotted to 1 Para which was in the
following terms:
“1. Maintain a Brigade Arrest Force to conduct a scoop-up operation of
as many hooligans and rioters as possible.
(a) This operation will only be launched either in whole or in part on
the orders of the Brigade Commander.
(b) …………
(c) …………
(d) It is expected that the arrest operation will be conducted on foot.
2. A secondary role of the force will be to act as the second Brigade
mobile reserve.”
113. Lord Widgery omitted the directions for dealing with
“Hooliganism” at (b) and (c). According to the Sunday Times Insight
Team report published in April 1972 and that of Prof. Dash, part (c) of the
Operation Order set out the geographical confines of the operation as follows;
“the scoop up operation is likely to be launched on two axes, one directed
towards hooligan activity in the area of William St./Little Diamond, and one
towards the area of William St./Little James St.” In other words, the order
envisaged activity along William Street and not up Rossville Street. Lord
Widgery’s failure to spell this out was a telling one for it would have
underlined the extent to which the movement of 1 Para had violated the Operation
Order. If they were not following this plan, what plan, it can be legitimately
asked, had they in mind?
Para 21. The Operation Order, which was classified “Secret”,
thus clearly allotted to 1 Para the task of an arrest operation against
hooligans. Under cross-examination, however, the senior Army officers, and
particularly General Ford, were severely attacked on the grounds that they did
not genuinely intend to use 1 Para in this way. It was suggested that 1 Para had
been specially brought to Londonderry because they were known to be the roughest
and toughest unit in Northern Ireland and it was intended to use them in one of
two ways: either to flush out any IRA gunmen in the Bogside and destroy them by
superior training and fire power; or to send a punitive force into the Bogside
to give the residents a rough handling and discourage them from making or
supporting further attacks on the troops.
Para 22. There is not a shred of evidence to support these suggestions and
they have been denied by all the officers concerned. I am satisfied that the
Brigade Operation Order accurately expressed the Brigade Commander’s intention
for the employment of 1 Para and that suggestions to the contrary are unfounded.
1 Para was chosen for the arrest role because it was the only experienced
uncommitted battalion in Northern Ireland.
114. The suspicions that either of these scenarios in one form or another
more accurately reflected the intention of those who deployed 1 Para have never
been quite dispelled and were certainly not put to rest by the Widgery Report at
the time. In fact, the emergence of the new material has reawakened in very
forceful terms suspicions about what was the actual intent of the authorities
and the British Army. The new material repeatedly begs the questions which have
yet to be answered. Why were demonstrably unarmed and innocent civilians shot
dead? Why was there fire from the Walls? Why did the soldiers act with such
brutality generally, even to uniformed members of the Order of Malta trying to
render assistance? Why was 1 Para used for an arrest operation in an area liable
to IRA attack when by Lord Widgery’s own description the Paras “show no
particular concern for the safety of others in the vicinity of the target”?
The suggestions put forward and dismissed by Lord Widgery appear to supply a
more credible answer to these questions than the findings he presented in his
Report.
115. Lord Widgery did not attempt to present a case for his assertion that
there was “not a shred of evidence to support these suggestions” and
was content to simply make this assertion. The argument that 1 Para was the only
experienced uncommitted battalion in Northern Ireland for the arrest operation
was hardly a convincing one. His judgement that the Operation Order accurately
expressed the intention of the officer ostensibly in command, Brigadier
McLellan, vis-a-vis the role of 1 Para did not properly address the concern that
McLellan may not have been party to all of the decisions made regarding 1 Para,
e.g, decisions involving General Ford, Lt. Col Wilford and very possibly
Brigadier Kitson. The actions of members of 1 Para itself, the degree of force
employed (as measured in terms of civilians dead and wounded), the absence of
any injury to security force personnel, and the description of what happened as
presented by highly credible eyewitnesses contrast so starkly with Lord
Widgery’s assertion that 1 Para was deployed as an arrest force that it now
simply lacks credibility.
116. The NICRA/NCCL eyewitness statements raise serious questions about the
commitment of the soldiers to a scoop up and arrest operation. Based on their
accounts, there appears to have been a willingness to employ lethal force on
unarmed civilians – many of whom were fleeing and some of whom were attempting
to assist those already hit by fire. Overwhelmingly, these accounts agree that
the groups amongst whom the victims were shot were not hostile and that the
arrival of 1 Para provoked a sense of panic and a desire to flee the area or
seek shelter from the live ammunition being fired at them. Given the degree of
force used by the soldiers, their area of activity (i.e. outside that defined by
the Operation Order) and the length of time in which 1 Para was deployed, it
appeared that the Operation Order was simply being ignored by the soldiers on
the ground. Possible explanations suggest themselves: members of 1 Para directly
and wilfully ignored their orders to mount an arrest operation and simply ran
amok; they believed their behaviour was in some way sanctioned or deemed
acceptable by the authorities; or their actions formed part of a planned
military operation which has yet to be revealed. It may be, in fact, that all of
these factors were at play in determining the behaviour of the soldiers and
their officers.
117. More specifically, the alleged statements of Para AA include a claim
that the anti-tank unit of 1 Para were directed by a Para Lieutenant (name
supplied) the day before Bloody Sunday to get “some kills”. It alleges
that the Para Lieutenant said “lets teach those buggers a lesson – we want
some kills tomorrow”. The Para AA statement is treated more fully later but
it is relevant to note at this stage that it does not contain any reference to
an arrest operation but tends, in its description of the actions of members of 1
Para, to support the charges laid against General Ford and others which Lord
Widgery had seen fit to dismiss.
118. The description in the Para AA document of the highly aggressive nature
and attitude of members of 1 Para, its function as a trouble shooting unit, its
briefing to “get some kills”, further references about the unit being
used elsewhere in Northern Ireland to draw IRA fire (i.e. “flush out and
destroy”) all add to the mystery of why 1 Para was chosen for what was
ostensibly an arrest operation in a situation where violence might well occur in
the midst of many civilians with the attendant risk to innocent lives.
Para 23. Another unjustified criticism of General Ford was persisted in
throughout the Tribunal hearing. It was said that when heavy firing began and it
became apparent that the operation had taken an unexpected course, the General
made no attempt to discover the cause of the shooting but instead washed his
hands of the affair and walked away. This criticism is based on a failure to
understand the structure of command in the Army. The officer commanding the
operation was the Commander 8 Brigade, who was in his Operations Room and was
the only senior officer who had any general picture of what was going on.
General Ford was present on the streets of Londonderry as an observer only.
Although he had wireless equipment in his vehicle he was not accompanied by a
wireless operator when on foot. When the serious shooting began the General was
on foot in the neighbourhood of Chamberlain Street and had no means of knowing
what was going on. Nothing would have been more likely to create chaos than for
him to assume command or even to interfere with radio traffic by asking for
information. Instead he did the only possible thing by going at once to an
observation post from which he could observe the scene for himself.
119. Whatever about the value of Lord Widgery’s self-imposed ordinance not to
consider the question of who made all decisions relevant to the British Army’s
activities in the lead up to Bloody Sunday, the emergence of new material
revives long standing questions about who contributed to the decision making
process leading up to the operation in Derry and what considerations and
calculations informed that decision. It deepens the concern about the claims of
the involvement – in advance of the date of 25 January cited by Lord Widgery on
which General Ford instructed Brigadier McLellan to prepare Operation Order 2/72
– of Brigadier Kitson, the role of the Northern Ireland Joint Security Council
and, prior to that, of the British Government’s Cabinet Committee on Northern
Ireland. In this context, Lord Widgery’s characterisation of General Ford’s
presence as purely an observer is unconvincing (as is the extraordinary claim
that a request by Ford over the radio for information would of itself have
created chaos).
120. The emergence from the archives of a record of a meeting between the
Prime Minister, the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice which appears to
have occurred on 31 January indicates remarkable speed and, combined with the
specificity of the Prime Minister’s advice to Lord Widgery, also tends to
suggest a degree of political involvement throughout the decision making
process. Since Lord Widgery failed to address this question, it has been left
open to many suspicions and speculations. Undoubtedly, some clarification of
precisely what political involvement there may or may not have been in the
formation of the operational plans prior to Bloody Sunday may lie in the
archives of the British Government and, one can assume, the memory of those who
might have been involved.
121. Combined with the speculation about the nature of political involvement
at the highest levels, the mere fact of General Ford’s presence on the ground in
Derry has long fuelled speculation that more than an arrest operation was afoot.
These were encouraged at the time by the fact that General Ford assigned 1 Para
to the arrest operation and actively encouraged 1 Para in their task on the
ground when their deployment began (in testimony, General Ford said that as he
was standing at barricade 14 when the arrest operation began, he had said
“Go on, 1 Para, go and get them, and good luck”).
122. Another claim has recently come to the Government’s attention regarding
General Ford’s role. This asserts that a British Army officer was debriefed by a
more senior officer on the Widgery Report and implies that the latter was deeply
unhappy with the treatment of Brigadier McLellan in it. In the course of this
debriefing, it was alleged that General Ford played a very active role, contrary
to Lord Widgery’s assertion, in determining the actions of British Army units
and issued instructions without the knowledge or consent of Brigadier McLellan.
It is claimed that General Ford directed British Army fire from the vicinity of
Derry Walls. Broadly speaking, this claim alleges that General Ford was the true
commander of the key British Army units and actions on the ground which resulted
in Bloody Sunday. As with any claims about the chain of command and
responsibility, this particular claim could be checked against official records.
The March as it Happened
Para 24. The marchers assembled on the Creggan Estate on a fine sunny
afternoon and in carnival mood….When in due course they appeared at the west
end of William Street it was obvious that their direct route to the Guildhall
Square lay along William Street itself and that the march would come face to
face with the Army at barrier 14 in that street. At this stage it became
noticeable that a large number of youths, of what was described throughout the
Inquiry as the hooligan type, had placed themselves at the head of the march;
indeed some of them were in front of the lorry itself….nothing of real
consequence occurred until the marchers reached the barriers in Little James
Street and William Street. When the leaders of the march reached the junction of
William Street and Rossville Street the lorry turned to its right to go along
Rossville Street and the stewards made strenuous efforts to persuade the
marchers to follow the lorry. It is quite evident now that the leaders of the
march had decided before setting off from the Creggan Estate that they would
take this course and thus avoid a head-on confrontation with the Army at the
William Street barrier.
123. Lord Widgery’s identification of a large number of youths as hooligans
at this point implicitly recalled his earlier description of rioters as
hooligans acting in concert with IRA gunmen. Without an explicit statement that
this was not the case, there is left the presumption that their role as
“hooligans” would again be similar – i.e. likely to provide cover for
attacks on the security forces by IRA gunmen – and that consequently one could
presume that the IRA were in the vicinity, if not already in their midst. Lord
Widgery did not attempt to establish that either of these presumptions were true
on the day in question or to address the question as to whether the security
forces might have had prior information on this. Rather, the fact that the march
began in carnival mood strongly suggests that those participating in it did not
anticipate attacks of the type described earlier by Lord Widgery; had gunmen
been operating in the area ready to take advantage of rioting, this would have
been very clear to the marchers and the atmosphere could not have been as
relaxed as indeed it was.
124. Furthermore, Lord Widgery asserts as “quite evident now” that
the march organisers had veered up Rossville Street to avoid confrontation at
barrier 14 “before setting off from the Creggan” as if it could not
have been known at the time. This suggests that the decision by the march
organisers to avoid confrontation was not available to the security forces at
the time. Yet Chief Superintendent Lagan had informed the military authorities
of this intention and had confirmed it on the morning of the march; Lagan gave
his account of this in testimony to the Tribunal. Despite this, Lord Widgery
made no reference to these assurances and made no effort to address in his
Report the intentions and plans of the march organisers to avoid confrontation
and ensure that the march passed off peacefully. Nor did he refer to the impact
on the population of the Bogside of the violent behaviour of the Paras toward
anti-internment demonstrators on the beach outside Magilligan Prison a week
beforehand and which had alerted the march organisers to the danger of
disturbances when the Paras were deployed. All of these would appear to be
crucial factors in assessing the events of the day and the
“reasonableness” under law of the actions of the security forces.
Para 25. The films show at least one middle-aged man making some attempt
to move the barrier aside. Had other members of the crowd followed his example,
the results might have been disastrous….. After a time the movement of the
crowd at the rear reduced the pressure on those at the front in William Street
and the crowd in front of the barrier began to thin out somewhat. The hooligans
at once took advantage of the opportunity to start stone-throwing on a very
violent scale. Not only stones, but objects such as fire grates and metal rods
used as lances were thrown violently at the troops in a most dangerous
way….Some witnesses have sought to play down this part of the incident and to
suggest that it was nothing more than a little light stoning of the kind which
occurs on most afternoons in this district and is accepted as customary. All I
can say is that if this in any way represents normality the degree of violence
to which the troops are normally subjected is very much greater than I suspect
most people in Britain have appreciated…..At about 15.55 hours the troops
appeared to be reaching a position in which they might disperse the rioters and
relieve the pressure upon themselves….It was at this point that the decision
to go ahead with the arrest operation, for which 1 Para was earmarked, was made.
125. Again, Lord Widgery failed even to refer to the presence or likely
presence of IRA gunmen at this barricade much less invoke evidence to prove that
the paramilitary tactics so carefully described in his introduction represented
a genuine threat to the British soldiers on the day. Moreover, as McMahon so
pointedly makes clear,
… apart from the irrelevance of his appeal to the knowledge of ‘most
people in Britain’, Lord Widgery’s reluctance to pronounce on the normality or
abnormality of the stoning is remarkable…With such specific knowledge [of
the security situation 1 August 1971 to 9 February 1972 detailed in paragraphs
10 to 15 of the Report] and with the wealth of evidence on the events of the
afternoon of 30 January, it was remarkable that Lord Widgery could not decide,
even in general terms, whether the stone throwing on the afternoon in question
was of abnormal intensity or of a customary kind in this area. This was an
important point in view of the reaction the stoning is supposed to have
triggered.
126. Paragraph 25 is a clear example of Lord Widgery’s tendency, particularly
on critical questions, to avoid making relevant judgements and drawing
appropriate conclusions. This was despite the fact that Chief Superintendent
Lagan fully expected that bottles and stones would be thrown and that it was
almost an everyday event, a view communicated at the time to the military
authorities and attested to in the course of the Inquiry. The evidence of the
NICRA/NCCL statements was that the incident at this barricade was a modest
disturbance representing a relatively low key threat to the security forces by
the standards of the time. This paragraph is also significant in that it clearly
states that by1555 hrs, before 1 Para began its “arrest operation”,
the crisis, such as it was, had passed and the soldiers would shortly be in
position to disperse remaining rioters.
The Launching of the Arrest Operation
Para 26. Since the tactics of the arrest operation were to be determined
by the location and strength of the rioters at the time when it was launched,
the Brigade Order left them to be decided by Lieutenant Colonel Wilford,
Commanding Officer of 1 Para. He had three Companies available for the arrest
operation: A Company, C Company and Support Company, the latter being reinforced
by a Composite Platoon from Administrative Company. (A fourth Company had been
detached and put under command of 22 Light Air Defence Regiment for duties
elsewhere in Londonderry.) In the event these three Companies moved forward at
the same time. A Company operated in the region of the Little Diamond and played
no significant part in the events with which the Inquiry was concerned. C
Company went forward on foot through barrier 14 and along Chamberlain Street,
while Support Company drove in vehicles through barrier 12 into Rossville Street
to encircle rioters on the waste ground or pursued by C Company along
Chamberlain Street. The only Company of 1 Para to open fire that afternoon-other
than with riot guns-was Support Company.
127. In light of the new material’s strong suggestion that there was firing
from the vicinity of Derry Walls, the assertion that only 1 Para opened fire
that afternoon is now open to question. It either means that soldiers other than
1 Para opened fire or that the fourth company of 1 Para on duty elsewhere in
Derry was on the Walls and opened fire. Either way, Lord Widgery failed to
account for the actions of the soldiers around the Walls who, it now seems
clear, opened fire and possibly hit and killed civilians. Since this fundamental
assertion, so critical to cause, effect and culpability, is now open to clear
contradiction, then the Widgery Report by this measure alone is fatally flawed
as an account of what actually happened.
128. This paragraph also proffers some very intriguing questions. Where in
Derry was this fourth company of Paras located? How could it have been spared
since, according to Lord Widgery, 1 Para was the only uncommitted experienced
unit available for the arrest operation? What were its duties? Did this company
contain snipers? Where was the 22 Light Air Defence Regiment and what duties had
it assigned to this fourth company? What duties were assigned to the 22 Light
Air Defence Regiment? What roles and duties were assigned to the other British
Army units which have been identified as probably operating in and around Derry
on that day? Why was Derry under what appeared to be virtual military siege as
attested to by civilians trying to reach it? What role was assigned to each of
these units in the broader plan of coordination and what bearing did this have
on the events of the day? By concentrating primarily on the arrest operation,
Lord Widgery failed to address critical questions about the British Army’s
intentions – questions the significance of which have become all the more
apparent in the light of recent revelations.
129. Furthermore, Lord Widgery writes that “in the event” the three
companies moved forward together. Was this coincidence? Or was it part of a
coordinated movement? The movement of ten vehicles and an organised complement
of soldiers into the Bogside could not have been organised spontaneously. If as
logic dictates it was a coordinated movement, who coordinated it and why? What
was its overall purpose in simultaneously moving along two axes not sanctioned
in the Operation Order? What, in other words, had Lt. Col. Wilford in mind? Lord
Widgery failed to explain this apparent manoeuvre and its purpose and failed to
come to a judgement as to what it might reveal about the British Army’s
intentions. Whatever might be known about what happened on the day, the why
remains to all intents and purposes a mystery.
Para 27. Before the wisdom of the order launching the arrest operation is
considered it is necessary to decide who gave it. According to the Commander 8
Brigade and his Brigade Major (Lieutenant Colonel Steele) the operation was
authorised by the Brigadier personally, as indeed was envisaged in the Brigade
Order. The order for 1 Para to go in and make arrests was passed by the Brigade
Major to the Commanding Officer 1 Para on a secure wireless link, ie one which
was not open to eavesdropping. This link was used because the arrest operation
depended on surprise for its success and it was known that normal military
wireless traffic was not secure. The Commanding Officer 1 Para confirmed that he
received the order and all three officers agreed that the order was in terms
which left the Commanding Officer free to employ all three Companies.
Para 28. During the Inquiry however it was contended that the Brigadier
did not authorise the arrest operation and that it was carried out by Lieutenant
Colonel Wilford in defiance of orders or without orders and on his own
initiative. The suspicion that Lieutenant Colonel Wilford acted without
authority derives from the absence of any relevant order in the verbatim record
of wireless traffic on the ordinary Brigade net. This omission was due to the
use of the secure wireless link for this one vital order, as mentioned in the
previous paragraph.
130. There remain grounds for serious doubt about Brigadier McLellan’s role
in ordering the launch of the arrest operation (logs of the secure transmissions
would clarify this point) and whether in fact he had authorised the use of all
three companies as asserted here by Lord Widgery. Since there was, in fact, no
written record in the brigade log of such an order, Lord Widgery chose to
dismiss the written official record in favour of the oral testimony offered post
hoc by participants, as McMahon points out. This points to a serious flaw in the
Widgery Report on the vital point of who was in command of the British Army
units involved in Bloody Sunday.
131. Clearly the secure link provided the vital conduit for the communication
of orders and suggested that the Army was preparing to encounter a formidable
enemy capable of monitoring its open communications and undertaking counter
measures. To whom was this link available at the time? What messages were
conveyed on it? Furthermore, why were two distinct modes of communication used,
one secure and the other open? The messages on the secure link would appear to
be far more germane to understanding the intentions and actions of the key
British Army units than the messages recorded on the open lines. The Widgery
Report was seriously flawed in not attempting to locate or examine, even in
camera, the logs recording messages given and received on the secure link.
Furthermore, tracing which officers and units were in communication on this
secure link would have allowed for greater clarity as to which officers and
units were responsible for particular actions undertaken, such as the when,
where and why of the use of lethal force.
Para 29. Other circumstances which suggest that 1 Para moved without
orders are less easily explained. The Brigade Log, which is maintained in the
Brigade Operations Room and is a minute by minute record of events and messages,
regardless of the method of communication used, contains the following entries:
“Serial 147,1555 hours from 1 Para. Would like to deploy sub-unit
through barricade 14 to pick up yobbos in William Street/Little James
Street.”
“Serial 159, 1609 hours from Brigade Major. Orders given to 1 Para at
1607 hours for one sub-unit of 1 Para to do scoop-up op through barrier 14.
Not to conduct running battle down Rossville Street.”
Serial 159 is identified by the Brigade Major as recording the Brigadier’s
instruction for 1 Para to move; but its terms are inconsistent with the
employment of three Companies. (a sub-unit is a Company.) Further, the Brigade
Operation Order said that it was expected that the arrest operation would be
conducted on foot and that the two axes of advance were likely to be towards the
areas of William Street/Little Diamond and William Street/Little James Street,
ie the Order did not contemplate the use of Rossville Street as an axis of
advance; and whatever the prohibition of a “running battle down Rossville
Street” was intended to imply it at least suggests that a penetration in
depth at this point was not intended. It has been contended that the Brigade log
shows prima facie that the only action which 1 Para was authorised to carry out
was the limited one for which permission had been sought in the message recorded
in Serial 147. This view is supported by the evidence of Chief Superintendent
Lagan, who was in the Brigadier’s office at the relevant time and who formed the
impression that 1 Para had acted without authority from the Brigadier.
132. Lord Widgery acknowledged that the terms of these orders were
inconsistent with employing three companies and noted the suggestion that
Rossville Street, on the basis of this evidence, was not contemplated as an axis
of advance. However, the new material, which has resurrected suggestions that
something other than an arrest operation was afoot, also adds considerably to
the significance of Brigadier McLellan’s order not to conduct a running battle
up Rossville Street. From this perspective, Brigadier McLellan’s injunction
would have had, at a stroke, frustrated a flush out and destroy operation. Had
Lord Widgery not dismissed the allegations that the actions of the Paras were
more consistent with a flush out and destroy operation than an arrest one, he
would have had to deal more adequately with Brigadier McLellan’s orders as
recorded in the brigade log and particularly his injunction about Rossville
Street. The new material, and the terms in which it describes the actions of the
Paras, resurrects the key question as to what is the most reasonable
interpretation of the written military records and the actions of the soldiers
on the ground.
Para 30. It is understandable that these circumstances have given rise to
suspicion that the CO 1 Para exceeded his orders, but I do not accept this
conclusion in the face of the sworn evidence of the three officers concerned. I
think that the most likely explanation is that when the Brigade Major gave
instructions to the log keeper to make the entry which appears as Serial 159 the
latter mistakenly thought that the order was a response to the request in Serial
147 and he entered it accordingly.
133. Lord Widgery’s decision to accept the sworn testimony of the three
officers concerned (though not all of the relevant officers, such as the
note-keeper) conveniently but not convincingly removed the difficulties
presented by the written records. As McMahon points out, “Lord Widgery not
only accepted oral evidence in preference to written evidence, but also
preferred the evidence of implicated persons to that of independent witnesses.
He also rejected what is traditionally recognised as a reliable source of
evidence; official records.”
Should the Arrest Operation have been Launched at all ?
Para 31. By 1600 hours the pressure on barrier 14 had relaxed. There were
still 100 to 200 hooligans in the William Street area but most of the
non-violent marchers had either turned for home or were making their way down
Rossville Street to attend a meeting at Free Derry Corner where about 500 were
already assembled. (Still of Army helicopter film EP 29/16.) On the waste ground
between the Rossville Flats and William Street there was a mixed crowd of
perhaps 200 which included some rioters together with marchers, local residents,
newspapermen and sightseers who were moving aimlessly about or chatting in
groups. (Mr Tucker’s photographs EP 28/1 to 4.) This was the situation when
Commander 8 Brigade ordered 1 Para to move forward and make arrests.
134. Given that there was army helicopter film, the question can legitimately
be asked whether the events of Bloody Sunday were actually filmed in full and
whether such a record is available. This paragraph further illustrates that the
situation, despite the fact of continued stone throwing, had eased considerably
and that the crowd between Rossville Flats and William Street, into which 1 Para
drove its assault, was for the most part mixed, aimless and relaxed.
Para 32. In the light of events the wisdom of carrying out the arrest
operation is debatable. The Army had achieved its main purpose of containing the
march and although some rioters were still active in William Street they could
have been dispersed without difficulty. It may well be that if the Army had
maintained its “low key” attitude the rest of the day would have
passed off without further serious incident. On the other hand the Army had been
subjected to severe stoning for upwards of half an hour; and the future threat
to law and order posed by the hard core of hooligans in Londonderry made the
arrest of some of them a legitimate security objective. The presence of 1 Para
provided just the opportunity to carry this out.
Para 33. In view of the large numbers of people about in the area the
arrest operation presented two particular risks: first, that in a large scale
scoop-up of rioters a number of people who were not rioters would be caught in
the net and perhaps roughly handled; secondly, that if the troops were fired
upon and returned fire innocent civilians might well be injured.
135. These paragraphs clearly understated the dangers faced by the civilians
in and around Rossville Street once 1 Para was mobilised. In the light of the
Para AA document, its claims about the brutal esprit de corps prevailing in the
Parachute Regiment, and the widely acknowledged acceptance – even by Lord
Widgery – that the Paras were particularly aggressive in their approach, there
could have been little doubt in the minds of the commanding officers of the
likely risk to civilians present when 1 Para deployed. Apparently under the
sights of British Army snipers viewing the situation from elevated positions
near the Walls and an officer located overhead in a helicopter, a military unit
known to be particularly aggressive and ruthless was deployed in a rapid advance
simultaneously up Chamberlain Street and Rossville Street against a mixed,
aimless and relaxed crowd dispersing from a relatively minor disturbance toward
Free Derry corner. This advance, contrary to the orders of Brigadier McLellan,
was into an area in which the Army reportedly believed these soldiers were
liable to sniper attack by members of the IRA located in and around the
Rossville Flats complex.
Para 34. Whether the Brigade Commander was guilty of an error of judgment
in giving orders for the arrest operation to proceed is a question which others
can judge as well or better than I can. It was a decision made in good faith by
an experienced officer on the information available to him, but he
underestimated the dangers involved.
136. Since Lord Widgery, contrary to the record, ascribed to Brigadier
McLellan the responsibility of launching the arrest operation (without which, as
Lord Widgery conceded, there may have been no deaths that day), Brigadier
McLellan bore the weight of responsibility for the consequences of that action.
Yet Lord Widgery, charged with the investigation into the most serious incident
involving the British Army in its recent history, simply refused to make a
judgement on whether or not Brigadier McLellan made a fatal error of judgement
which resulted in 13 deaths that afternoon. This not only contrasts with the
certitude with which he laid the blame for the events of that day on the march
organisers, but avoids what must by any reasonable standard be seen as the
reason for holding the Inquiry in the first place.
137. That is not to claim that Brigadier McLellan was actually the
responsible agent in precipitating the operation which led to the civilian
casualties since questions remain as to his control on the day and on the nature
of the authorities’ overall intentions. One might even make the argument that
Brigadier McLellan, as demonstrated by the official record, gave an order not to
conduct a running battle down Rossville Street which, if adhered to by 1 Para,
would undoubtedly have greatly diminished – even to the point of elimination –
the risk to civilians. In considering whether Brigadier McLellan gave an
accurate account in testimony, Prof. Dash asked: “Even if General Ford had
given the order, could Brigadier McLellan be expected to repudiate his
commanding officer? Or, if 1 Para had acted without orders at all, would
Brigadier McLellan’s basic loyalty to the Army, or his concern for the
reputation of the British government, permit him to expose such shocking
conduct, especially after the tragic events of January 30?” Prof. Dash
concludes that the crucial question of orders “was not resolved by the
Tribunal Inquiry, and certainly not by Lord Widgery’s Report.”
The First High Velocity Rounds
Para 35. …The Company Commander of the Support Company found a route
over a wall by the side of the Presbyterian Church which he considered might be
useful for this purpose, but which was obstructed by wire. Accordingly he sent a
wire-cutting party to make this route usable if required. Whilst some soldiers
from the Mortar Platoon were cutting the wire a single high velocity round was
fired from somewhere near the Rossville Flats and struck a rainwater pipe on the
side of the Presbyterian Church just above their heads. A large number of
witnesses gave evidence about this incident, which clearly occurred, and which
proves that at that stage there was at least one sniper, equipped with a high
velocity weapon, established somewhere in the vicinity of the Rossville Flats
and prepared to open fire on the soldiers.
138. Lord Widgery did not make clear here that the witnesses to this event
were military. None of the NICRA/NCCL statements or the eyewitness statements
given to the Government in 1972 attest to this event as described by Lord
Widgery. In seeking to establish the threat of sniper fire from Rossville Flats
as he does in this instance, Lord Widgery logically called into question the
subsequent decision to send soldiers into the open areas in front of these
flats.
Para 36. The Company Commander of Support Company had sent a number of men
forward to cover the wire-cutting party. Some of these men established
themselves on the two lower floors of a three storey derelict building on
William Street….A hail of missiles was thrown at these soldiers. After a time
Soldier A fired two rounds and Soldier B fired three rounds. There is no doubt
that this shooting wounded Mr John Johnson and Mr Damien Donaghy. Evidence from
civilians in the neighbourhood, including Mr Johnson himself, is to the effect
that although stones were being thrown no firearms or bombs were being used
against the soldiers in the derelict building. Having seen and heard Mr Johnson
I have no doubt that he was telling the truth as he saw it. He was obviously an
innocent passer-by going about his own business in Londonderry that afternoon
and was almost certainly shot by accident. I have not thought it necessary to
take a statement from Mr Donaghy, who was injured more seriously and was still
in hospital when I finished hearing evidence. I am quite satisfied that had he
given evidence it would have been in the same sense as that given by Mr Johnson.
139. It is interesting to note here that the wire-cutting party was being
given cover by Support Company. In the light of the new material and evidence
that firing occurred from elevated positions, the question arises as to what
cover was established, and where it was situated, to protect Support Company
when it later advanced up Rossville Street – all the more so since it had been
claimed that a high velocity shot had come from Rossville Flats. Lord Widgery
did not offer any insight into what cover was organised for the soldiers moving
up Rossville Street. If such cover was not present, it would seem a dereliction
of duty by the officers commanding. If it was, did it open fire as so many
eyewitnesses attest and thereby contribute to the fatal events that followed? It
is also interesting to note that while Lord Widgery recorded the views of
eyewitnesses that only stones were thrown and while he was prepared to say that
he believed Mr. Johnson was telling the truth as he saw it, Lord Widgery did not
offer a similar judgement on the views of those other eyewitnesses about the
type of projectiles being used, nor did he seek to hear the views of Damien
Donaghy – despite his relevance as one of the wounded and despite the nature of
the allegations being levelled at him by the soldiers. Had Lord Widgery done so,
he would have had considerable difficulty in accepting the accounts offered by
the implicated soldiers.
Para 37. …The man reappeared carrying an object in his right hand and
made the actions of striking a fuse match against the wall with his left hand.
When he brought his two hands together soldier A assumed that he was about to
light a nail bomb, took aim and fired at him.
Para 38. …[soldier B] noticed one man come out from the waste ground
across William Street carrying in his right hand a black cylindrical object
which looked like a nail bomb. With his left hand he struck the wall with a
match. Thinking that the man was about to light the nail bomb, and that there
was no time to wait for orders from his Platoon Sergeant, soldier B took aim and
fired.
140. These paragraphs concern the shootings of Damian Donaghy and John
Johnson in William Street, both wounded at the time (Johnson subsequently died,
reportedly as a result of his wounds). These were the first victims of Bloody
Sunday. Lord Widgery cleared the victims of any suggestion that they were trying
to light or were lighting a bomb. He relates the accounts of soldiers A and B as
being “in similar terms” and supports their belief that they had been
attacked by nail bombs but finds “it impossible to reach any conclusions as
to whether explosive substances were thrown at these soldiers or not.”
141. It is clear, however, that the original statements made by these
soldiers to the Military Police, as detailed by Prof. Walsh, were significantly
different to their subsequent description of events. In this original statement,
Soldier A placed the target at a different spot and claimed that the target
struck the nail bomb against the wall to ignite it with his right hand and was
in the process of passing it into his left hand when he was shot and hit by
Soldier A. Two men dragged the target away. Soldier B gave a very similar
account, though B claimed that the target lit something with his left hand and
was about to ignite the object in his right hand. Both also claimed that two
nail bombs exploded near them prior to this. Yet no nail bombs were recovered
from the scene. No civilian eyewitness identified nail bombs being used. No
civilian eyewitness described the incident depicted by the soldiers. Soldier A
corrected his placement of the target in a subsequent statement to the Treasury
Solicitors and, significantly, also changed his statement to say that the target
moved his left hand down the wall which had the effect of matching it to the
account given by Soldier B.
142. It is clear that the soldiers’ testimony to the Tribunal was open to the
charge that it had been changed and was therefore unreliable. Since these
changes were not revealed to Counsel for the next of kin, the cross-examination
was denied the opportunity of addressing the discrepancies of place and
movements. Since a reasonable number of the authors of the eyewitness statements
were not called to testify, the possibility of refuting the soldiers’ testimony
as being tantamount to fiction was never properly explored.
Para 39. I find it impossible to reach any conclusion as to whether
explosive substances were thrown at these soldiers or not. Mere negative
evidence that nail bombs were not seen or heard is of relatively little
importance in a situation in which there was already a great deal of noise.
Baton rounds were being fired from the barrier in Little James Street nearby and
there were other distractions for the various witnesses. Having seen Soldiers A
and B vigorously cross-examined I accept that they thought, rightly or wrongly,
that the missiles being thrown towards them included a nail bomb or bombs; and
that they thought, rightly or wrongly, that one of the members of the crowd was
engaged in suspicious action similar to that of striking a match and lighting a
nail bomb. The soldiers fired in the belief that they were entitled to do so by
their orders. Whether or not the circumstances were really such as to warrant
firing there is no reason whatever to suppose that either Mr. Johnson or Mr.
Donaghy was in fact trying to light or throw a bomb.
143. It seems extraordinary that Lord Widgery found it impossible to reach a
conclusion as to whether nails bombs were thrown. Both soldiers, in identical
terms, describe two nail bombs landing nearby before they opened fire. Either
they were telling the truth or they were not. Since they were implicated
witnesses, since the emergence of the archival material demonstrates that they
made significant changes to their testimony and since eyewitnesses failed to
corroborate their version, there are clear grounds for disbelieving their
account. Furthermore, since both soldiers A and B claimed to have fired aimed
shots, and since Lord Widgery accepted that the wounded were innocent, then
logically he ought to have concluded that soldier A and soldier B aimed at and
hit two innocent civilians.
144. As to Lord Widgery’s claim that mere negative evidence (i.e. no
eyewitnesses identified the use of nail bombs) is of relatively little
importance, McMahon rightly poses the question “how else could the
civilians prove there was no bomb except by declaring that they had not seen
any?” He goes on, “in circumstances like those under scrutiny it would
be almost inconceivable for civilians to prove the absence of nail bombs, etc.,
other than by negative evidence…..Negative truth is better than positive lies.
It is very difficult to prove a negative statement (e.g. that there were no
bombs) other than by negative evidence.”
145. Had Lord Widgery concluded, as the weight of evidence suggests, that
there were no nail bombs thrown, then the soldiers’ belief that they were
entitled to fire would have been seriously undermined. The soldiers’ subjective
belief – even if substantiated – that they were entitled to fire is not a
sufficient justification for firing. Lord Widgery’s failure to apply an
objective standard of reasonableness to the actions of the soldiers, so evident
here, set the pattern in his overall Report regarding the actions of British
Army personnel.
146. Why Soldier A and B chose to shoot Donaghy and Johnson remains a
mystery. Don Mullan states that many believe that these early shots, fired by
Support Company of 1 Para and hitting Donaghy and Johnson, “were aimed at
drawing the IRA units down into the Bogside…..the IRA reaction did not
materialise….When the Paras moved into Rossville Street twenty minutes later,
the fusillade of bombs and bullets they later claimed they encountered simply
did not occur.” The validity of this belief can only be fully assessed in
the light of further information on or clarification of the British Army’s prior
intentions and on the role envisaged for 1 Para.
Support Company in Action
Para 40. An ammunition check on return to barracks showed that Support
Company of 1 Para had, in the course of 30 January, expended 108 rounds of 7.62
mm ammunition….Five rounds of 7.62 mm ammunition had been fired by Soldiers A
and B as already described in paragraph 36 above and one had been ejected
unfired by a soldier in clearing a stoppage in his rifle. The remaining 102
rounds were fired by soldiers of Support Company in a period of under 30 minutes
between 1610 and 1640 hours. About 20 more rounds were fired by the Army in
Londonderry that afternoon, but not by 1 Para and not in the area with which the
Tribunal was primarily concerned.
147. Lord Widgery could not account for 19 shots by soldier H who claimed
that he saw and fired on a gunman who appeared in a window 19 times in a row.
Despite the accommodating calisthenics of the gunman, soldier H failed either to
hit him, the window or even the building. While Lord Widgery at least baulked at
accepting soldier H’s fanciful explanation, he did not attempt to provide an
alternative explanation in order to account for this ammunition. He failed,
therefore, to account for some 39 bullets fired out of a total of 128 rounds
(i.e 30%) which, by his reckoning, were fired by the Army that day in Derry. Nor
did Lord Widgery seek to censure the soldier for attempting to mislead the
Inquiry.
148. The official tally of ammunition fired has now been seriously undermined
by the Para AA document. According to Para AA, members of 1 Para colluded to
conceal how many bullets they had individually fired, had their own personal
supply of ammunition and used dum-dum bullets. According to the Para AA
statement,
“Several of the blokes had fired their own personal supply of dum-dums.
Para BB for one fired 10 dum-dums into the crowd but as he still had his
official quota he got away with saying he never fired a shot in the subsequent
investigations. This happened with several people in my vehicle. Para CC fired
22 rounds but was stupid enough to boast about it within the sergeant’s hearing
before he could spread them out i.e. add a few to each of our tallys.”
149. Para AA’s allegation that dum-dum bullets were used is particularly
startling. It bespeaks not only a culture of ill-discipline but the use of
ammunition banned under the Geneva Conventions. Furthermore, it may explain the
particular nature of the wounds suffered by Barney McGuigan, for example, which
indicated that the bullet which struck him in the head had apparently shattered
on impact. Lord Widgery’s apparent assiduousness in accounting for all
ammunition and his reckoning of the total amount did not match the civilian
eyewitness accounts which invariably described a sustained fusillade of fire
from many directions; it seems highly unlikely that this description matches the
rate of 3-4 rounds a minute over a 30 minute period indicated by Lord Widgery.
This discrepancy may well be explained in part by the Para AA statement.
150. The fact that 20 shots were also fired by the British Army outside the
area of Lord Widgery’s primary concern opens up an intriguing question. A close
reading of Lord Widgery’s syntax reveals that one could argue that it did not
rule out that shots were fired from the vicinity of the Walls (i.e. outside the
narrow confines defined by Lord Widgery) but hit people within that area. Lord
Widgery did not investigate the likely trajectory of fatal shots. The new
material reveals that such an examination at the time may well have revealed
significant information regarding the source of some of the fatal shots as
coming from the vicinity of Derry Walls.
Para 41. Support Company advanced through barrier 12 and down Rossville
Street in a convoy of 10 vehicles. A photograph taken very shortly afterwards
shows the Guildhall clock standing at 10 minutes past 4 (EP35/20). In the lead
was the Mortar Platoon commanded by Lieutenant N….The rear was brought up by
two further APCs carrying the Anti-Tank Platoon, which consisted of Lieutenant
119 in command and 17 other ranks.
Points 151-190
151. The assembly of 10 vehicles containing organised units of soldiers and
deploying in a choreographed manner suggests a considerable degree of prior
coordination and deliberation. Such a movement was clearly contrary to the
Brigade Operation Order, both in the use of vehicles and in the area in which
they and the soldiers were deployed. The new material relates that this
deployment was carried out at considerable speed and that one of the Saracens
“deliberately hit an elderly man”. One eyewitness relates that a
soldier appeared between the Saracens, without riot gear, firing from his hip,
apparently at random.
Para 42. According to Major 736 his orders were simply to go through barrier
12 and arrest as many rioters as possible. As the rioters retreated down
Rossville Street he went after them.
Para 43. The leading APC (Lieutenant N) turned left off Rossville Street
and halted on the waste ground near to where Eden Place used to be. The second
APC (Sergeant O) went somewhat further and halted in the courtyard of the
Rossville Flats near the north end of the western (or No 1) Block. The Platoon
immediately dismounted. Soldier P and one or two others from Sergeant O’s
vehicle moved towards Rossville Street but the remainder of the Platoon started
to make arrests near to their vehicles.
Para 44. Meanwhile the remainder of Support Company vehicles had halted in
Rossville Street. The Company Commander (Major 236) says that his command
vehicle came under fire so he moved it with his scout car in attendance to the
north end of No 1 Block of the Flats to obtain cover…The Anti-Tank Platoon’s
vehicles halted behind the 4-ton lorries and the men of that Platoon dismounted
and moved to Kells Walk. Some of these men were to appear later in Glenfada
Park. The Composite Platoon Commander deployed half of his men to the east in
support of the Mortar Platoon, the other half to the west in support of the
Anti-Tank Platoon.
Para 45. Thereafter Support Company operated in three areas which require
separate examination: the courtyard of the Rossville Flats; Rossville Street
from Kells Walk to the improvised barricade; and lastly the area of Glenfada
Park and Abbey Park.
152. This account is not subject to any comment by Lord Widgery and is
presented as a straight narrative. In its economy of the truth, it is a highly
misleading account. Lord Widgery’s flat statement that the soldiers
“started to make arrests” does not convey the nature of their arrival,
an important factor which explains why the crowd reacted in panic and attempted
to flee. The civilian eyewitnesses are at one on the exceptional and frightening
degree of aggression and brutality deployed. The following selection is
illustrative:
– A boy was running away from them and a soldier went down on one knee and
fired his rifle and the boy pitched forward. There was a large amount of blood
around him. I then saw three soldiers beating a man with batons.(Isabelle
Duffy)
– Two soldiers came down Rossville Street with a man in a black suit – half
walking and half dragged, receiving blows from the muzzle of the soldier’s gun
and the butt of the other soldier’s gun. When they got behind the Saracens, I
saw him struck on the body and fall. Whilst on the ground, I saw him kicked by
two other soldiers. They lifted him and threw him bodily into the
Saracen…[Another] young boy appeared to be pleading with him [a Para]….The
paratrooper [a second one] ran back behind the boy and hit him on the back of
the head with the butt of his rifle…as he marched him to the Saracen kept
hitting him with the muzzle of the gun….I saw a soldier in a kneeling
position, firing straight up Rossville Street towards the barricade. He seemed
to have fired a full magazine ….(Tony D.)
– One Saracen knocked a man on the ground and a soldier jumped out. He kept
the man on the ground by battering him with the butt of his rifle and another
soldier shot at this man from very close range. Then the soldiers seemed to go
berserk and were shooting everywhere. Women and children were running for
cover, screaming. (Agnes Hume)
153. Furthermore, Lord Widgery does not challenge Major 236’s claim that he
was fired on. By Lord Widgery’s own measure, who fired first was considered to
be “vital” and “probably the most important single issue which I
have been required to determine.” Yet he failed to deal in this narrative
with the warning shots which Lt. N, leading the mortar platoon which was the
first to debus in Rossville Street, claimed to have fired before he heard any
other shots. Indeed, Lord Widgery did not even refer to this event in paragraph
43 despite its obvious relevance. As Prof. Walsh points out, “the Tribunal
ignored the strong possibility that these shots were the first fired on
Rossville Street when making its determination on who fired first.” In
short, these paragraphs are an inaccurate and misleading account of
“Support Company in Action”.
(a) The activities of Mortar Platoon in the courtyard of the Rossville
Flats
Para 46. As soon as the vehicles appeared in William Street the crowd on
the waste ground began to run away to the south and was augmented by many other
people driven out of Chamberlain Street by C Company…..The crowd ran not
because they thought the soldiers would open fire upon them but because they
feared arrest. Though there was complete confidence that the soldiers would not
fire unless fired upon, experienced citizens like Father Daly recognised that an
arrest operation was in progress and wished to avoid the rubber bullets and
rough handling which this might involve. One of the photographs taken by Mr
Tucker from his home in the central block of the Rossville Flats shows clearly
what was happening at this stage. However, careful study of the photograph
(EP28/5)shows that many of the crowd remained under cover in the doorways of the
Flats or remained facing the vehicles to see how far they would come.
154. On the face of it, this paragraph was an astonishingly confident
assertion of what motivated the crowd (which he had described as mixed) i.e.
fear of arrest and rough handling combined with “complete confidence”
that the soldiers would not fire unless fired upon. The new material,
particularly the eyewitness statements and the Para AA document, undermines this
assertion. They demonstrate forcefully the sense of fear and panic which seized
most civilians present with the arrival of the Paras and the soldiers’
immediately aggressive behaviour, followed so rapidly by the use of live
ammunition. Lord Widgery’s characterisation of those seeking cover in order to
adjudge how far the Paras would advance is a travesty of what was actually going
on – civilians fleeing the Paras and then attempting to seek cover from the fire
directed into their midst.
Para 47. The APCs of Mortar Platoon penetrated more deeply than was
expected by the crowd, which caused some panic….As soon as the vehicles halted
the soldiers of Mortar Platoon began to make arrests….But within a minute or
two firing broke out and within about the next 10 minutes the soldiers of Mortar
Platoon had fired 42 rounds of 7.62 mm ammunition and one casualty (John Duddy)
lay dead in the courtyard.
Para 48. This action in the courtyard is of special importance for two
reasons. The first shots-other than those in William Street referred to in
paragraphs 35 to 38-were fired here. Their sound must have caused other soldiers
to believe that Support Company was under attack and made them more ready than
they would otherwise have been to identify gunmen amongst the crowd. Secondly,
the shooting by the Mortar Platoon in the courtyard was one of the incidents
invoked by those who have accused the Army of firing indiscriminately on the
backs of a fleeing crowd.
Para 49. I have heard a great deal of evidence from civilians, including
pressmen, who were in the crowd in the courtyard, almost all to the effect that
the troops did not come under attack but opened fire without provocation. The
Army case is that as soon as they began to make arrests they themselves came
under fire and their own shooting consisted of aimed shots at gunmen and bomb
throwers who were attacking them. This issue, sometimes referred to as “Who
fired first?”, is probably the most important single issue which I have
been required to determine.
155. Having thus established the contending version of events in the
courtyard, Lord Widgery then presented in paragraph 50 “a representative
sample” of six civilian versions in summary form of what they witnessed. In
themselves, these stand in startling contrast to the narrative offered earlier
by Lord Widgery (paragraphs 41-45). He then offers evidence from the Army side,
eight examples in all. Before considering them in detail, it is worth recalling
Prof. Walsh’s comment that the overall account provided by the soldiers lacks
credibility. Prof. Walsh has identified a whole catalogue of discrepancies and
alterations in the statements offered by the soldiers which further undermine
the reliability of the statements offered by the soldiers to the Tribunal –
statements, it should be remembered, by those implicated in the deaths of
unarmed civilians. None of these alterations and discrepancies – which had the
effect of making their statements safe from possible prosecution and aligning
them to one another – were revealed in the course of the Inquiry or to the
Counsel for the next of kin.
156. The soldiers alleged that they came under sustained gun and bomb attack.
Yet these supposed IRA attacks did not inflict casualties on the civilians
milling about. Nor were civilians or journalists aware of the activities of
these gunmen and bombers; they neither saw nor heard them. Only soldiers were
apparently able to detect them though they, like the civilians and journalists,
were able to remain completely immune from any injury. Despite the alleged
intensity of hostile fire, the soldiers continued to operate in the open and to
advance. None of the accounts given by the soldiers were supported by
non-military witnesses. No evidence corroborating their claims of hitting gunmen
or bombers was discovered. The dead and wounded did not match the soldiers’
versions of whom they shot at and where. The only reasonable conclusion to be
drawn from all of this is that the accounts provided by the soldiers were
fiction.
157. It might also be noted that by presenting two sets of statements as if
they were equally valid and representing equally valuable versions of the same
events is not only clearly unreal given the diametrically opposed descriptions
offered, but is now revealed by the new material to be inherently unbalanced
since one group was demonstrably unreliable. It is the implicated group which is
revealed as having changed and sought to match their versions. This whole
exercise, as presented by Lord Widgery, is now shown to have been based on a
fundamentally unsound premise that the soldiers were “telling the truth as
they saw it”. It appears that the Tribunal was well aware that this was the
case but concealed it from the public and the Counsel for the next of kin. That
the Tribunal never revealed this to the Counsel for the next of kin completely
undermined the validity of the cross-examination process. The revelations
provided by the archive material and Prof. Walsh’s analysis of it means that, on
this basis alone, the Widgery Report stands fundamentally flawed. Moreover, this
portion of the Report graphically illustrates the failure of Lord Widgery to
invoke ballistic, forensic or medical evidence to determine the veracity of the
contending accounts.
(i) Major 236….said that as he and his driver dismounted a burst of about
15 rounds of low velocity fire came towards them from the direction of
Rossville Flats….He saw seven or eight members of the Mortar Platoon firing
aimed shots towards the Flats but he could not see what they were firing at.
He said that these soldiers were under fire.
158. There is no convincing and clear independent, non-military corroboration
of this claim. The statements of the civilian eyewitnesses are very consistent
on the point that no civilian gunfire as described by Major 236 took place.
(ii) Lieutenant N…. moved towards Chamberlain Street where he was faced
by a hostile crowd and fired a total of three shots above their heads in order
to disperse them….He then fired one further round at a man whom he thought
was throwing a nail bomb in the direction of Sergeant O’s vehicle.
159. Prof. Walsh makes a number of points in regard to these “warning
shots”, particularly the failure by the Tribunal to consider whether Lt. N
was justified in firing shots in the first place. Lord Widgery simply did not
consider Lt.N’s claim to have wounded a nail bomber since he had decided not to
examine all of the wounded cases. Prof. Walsh has also uncovered from the
archives that Lt. N changed the sequence of his shots in the version offered to
the Tribunal to that initially given to the Military Police and made another
change to align his version with the facts or with statements by other soldiers.
These discrepancies were not revealed in the course of the Inquiry and were not
referred to by Lord Widgery, despite their obvious significance.
(iii) Sergeant O….said that he and his men began to make arrests but were
met with fire from the Rossville Flats. He thought that the fire came from
four or five sources and possibly included some high velocity weapons. He saw
the strike of bullets four or five metres from one of the members of his
Platoon. He and his men returned to his APC to secure their prisoners and then
spread out in firing positions to engage those who had fired upon them.
Sergeant O fired three rounds at a man firing a pistol from behind a car
parked in the courtyard. The man fell and was carried away. He fired a further
three rounds at a man standing at first floor level on the cat-walk connecting
Blocks 2 and 3, who was firing a fairly short weapon like an M1 carbine. The
flashes at the muzzle were visible. Sergeant O caught a glimpse of Soldier S
firing at a man with a similar weapon but his view was obscured by people
“milling about”. The Sergeant returned to his vehicle, but later
fired two more rounds at a man whom he said was firing an MI carbine from an
alleyway between Blocks 2 and 3. He later saw Soldier T splashed with acid and
told him that if further acid bombs were thrown he should return fire. He
heard Soldier T fire two rounds and saw another acid bomb which had fallen.
Sergeant O described the firing from the Flats as the most intense that he had
seen in Northern Ireland in such a short space of time.
160. Lord Widgery himself dismissed soldier O’s account of the intensity of
hostile fire. Prof. Walsh has uncovered six major discrepancies between his
evidence to the Tribunal and his original statement, including in regard to the
intensity of fire, the number of shots he fired, whether he saw the body of the
gunman being dragged away and the number of acid bombs he claimed to have seen
thrown.
(iv) Private Q, after dismounting from his vehicle, was being stoned and so
took cover at the end of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. There he heard four
or five low velocity shots, that is to say shots fired by someone other than
the Army, though he could not say from what direction. Shortly afterwards he
saw a man throwing nail bombs, two of which simply rolled away whilst another
one exploded near to the houses backing on to Chamberlain Street. He shot at
and hit the man as he was in the act of throwing another nail bomb. That bomb
did not explode and the man’s body was dragged away.
161. Prof. Walsh identifies two major discrepancies arising from soldier Q’s
original statement: he changes the direction in which the nail bombs were thrown
(Walsh speculates because the original target as claimed would have been beyond
range) and the number thrown (from one to several).
(v) Private R heard one or two explosions like small bombs from the back of
Rossville Flats. He also heard firing of high and low calibre weapons. He
noticed a man about 30 yards along the eastern side of Block 1, who made as if
to throw a smoking object, whereupon Private R fired at him. He thought he hit
him high up on the shoulder, but was not certain what happened to the man
because he was at that moment himself struck on the leg by an acid bomb thrown
from an upper window in the Flats. A few moments later R saw a hand firing a
pistol from the alleyway between Blocks 2 and 3. R fired three times, but did
not know whether he made a hit.
162. Prof. Walsh identifies five substantial discrepancies between R’s
original statement and his account to the Treasury Solicitors and the Inquiry,
including differences in his version of the actions of soldiers O and T.
(vi) Private S said that he came under fire as soon as he dismounted from
his vehicle. The fire was fairly rapid single shots, from the area of the
Rossville Flats. He dodged across to the back of one of the houses in
Chamberlain Street, from which position he saw a hail of bottles coming down
from the Flats onto one of the armoured vehicles and the soldiers around it.
He fired a total of 12 shots at a gunman or gunmen who appeared, or
reappeared, in front of the alleyway between Blocks 1 and 2 of the Flats. The
gunman was firing what he thought was an M1 carbine. He thought that he scored
two hits.
163. Prof. Walsh identifies a series of major discrepancies and alterations
in the various statements made by soldier S. While all of them are significant,
the most striking is the fact that in his original statement he made no mention
of coming under fire immediately upon debussing. Also in his original statement,
soldier S claimed that the crowd opened to reveal a gunman and closed when he
returned fire. This choreographed ballet between the crowd, the gunman and the
soldier, the original statement claimed, repeated itself four times. This
surreal and unbelievable image was not repeated in evidence.
(vii) Private T heard a burst of fire, possibly from a semi-automatic rifle
being fired very quickly, about 30 to 45 seconds after dismounting from his
vehicle. It came from somewhere inside the area of the Rossville Flats. He was
splashed on the legs by acid from an acid bomb and noticed a person throwing
acid bombs about three storeys up in the Flats. On the orders of his Sergeant
he fired two rounds at the acid bomb thrower. He thought that he did not score
a hit.
164. Prof. Walsh reveals that soldier T, contrary to his evidence to the
Inquiry, did not claim to have come under fire when he debussed in his original
statement. He also changed the moment he fired at the alleged acid bomber from
“before” to “after” the second acid bomb was thrown.
(viii) Lance Corporal V heard two explosions, not baton rounds or rifle
fire, before his vehicle stopped. As soon as he jumped out he heard rifle fire
and saw several shots spurting into the ground to his right. He thought that
this fire was coming from the alleyway between Blocks 1 and 2 of the Rossville
Flats. He saw a crowd of about 100 towards the end of Chamberlain Street who
were throwing stones and bricks. Corporal V moved further forward and shot at
and hit a man about 50 or 60 yards away from him in the act of throwing a
bottle with a fuse attached to it.
165. Prof. Walsh identifies four significant differences between his original
statement and the evidence he offered subsequently. The key difference concerns
when he fired at the alleged nail bomber. In his original statement, he claimed
to have fired after the bomb had landed and failed to explode. He changed this
to firing when the nail bomber was about to throw. As Prof. Walsh notes, on the
basis of the original version, “there are grounds for charging V with
murder or attempted murder depending on whether this target was killed or
not.” This becomes moot because, as Walsh states, “the circumstances
of the shooting and the description of the victim as given by V could not be
matched up with any of the casualties.” As Walsh concludes, “it would
be difficult to place much trust in V’s evidence.”
Para 52. A number of soldiers other than those of 1 Para gave evidence
about the opening of fire….Captain 028, a Royal Artillery officer attached to
1 Para as a Press Officer saw the leading vehicle struck by a round before it
came to a halt and saw a man open fire with a sub-machine gun from the barricade
as the soldiers jumped out of their vehicles……Lieutenant 227 of the Royal
Artillery, who was in command of an observation post on the City Walls, heard
two bursts of automatic fire from the Glenfada Park area after the arrest
operation had begun and before he had heard any other sort of ball
ammunition…..Gunner 030, who was in a slightly different position on the City
Walls, saw a youth fire five or six shots with a pistol….This was before 030
heard any fire from the Paras. Later on he heard a burst of automatic fire and
saw a man with a machine gun running in Glenfada Park.
Para 53. There was also a considerable body of civilian evidence about the
presence of gunmen in the Bogside that afternoon, including some to the effect
that they were the first to open fire. Father Daly saw a man armed with a pistol
fire two or three shots at the soldiers from the south end of Chamberlain
Street…… Mr Phillips, Mr Seymour, Mr Wilkinson and Mr Hammond, members of an
Independent Television News team, who also went through the William Street
barrier behind the Paras, all heard machine gun fire as the soldiers went across
the open space. They also heard single shots but were not unanimous as to
whether or not the automatic fire came first. It has been established that the
troops did not use automatic weapons. So though the ITN men were not able to
throw much light on the question of who fired first, their evidence did add
considerable weight to the probability that the soldiers were fired on very soon
after getting out of their vehicles……
166. In claiming that civilian gunmen were present and active, Lord Widgery
failed to make convincing connections between those claims and the actions of
the individual soldiers who killed or wounded 27 civilians that day. The
eyewitness statements provide clear and consistent accounts that 1 Para were the
first to open fire and that they were not met with any sustained or significant
return fire. As Prof. Dash makes clear from his study of the testimony, three
officers in the midst of this supposed hostile fire did not claim to have
encountered heavy civilian fire, including Lt. Col. Wilford as he walked among
his men.
167. That is not to say that a low velocity weapon was not fired in the
course of the afternoon. However, it cannot be ascertained definitively if that
was the case or who was responsible. For example, civilian eyewitness John
Gorman, who had served with the Enniskillen Fusiliers for nine years, had
testified at the Tribunal and stated categorically that the British Army scout
car’s Browning machine gun opened fire. He had made this point in his statement
to the NICRA/NCCL saying that “the whippet car opened fire – this was
automatic fire from a Browning machine gun.” According to Lord Widgery,
Support Company “was equipped that day with a Browning machine gun on a
Ferret scout car.” But he goes on to assert that “no Browning or
submachine gun ammunition had been used.” In any event, if there was any
civilian gunfire, it did not result in one single injury to a member of the
security forces.
Para 54. To those who seek to apportion responsibility for the events of
30 January the question “Who fired first?” is vital. I am entirely
satisfied that the first firing in the courtyard was directed at the soldiers.
Such a conclusion is not reached by counting heads or by selecting one
particular witness as truthful in preference to another. It is a conclusion
gradually built up over many days of listening to evidence and watching the
demeanour of witnesses under cross-examination …. Notwithstanding the opinion
of Sergeant O I do not think that the initial firing from the Flats was
particularly heavy and much of it may have been ill-directed fire from pistols
and like weapons. The soldiers’ response was immediate and members of the crowd
running away in fear at the soldiers’ presence understandably might fail to
appreciate that the initial bursts had come from the direction of the Flats. The
photographs already referred to in paragraph 47 confirm that the soldiers’
initial action was to make arrests and there was no reason why they should have
suddenly desisted and begun to shoot unless they had come under fire themselves.
If the soldiers are wrong they were parties in a lying conspiracy which must
have come to light in the rigorous cross-examination to which they were
subjected.
168. The new material is particularly relevant on two counts in this
instance. Firstly, in helping to demonstrate that the soldiers were in fact the
first to open fire, it undermines completely Lord Widgery’s assertion that
without hostile civilian fire there was no reason for 1 Para to open fire. As
McMahon points out, there is an inherent logical contradiction in Lord Widgery’s
assertions here; since one possible accusation against the soldiers was that
they acted unreasonably, it is nonsense to argue that they did not open fire
because it would have been unreasonable to do so. This highlights Lord Widgery’s
failure to determine why in fact the Paras opened fire without justification.
Only further material from official sources can throw light on the extraordinary
and as yet inexplicable behaviour of the soldiers.
169. Secondly, the new material, in particular the work of Prof. Walsh,
demonstrates that the soldiers, in being “wrong” as Lord Widgery puts
it, were in fact lying. Most damning of all, the Widgery Tribunal was aware that
inconsistencies and discrepancies existed in the soldiers’ statements and
concealed this fully from the Counsel for the next of kin. In doing so, the
soldiers and the Tribunal deliberately undermined the cross-examination process
and made it impossible for the Counsel for the next of kin to establish the
pattern of alterations made by the soldiers which have now been revealed by
Prof. Walsh. Had it been possible to establish this pattern, Lord Widgery would
have had considerable difficulty in judging the soldiers to be credible
witnesses and, consequently, would have found it difficult to accept their
version of events.
170. The new material therefore reveals that the Widgery Tribunal accepted
accounts known to it to be unreliable of what happened in the courtyard of
Rossville Flats. Lord Widgery’s exoneration of the soldiers stands therefore as
wholly and completely unwarranted. Had he chosen to accept the version offered
by the civilian eyewitnesses, he would have had little option but to determine
that the deaths and injuries brought about by the deliberate acts of the
soldiers were unprovoked and wholly unjustified.
171. Since the cross-examination process had been undermined, it was unlikely
that “a lying conspiracy” would have been uncovered. Moreover, as
McMahon points out, it was not logical to suggest that if the soldiers were
“wrong”, they would have had to have been parties to conspiracy.
McMahon writes “according to Lord Widgery the civilians were wrong, but he
makes no attempt to claim either that they were in a conspiracy or that such a
conspiracy must have come to light in the course of cross-examination”. He
concludes on this point that “from a logical point of view the criterion of
truth is arbitrarily selected, is applied only to one set of evidence, and in no
circumstances does it produce the conclusion attempted.”
(b) The Action in Rossville Street
Para 55. When the vehicle convoy halted in Rossville Street the Anti-Tank
Platoon and one half of the Composite Platoon deployed to their right in the
vicinity of the flats known as Kells Walk….. a considerable number of rounds
was fired from Kells Walk in the direction of the barricade, at which at least
four of the fatal casualties occurred.
Para 56. It will be remembered that when the vehicles entered Rossville
Street a densely packed crowd of perhaps 500 people was already assembled round
the speakers’ platform at Free Derry Corner and that the arrival of the soldiers
caused some of the crowd on the waste ground also to run towards Free Derry
Corner.
Para 57. Perhaps the most ugly of all the allegations made against the
Army is that the soldiers at Kells Walk fired indiscriminately on a large and
panic-stricken crowd which was seeking to escape over the barricade. ….. Mr
Chapman… maintained ….. that the Army fired indiscriminately upon the backs
of that number of people who were scrambling over the barricade in an effort to
escape and that no firearms or bombs were being used against the soldiers at
that time.
Para 58. Mr Robert Campbell, the Assistant Chief Constable of the Renfrew
and Bute Constabulary, who was observing the scene from the City Wall, gave a
very different account of events at the barricade…… Father O’Keefe …..
gave a version of this incident which supported Mr Campbell rather than Mr
Chapman…..Further, the pathologist’s evidence about the four young men who
were casualties at the barricade, namely Kelly, Young, Nash and McDaid, was that
they were not shot from behind.
172. The deaths of eight individuals occurred in Rossville Street close to
the barricade. Lord Widgery devoted only four paragraphs to describing the scene
there. Yet the bulk of the texts of these paragraphs were devoted to a
consideration of the accounts given by Chapman, O’Keefe and Campbell and what
they said about the nature of the crowd at the barricade. Campbell, by Lord
Widgery’s own admission, could not see the entry of 1 Para and could only see
part of the Rossville Street barricade. Moreover, he only claimed to have heard
low velocity shots. There was no attempt, as there was in dealing with the
Rossville Flats courtyard, to provide a narrative of the movements,
intentions,beliefs and actions of the soldiers. The new material reinforces the
fact that there was considerable evidence available to provide a detailed
account of how so many met their end here. This was, after all, the remit of the
Inquiry. Yet inexplicably, Lord Widgery failed to make use of that evidence. Its
emergence, or rather re-emergence, now reveals the appalling inadequacy of
Widgery’s treatment of the events in Rossville Street.
173. It should also be noted that Lord Widgery’s failure to consider the
possibility that shots were fired from the vicinity of Derry Walls was not only
an omission but caused him to misrepresent the significance of the pathologist’s
evidence that Kelly, Young, Nash and McDaid were not shot from behind i.e. not
by the soldiers in Rossville Street. On this basis, Lord Widgery was satisfied
that the soldiers did not fire on the backs of a fleeing crowd. Yet it is clear
that they did so in other cases, such as that of Kevin McElhinney and Paddy
Doherty. He is implying that those shot from the front were facing the soldiers
toward Kells Walk and were throwing missiles. The new material indicates that
they – or certainly three of them – were facing away from the soldiers advancing
toward them and were in fact moving in the general direction of Free Derry
Corner when they were hit by British Army snipers from the vicinity of Derry
Walls.
Para. 59. I am entirely satisfied that when the soldiers first fired at
the barricade they did not do so on the backs of a fleeing crowd but at a time
when some 30 people, many of whom were young men who were or had been throwing
missiles, were standing in the vicinity of the barricade.
174. The Mullan thesis that at least three of those killed on the barricade
were hit by British Army fire from elevated positions in the vicinity of Derry
Walls is firmly grounded in the new material, including the civilian eyewitness
statements, the expert opinion of Robert Breglio, the conclusions of Dr. Raymond
McClean, the judgement of Dr. Hugh Thomas and the statements made by a number of
individuals (one claiming to have been a British soldier on duty on the Walls
that day in the course of reports broadcast by Channel Four). In light of this,
Lord Widgery’s views on the circumstances of how Nash, Young and McDaid met
their end must now be set aside.
Responsibility
Para 61. Having dealt with the allegations of a general character made
against the conduct of 1 Para on 30 January I turn to consider the conduct of
the individual soldiers who fired and the circumstances in which the individual
civilians were killed.
Para 62. The starting point of this part of the Inquiry is that 108 rounds
of 7.62 mm ammunition were expended by members of Support Company. The Browning
gun on the Company Commander’s scout car was not fired nor were the three
sub-machine guns. No shots were fired by the other Companies of 1 Para. I have
no means of deciding which soldiers fired or how many rounds each fired except
the evidence of the soldiers themselves….. The Army case is that each of these
shots was an aimed shot fired at a civilian holding or using a bomb or firearm.
On the other side it was argued that none of the deceased was using a bomb or
firearm and that the soldiers fired without justification and either
deliberately or recklessly.
175. The new material, particularly the research undertaken by Prof. Walsh
and the Para AA statement in addition to the eyewitness statements on the
intensity of fire, render Lord Widgery’s conclusions on the use of ammunition
not only unreliable but misleading.
Para. 63. To solve this conflict [whether the victims were using weapons
and whether the soldiers fired with justification] it is necessary to identify
the particular shot which killed each deceased and the soldier who fired it. It
is then necessary to consider the justification put forward by the soldier for
firing and whether the deceased was in fact using a firearm or bomb. It has
proved impossible to reach conclusions with this degree of particularity.
176. Lord Widgery omitted an obvious point that the circumstances in which
the victims were killed or wounded could have been clarified by testing the
reliability of eyewitnesses, by determining the degree of corroboration and by
fully exploring the import of the evidence presented by ballistics, medical and
forensic experts. The new material magnifies Lord Widgery’s failure to have done
so despite the availability of evidence and witnesses, some of whom claimed to
have been able to identify individual soldiers.
a. Were the Deceased Carrying Firearms or Bombs?
Para 65. Although a number of soldiers spoke of actually seeing firearms
or bombs in the hands of civilians none was recovered by the Army. None of the
many photographs shows a civilian holding an object that can with certainty be
identified as a firearm or bomb. No casualties were suffered by the soldiers
from firearms or gelignite bombs. In relation to every one of the deceased there
were eye witnesses who said that they saw no bomb or firearm in his hands.
177. The new material strongly supports and corroborates the points made
here. It might be added that none of the wounded were identified as having been
armed, nor were any of the dozens arrested on the day.
Para 68. According to the expert evidence of Dr Martin of the Northern
Ireland Department of Industrial and Forensic Science and Professor Keith
Simpson a concentration of minute particles on the hand creates a “strong
suspicion” that the subject has been firing.
178. Prof. Dash very effectively repudiated the reliability of Dr. Martin’s
forensic evidence. Any inferences drawn from it can be discounted. The
eyewitness statements about the treatment of the dead help to substantiate the
concerns expressed by Prof. Dash about accidental or deliberate contamination by
the authorities.
The Deceased Considered Individually
John Francis Duddy
Para 69. Age 17. He was probably the first fatal casualty and fell in the
courtyard of Rossville Flats. (Mr Grimaldi’s photographs EP 26/12, 13 and 14.)
As already recounted (paragraph 50(I)) he was seen to fall by Father Daly. Mrs
Bonnor and Mrs Duffy both spoke of seeing a soldier fire at him. According to
Mrs Bonnor he was shot in the back. In fact the bullet entered his right
shoulder and travelled through his body from right to left. As he ran he turned
from time to time to watch the soldiers. This fits in with Father Daly having
overtaken him while running and explains the entry wound being in his side. No
shot described by a soldier precisely fits Duddy’s case. The nearest is one
described by Soldier V who spoke of firing at a man in a white shirt in the act
of throwing a petrol bomb, but Duddy was wearing a red shirt and there is no
evidence of his having a bomb. His reaction to the paraffin test was negative. I
accept that Duddy was not carrying a bomb or firearm. The probable explanation
of his death is that he was hit by a bullet intended for someone else.
179. Four civilians testified to the Widgery Tribunal that they had witnessed
the killing of John “Jackie” Duddy – Father Daly, Mrs. Bonnor, Mrs.
Duffy and Mr. Tucker. Mr. Tucker, an ex-serviceman, was not permitted to testify
on the details of what he saw because Lord Widgery took the view that he had
already heard enough about the incident from the other three witnesses. In his
finding, Lord Widgery in effect rationalised the account of Fr. Daly by
reference to the last movements of Jackie Duddy. He singularly failed to do this
with regard to Mrs Duffy’s, Mr Tucker’s and Mrs Bonnor’s evidence, despite
drawing special attention to the latter’s statement. Mrs Bonnor perceived that
Duddy was shot in the back but Lord Widgery, having made reference to this,
should have set her account in the proper context – for example, that she
witnessed the shooting from the second floor of Rossville Flats and that the
crowd which included Duddy was running towards those flats at the moment of the
shooting i.e. he was not facing the soldiers. Even had Duddy been facing the
soldiers, the point would have been moot since he was unarmed. Nor did Lord
Widgery make any reference to Mrs Bonnor’s claim that the soldier who shot Duddy
fired from the waist. It is not possible to fire carefully aimed shots, as all
the soldiers had claimed, from the waist. Such casual use of live ammunition,
attested to by many witnesses, would have been singularly incompatible with Lord
Widgery’s endorsement of the testimony of the soldiers.
180. The following accounts regarding what happened in the Rossville Flats
courtyard, specifically how Jackie Duddy was shot dead, are drawn from those
assembled by the Government in 1972;
– … Two Saracens came rushing up Rossville St. and into the car park and
the soldiers jumped out. One of them got down and started shooting from beside
the Saracen… One boy (about 16) in the middle of the car park was hit in the
back while running away and fell down. He wasn’t carrying anything….
– … Two Saracens turned into the car park of the Flats from Rossville
St… The Saracens stopped… One soldier ran to the front nearside wheel and
took up a firing position. Another ran to the wall at the backs of the
Chamberlain St. houses and started pushing people with his rifle … The
soldier at the nearside front wheel of the Saracen started firing and I saw a
man fall to the ground… the shot which that soldier fired was the first shot
I heard that day. Shooting continued and I saw two other men shot in the car
park. The first of these was roughly in the middle of the car park with his
hands raised in the air. He appeared to be shot in the leg as he suddenly
grasped his right leg with his right arm and hopped into the top corner of the
car park where the kiddies’ play area is… At no time did I see any of the
above-mentioned men with weapons of any sort in their hands…. At no time did
I see or hear nail bombs or petrol bombs being used, nor did I see any gunmen
in or near the Flats.
– … No shooting was coming from the flats. I was standing beside them and
could not have failed to hear it. No petrol or nail bombs were thrown or again
I could not have failed to hear them…
– … The three armoured cars came across Rossville Street and two of them
came to a halt at the gable end of the Rossville Street flats (William Street
end). The third car drove past these two and entered the car park driving
straight towards the people who were running in every direction trying to
escape. One man was knocked down by this car. As the man was attempting to
rise, a soldier ran from the back of the car which was now stationary and
raised his rifle in an attempt to strike the man with the rifle butt. A youth
dashed forward and grabbed the soldier around the neck and held him until the
injured man escaped. The youth ran off into the crowd. The soldier raised his
rifle, took deliberate aim and fired. The soldier, I thought, aimed between
the Rossville Street block and Joseph Place. The crowd fell back and I saw a
man lying on the ground, about four or five yards from the spot where the
soldier was standing after having fired the shot. I had not seen anyone fire
at the soldier nor had I heard any shooting. There were no explosions. Several
people came forward to help the man lying on the ground and a youth walked
towards the armoured car with his hands raised above his head. A soldier came
round from behind the car, raised his rifle and shot the young man, who turned
and limped [off] helped away holding his leg….
– …. I was in Chamberlain Street….. As I entered the back of the High
Flats in Rossville Street, a Saracen stopped and two soldiers leaped from it.
One got down on one knee and fired at least six rounds into the fleeing crowd.
The other one fired at least eight rounds. I passed the body of one dead or
seriously injured youth lying in the middle of the tarmac. I saw a youth whom
I have since learned to be named Michael Bridge show himself in front of the
troops and shout “you killed my mate now shoot me”. About a second
later when I looked from my hiding place I saw Michael fall, shot and injured.
At no time did I see anyone fire at the troops… and I as an ex-service man
would not have believed it if I had not seen it with my own eyes.
181. These statements are representative of the many eyewitnesses available
at the time. They are remarkably consistent, including with statements published
by Mullan. There were no nail or petrol bombs, much less hostile civilian fire.
The soldiers immediately assumed firing positions. Duddy and Bridge were
unarmed. The statements provide a clear foundation for attempting to identify
the two soldiers (one at the nearside front wheel of the lead Saracen) involved
in the death of Jackie Duddy and the wounding of Michael Bridge. Bridge, since
he was only wounded, was never called to give evidence despite the
incontrovertible fact, evidenced by his wound, that he was both a victim and a
witness. These accounts corroborate the other eyewitness statements as published
and provide clear and credible grounds for believing that Jackie Duddy was hit
and killed without justification while fleeing with a deliberate shot and that
Bridge was deliberately shot while protesting the shooting of Duddy.
182. Lord Widgery’s reference to soldier V’s description of his target as the
“nearest” to Duddy was plainly ludicrous, even on first sight: a white
shirt is not a red shirt. Further, Prof. Walsh has identified substantive
changes to the accounts originally given by soldier V which render unreliable
his testimony and which, if they had not been made, might have left V open to
criminal charges. Clearly, the soldier who aimed at and shot Duddy had concealed
this act. So too did the soldier who shot Bridge as he protested, hands aloft.
Had Lord Widgery stated this obvious point in regard to every incident involving
a civilian death or wounding (all of which failed to be corroborated in any
account by the soldiers), it would have made a mockery of the well honed, but
what now seems certain, fanciful accounts which were presented to the Inquiry by
the implicated soldiers. Lord Widgery’s conclusion that the shot which killed
Duddy was intended for someone else was perverse and stands comprehensively
contradicted.
Patrick Joseph Doherty
Para 70. Age 31. His body was found in the area at the rear of No 2 Block
of Rossville Flats between that Block and Joseph Place. His last moments are
depicted in a remarkable series of photographs taken by Mr Peress which show him
with a handkerchief over the lower part of his face crawling with others near
the alleyway which separates No 2 Block from No 3. (EP 25/7, 8, 9, 11 and 12.)
He was certainly hit from behind whilst crawling or crouching because the bullet
entered his buttock and proceeded through his body almost parallel to the spine.
There is some doubt as to whether he was shot when in the alleyway or at the
point where his body was found. On the whole I prefer the latter conclusion. If
this is so the probability is that he was shot by Soldier F, who spoke of
hearing pistol shots and seeing a crouching man firing a pistol from the
position where Doherty’s body was found. Soldier F said that he fired as the man
turned away, which would account for an entry wound in the buttock. Doherty’s
reaction to the paraffin test was negative. In the light of all the evidence I
conclude that he was not carrying a weapon. If Soldier F shot Doherty in the
belief that he had a pistol that belief was mistaken.
183. The following are two extracts from the statements collated by the
Government in 1972 regarding the death of Patrick Doherty.
– … I could see into Fahan Street car park, the maisonettes and Joseph
Place…. a man started to crawl from right beneath my window across to the
alleyway. He reached halfway, when a shot rang out, his right leg kicked out
and he lay still. This man I now know to be Patrick Doherty…. At no time did
I see or hear nail bombs or petrol bombs being used, nor did I see any gunmen
in or near the Flats.
– I saw three people shot – one of them later died – his name was Patrick
Doherty. The first man I saw shot was in the courtyard of the flats – he was
unarmed and was shot in the leg… The second person I saw being shot was
Patrick Doherty. He was unarmed and was crawling across the courtyard in front
of the flats towards the alleyway at Joseph Place. He was two-thirds of the
way across when he was shot on the right side of the chest. The soldier who
shot him was positioned at the entrance to Glenfada Park. At the time Mr.
Doherty was shot,.. the rioting had stopped and the people had dispersed…. a
man… went to his aid. He was in the process of dragging him from the line of
fire when he was shot in the leg….
184. Charles McLaughlin’s account as published by Mullan is particularly
compelling:
– I looked out of my window. I saw a man lying on his stomach. He was lying
parallel with the front of the flats. He was facing Fahan Street. He started
to crawl on his stomach heading for the alley behind Joseph Place. He was
trailing his left leg. I shouted to him not to go across or they would shoot
him. He kept moving and I shouted again, ‘For God’s sake don’t go across or
they will shoot you.’ At that stage they shot at him. The bullet passed over
him because I saw chippings fly off the wall where the bullet struck. They
fired a second shot at him. The bullet struck him high up on the right hand
side of his body. He put his hand to his side and said in a loud voice, ‘They
shot me again.’ His head fell to the ground. When a number of men carried him
to the ambulance past my window, it was then I recognised him as a workmate
named Paddy Doherty.
185. There is a compelling concurrence of views as to how Patrick Doherty met
his end among these eyewitnesses. There are no references to any pistol shots
having been heard or of a crouching man firing a pistol from the position where
Doherty’s body was found. One eyewitness states specifically that at the time
Doherty was shot, the rioting had stopped and the people had dispersed and that
Doherty had been crawling, not crouching. This description of the angle of
Doherty’s body when he was shot precisely matches the medical evidence.
According to Dr. McClean, the axis of the exit wound on the left side of the
chest, the bullet having entered the buttock, was “downwards and
forward”. Doherty could not have been anywhere near a standing or crouching
position. Photographic evidence also bears this out.
186. Eyewitnesses claim that at least two shots were fired at Doherty; the
first one missed him. Yet Lord Widgery refers only to the bullet that killed
Doherty. The eyewitness evidence suggests that, having regard to all the
circumstances, it was not possible for Doherty to have been the same person
described by soldier F. This soldier was in fact making an unfounded claim about
Doherty at the time he was shot. Furthermore, soldier F claimed that he fired at
the man as he turned away. The logic – or lack of it – of this statement is that
the victim managed to turn at a speed greater than that of the bullet which
killed him. No eyewitness statement supports the claim that Doherty turned away
and in fact state the opposite; Charles McLaughlin describes Mr. Doherty’s last
moments in terms such as ‘lying parallel with the front of the flats’…
‘started to crawl’… ‘kept moving’.. ‘shot at’ [twice].
187. According to Prof. Walsh, soldier F’s credibility is severely undermined
by the significant changes (“bizarre contradictions” in Walsh’s words)
in his evidence from one statement to the next. Most damning of all, soldier F
“admitted in his evidence….that he forgot to mention having shot dead the
alleged gunman between Rossville Flats and Joseph Place.” In addition to
the evident contradictions surrounding it, there was clearly something
profoundly unreliable about F’s testimony. Lord Widgery’s reference to F’s
claims, without any acknowledgement of this in his overall treatment of
Doherty’s killing, was highly partisan and unbalanced and gave an inaccurate,
misleading and unjust account of Patrick Doherty’s death.
Hugh Pius Gilmore
Para 71. Age 17.Gilmore died near the telephone box which stands south of
Rossville Flats and near the alleyway separating Blocks 1 and 2. According to
Miss Richmond he was one of a crowd of 30 to 50 people who ran away down
Rossville Street when the soldiers appeared. She described his being hit just
before he reached the barricade and told how she helped him to run on across the
barricade towards the point where he collapsed. a photograph of Gilmore by Mr
Robert White (EP 23/9A), which according to Miss Richmond was taken after he was
hit, shows no weapon in his hand. The track of the bullet is not consistent with
Gilmore being shot from directly behind and I think it likely that the statement
of Mr Sean McDermott is more accurate on this point than the evidence of Miss
Richmond. Mr McDermott put Gilmore as standing on the barricade in Rossville
Street when he was hit and in a position such that his front or side may have
been presented to the soldiers.
Para 72. Gilmore was shot by one of the soldiers who fired from Kells Walk
at the men at the barricade. It is impossible to identify the soldier. Gilmore’s
reaction to the paraffin test was negative. There is no evidence that he used a
weapon.
188. The following are a selection of the accounts published by Mullan:
– I was at the corner of Rossville Street. I turned back towards Free Derry
Corner at Rossville Street. The boy, Gilmore, was walking along the side of
the flats at Rossville Street beside me. All of a sudden there was a lot of
shooting… This shooting came from the Army because when I turned round there
was a soldier on one knee. The boy Gilmore stumbled…. I helped to carry him
to where the telephone box was…. The man McGuigan was there at this time.
The young boy Gilmore had nothing in his hands…(Geraldine Richmond)
– I witnessed the shooting of Hugh Gilmore and Bernard McGuigan. I was
standing on the pavement outside the High Flats. I saw a boy walking alone
across waste ground on the William St. side of the Flats. A soldier appeared
on the corner of the Flats on the side nearest William Street. The soldier
caught hold of the youth and beat him mercilessly with a riot stick or baton.
At this moment, Hugh Gilmore emerged from the main door of the High Flats on
Rossville Street. He moved past towards the mound of rubble which formed a
barricade across Rossville Street. He got on top of the barricade… Hugh
Gilmore jumped up clutching the bottom of his stomach shouting “I’m hit,
I’m hit”…. Francis Mellon and myself… assisted him around the corner
of the Flats on the side nearest Free Derry Corner…. there was a narrow hole
on the left side of his body and an exit on the right side from which his
innards protruded… (Sean McDermott)
– Me and my mate were standing at the corner of flats opposite Glenfada
Park. John [Hugh] Gilmore jumped into the air shouting “I’ve been
hit”…. I commenced to open his jerkin… The bullet had gone in on the
right side just under the lung, I think…. I wiped the blood… All during
this period there was shooting around us… (Frank Mellon)
189. These are supported by statements given to the Government in 1972:
– I was standing at the barricade at Rossville St. flats with a young lad
who turned out to be Hugh Gilmore. We saw the soldiers coming in from William
St. I heard one shot, then another shot and the boy said “Christ, I’ve
been hit”. He half ran back to the corner of Rossville St. Flats for
cover. With some help we put him on his back. The blood was pouring out of his
side…. some of us tried to get help by running across to an open door… We
stayed in the house for about ten minutes and then we ran back to young
Gilmore, who was lying dead…
– When the soldiers entered Rossville Street…. One of these soldiers ran
towards a wall at the maisonettes opposite the High Flats – he aimed the rifle
at a group of young boys who were standing on the Free Derry Corner side of a
barricade of rubble which is directly outside the main doors of the High
Flats…I saw one of these boys fall just as a soldier fired from his position
at the maisonettes… Immediately I heard further shots…directed at the
other boys at the barricade of rubble…
190. Miss Richmond, who cradled the head of the dying Hugh Gilmore, believed
that he had been shot from behind. He could however have been shot by soldiers
in the car park to his left as he was running up Rossville Street (away from the
soldiers) and just before he reached the flats, as Prof. Dash had speculated.
Dash writes that “a shot fired at Gilmore by a paratrooper from this
location would be consistent with Miss Richmond’s statement that as they passed
along the side of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats on Rossville Street, Gilmore
cried out that he was hit.” Yet Lord Widgery disregarded her version of
Gilmore’s killing and opted instead for the statement of Sean McDermott who was
not called as a witness. Lord Widgery failed therefore to treat the two accounts
in equally thorough and fair terms. Indeed Lord Widgery’s use on this rare
occasion of one the statements submitted by the NICRA/NCCL raises questions
about the reasons why he did so.
Points 191-230
191. Lord Widgery failed to explore fully and reach a definitive finding on
the nature and medical importance of the wounds inflicted on Gilmore. According
to Dr. McClean, the entry wounds were on the extensor surface of the left
forearm and on the right side of the chest with the long axis of the wound being
downward and forward, centred 14 cms below and 7 cms behind the right nipple.
The exit wounds were on the flexor surface of the left forearm and 13 cms below
the left nipple. In his post mortem report, Dr. McClean said the following:
– It has been suggested that the four wounds mentioned would be in direct
line, if the left forearm were flexed at the elbow with the palm facing the
lower abdomen. I would not agree with this supposition as the track of the
bullet in the forearm is indicated as being from left to right, whereas the
bullet track through the abdomen is indicated as travelling from right to left
across the trunk.
192. This interpretation would significantly alter the view of how Gilmore
was shot and killed. Dr. McClean disagrees with Lord Widgery’s finding that the
bullet which killed Gilmore entered the left elbow and passed horizontally
through his body. He does not believe that the one bullet which exited Gilmore’s
left lower chest and created a gaping wound of 6cms x 5cms could then have
entered the left forearm and created a circular wound there of just 7 mms in
diameter. Dr. McClean is firmly convinced that Gilmore was in fact shot twice.
On this basis, it may well be the case that two soldiers from different
positions shot and hit Gilmore and that, therefore, the eyewitness accounts of
McDermott and Richmond were in fact complementary rather than contradictory as
implied by Lord Widgery. This possibility illustrates the significance of the
failure to call on Dr. McClean and other important eyewitnesses such as Sean
McDermott and Frank Mellon in this case.
193. Lord Widgery’s finding that an unidentified soldier at Kells Walk shot
dead the unarmed Hugh Gilmore means Gilmore had to be facing the soldiers (since
this, in Lord Widgery’s mind, amounted to justification). The only explanation
for Lord Widgery’s bizarre choice of whom to believe is that he was more intent
on concluding that the unarmed Gilmore faced the soldiers when he was shot than
on determining who was most likely to have fired the fatal shot. Again, Lord
Widgery appeared to be content that facing rather than fleeing the soldiers was
sufficient grounds to explain why the soldiers shot at the victims in Rossville
Street.
194. It is very clear from the eyewitness accounts, particularly that of
Geraldine Richmond, supported by photographic evidence, that Hugh Gilmore was
shot after Bernard McGuigan. The reasons why Lord Widgery chose to reverse that
sequence remain a mystery.
Bernard McGuigan
Para 73. Age 41. This man was shot within a short distance of Gilmore, on
the south side of No 2 Block of the Rossville Flats. According to Miss Richmond
a wounded man was calling for help and Mr McGuigan, carrying a white
handkerchief, deliberately left a position of cover to attend to him. She said
that he was shot almost at once. Other civilian witnesses confirmed this
evidence and photographs of McGuigan’s body show the white handkerchief in
question. (Mr Peress’s EP 31/2 and 3 and EP 25/18.) Although there was some
evidence that the shot came from Glenfada Park, which means that the soldier who
fired might have been Soldier F, another possibility is that the shot came
through the alleyway between Blocks 1 and 2. I cannot form any worthwhile
conclusion on this point.
Para 74. Although the eye witnesses all denied that McGuigan had a weapon,
the paraffin test disclosed lead deposits on the right palm and the web, back
and palm of his left hand. The deposit on the right hand was in the form of a
smear, those on the left hand were similar to the deposits produced by a
firearm. The earlier photographs of McGuigan’s body show his head uncovered but
in a later one it is covered with a scarf. (Mr Grimaldi’s EP 26/25.) The scarf
showed a heavy deposit of lead, the distribution and density of which was
consistent with the scarf having been used to wrap a revolver which had been
fired several times. His widow was called to say that the scarf did not belong
to him. I accept her evidence in concluding it is not possible to say that
McGuigan was using or carrying a weapon at the time when he was shot. The
paraffin test, however, constitutes ground for suspicion that he had been in
close proximity to someone who had fired.
195. Geraldine Richmond gave very evocative and compelling accounts of how
Barney McGuigan died. According to the proceedings of the Widgery Tribunal, she
testified that after Gilmore was shot, she and some men were sheltering from the
paratrooper shooting against a wall of Rossville Flats. They heard a wounded man
in the direction of Joseph Place cry out: “I don’t want to die [by] myself,
I don’t want to die [by] myself.” She then testified:
– Mr. McGuigan then says, ‘I can’t stand this no longer. If I take a white
handkerchief and go out they will not shoot me’. We tried to dissuade him from
going out, but that man was determined to go and he took about four paces from
the telephone box waving a white handkerchief and he got shot. I want to say
that… Mr. McGuigan was only going to help see if he could find a man that
was crying. That’s all I want to say.
196. Ms Richmond provided the following statement to the NICRA/NCCL which was
published in Eyewitness Bloody Sunday:
– The boy Gilmore stumbled…. I helped to carry him to where the telephone
box was…. The man McGuigan was there at this time. Another man was lying at
Fahan Street steps. I could hear him squealing but nobody could get to him
because of the shooting. Mr. McGuigan said that he was going to try to reach
him because he didn’t want him to die alone. He took two steps forward and was
then shot in the head. The other young boy was now dead… The young boy
Gilmore had nothing in his hands. Neither had Mr. McGuigan – he only went to
help somebody else.
197. The following is Patrick Clarke’s account as published in Eyewitness
Bloody Sunday.
– I covered up the body of Barney McGuigan with my jacket, removed his
shoes and straightened his legs from the crumpled position he was lying in…
Another lady came with a second blanket. This I then used to completely cover
the body of Mr. McGuigan….
198. Lord Widgery’s finding that there were grounds for suspicion that
McGuigan had been in close proximity to someone who had fired deliberately fogs
the horror of this killing. This view is reinforced by Lord Widgery’s acceptance
– qualified though it may be – that McGuigan was not using or carrying a weapon
at the time he was shot. In fact, McGuigan – an unarmed man, going to the
assistance of an injured person – was shot dead while clearly waving a white
handkerchief. It should be noted also that Lord Widgery accepted that it was a
white handkerchief and not a scarf that Mr. McGuigan was waving when he was shot
dead. That was the substance of the evidence before Lord Widgery. It is
extraordinary therefore that Lord Widgery, in his finding on McGuigan’s death,
devoted around half of his finding to forensic evidence which was not centrally
relevant to the actual killing. Bernard McGuigan was unarmed when shot and the
scarf was merely put on his head when he was lying dead on the ground.
199. Lord Widgery accepted that the scarf was not put on the deceased’s head
until some time after he had been shot. Photographic evidence was invoked in
that regard. Mr. McGuigan’s wife testified that the scarf did not belong to him.
Patrick Clarke gives an account of putting his jacket and a lady later placing a
sheet over McGuigan’s body. If Clarke and other witnesses had been called to
testify, more information on the source of the scarf might have been
forthcoming.
200. Since the scarf was put on Mr. McGuigan’s body some time after his
death, it could not have contributed to the “ground for suspicion that he
had been in close proximity to someone who had fired”. At most, it may
indicate that the person who put the scarf on Mr. McGuigan’s head might have
handled a firearm or had been in close proximity to somebody who had, though
even this could have been disposed of by virtue of the weakness of the forensic
tests. The new material tends to support the suspicion that McGuigan’s hands may
have been deliberately contaminated since the civilian eyewitness evidence,
supported by photographic evidence, point clearly to the deceased, and those in
close proximity to him, not having handled a firearm at any stage. Lord Widgery
did not explore seriously, if at all, that possibility.
201. Lord Widgery’s focus on the scarf exudes a sinister resonance when set
against his failure to find on the medical possibility that Bernard McGuigan was
shot dead by a dum-dum bullet. Dr. McClean noted in his report of the
examination of McGuigan’s body that there were ‘several fragmented pieces of
metal (about forty in number) throughout the interior of the skull space’ and
that there was ‘gross pathological damage to the skull structure’. This medical
evidence would tend to support Para AA’s claim that dum-dums were used on the
day.
202. While Lord Widgery, contrary to all the evidence presented to him, was
prepared to besmirch the reputation of Barney McGuigan and those around him, he
offered at the same time, not one word of judgement on the soldier who shot dead
this man while waving a white handkerchief in the air. That Lord Widgery sought
to call into question the integrity of McGuigan’s act of selflessness compounded
the unfairness and banality of the official account of how he died.
John Pius Young
Para 75. Age 17. This young man was one of three who were shot at the
Rossville Street barricade by one of the cluster of 10 to 12 shots referred to
by Mr Campbell (paragraph 58 above refers). (Mr Mailey’s EP 23/4. Mr Mailey said
that two men fell immediately after he took this photograph.) Young was
undoubtedly associated with the youths who were throwing missiles at the
soldiers from the barricade and the track of the bullet suggests that he was
facing the soldiers at the time. Several soldiers, notably P, J, U, C, K, L and
M all said that they fired from the Kells Walk area at men who were using
firearms or throwing missiles from the barricade. It is not possible to identify
the particular soldier who shot Young.
Para 76. The paraffin test disclosed lead particles on the web, back and palm
of the left hand which were consistent with exposure to discharge gases from
firearms. The body of Young, together with those of McDaid and Nash, was
recovered from the barricade by soldiers of 1 Para and taken to hospital in an
APC. It was contended at the hearing that the lead particles on Young’s left
hand might have been transferred from the hands of the soldiers who carried him
or from the interior of the APC itself. Although these possibilities cannot be
wholly excluded, the distribution of the particles seems to me to be more
consistent with Young having discharged a firearm. When his case is considered
in conjunction with those of Nash and McDaid and regard is had to the soldiers’
evidence about civilians firing from the barricade a very strong suspicion is
raised that one or more of Young, Nash and McDaid was using a firearm. No weapon
was found but there was sufficient opportunity for this to be removed by others.
203. The deaths of Young, Nash and McDaid have given rise to considerable
controversy, particularly in light of Don Mullan’s thesis that they died as a
result of shots fired from an elevated position in the vicinity of Derry Walls.
The point has been made elsewhere that on this ground alone, the Widgery Report
is fundamentally flawed in not having considered this possibility. The following
accounts from Eyewitness Bloody Sunday illustrate the strength of the eyewitness
conviction that shooting did in fact come from the Walls.
– I glanced behind and saw Saracens coming into Rossville Street. Within
seconds a volley of shots rang out positively coming from the army for even
though at this stage I was running looking for cover I can say with all
certainty that the direction of the shooting was from outside the Bogside,
namely junction of Rossville Street and from Derry Walls. Until I got cover
from a house inside the Bogside there were at least three or four series of
these bursts of high velocity gunfire still coming positively from the
directions I have already mentioned. (Bríd Donaghy)
– One Saracen stopped at the waste ground and three or four soldiers jumped
out and began to shoot recklessly into the unarmed fleeing crowd. I saw four
boys fall to the ground and one of their bodies was dragged away by two of the
soldiers. One of the soldiers actually aimed his rifle at me but suddenly
changed his mind and fired instead at the crowd. I moved to Free Derry Corner
where I had to lie flat on the ground as the soldiers fired from the city
Walls. I then crept on my hands and knees to my aunt’s house in St. Columb’s
Wells. (Teresa Cassidy)
– The soldiers were hitting people with the butts of rifles. I climbed over
a roof of the outhouse of the flats. There was shooting on the far side coming
from the Walls and Glenfada Park. I dived for cover and I saw a boy being shot
at a barricade. There was already someone lying there. He seemed to be hit
also as there was no movement from him. a bullet hit close by me coming from
the direction of Glenfada Park or Columbcille Court. I saw two men crawling
out, at the gap between the flats (where the shops are); one was shot. I
helped lead a crowd of panicking people along the Walls. A priest pulled up in
a red cross car. He was looking for injured people. He got out of the car. I
told him to take cover. He had hardly done so when a bullet hit the far wall.
It came from the Walls. We waited for ten minutes and then went away to
safety. I helped to put about seven of the injured into cars. (Tony H.)
– Just after this we saw men crawling along the small wall in front of the
shops at Joseph Place. They were protecting themselves because the army were
firing from the army posts on the Walls. We then saw a few men dragging a body
along at the same place. We looked down on the ground, directly below, in
front of the shops and we saw another body lying on the ground very white and
very still. One of the men using the small wall as protection came back and
tried to reach the man lying in front of the shops. He tried several times to
reach him but was forced back because of the shots coming from the Walls.
(Agnes McGuinness)
– Bernadette Devlin had just got up on the platform when we heard an awful
lot of shooting which was definitely directed towards the platform on which
the meeting was just about to start. Everybody fell flat on their faces and
some ran towards the gable of a house. I was at this gable and I looked up and
saw soldiers on top of [the] Walls with their guns pointed down at us. Another
volley of shots rang out from the Walls on the crowd and a bullet hit a 2 foot
high cement pillar beside me. We then realised that they were shooting
indiscriminately from the Walls into the crowd and we ran towards St. Columb’s
Wells. The people who had been lying on their faces also got up and ran
towards St. Columb’s Wells. As they did so the army fired constantly into the
crowd and I heard that some people had been hit. (S.B.)
– I turned round facing Fahan Street where I witnessed men carrying a body
from the courtyard that I came out of. This boy was taken into the house at
the end of Joseph Place opposite the shops. While I was watching this I heard
several shots coming from my left, i.e. Rossville Street. Two bullets actually
hit the pavement in front of me. I fell flat and lay for a few minutes. I then
crawled along the front of Joseph Place to an entrance to the back of the
maisonettes. The shooting became heavier as I took cover here with many others
including women who were screaming. After a few moments I thought of getting
out the back but then I realised that there was shooting from the Walls.
(Thomas Ralph Dawe)
– My aunt shouted to me that she saw a rifle aimed in our direction from
the Walls (Derry Walls). I had just time to shout a warning to the fellas to
clear when they opened up from the Walls and fired at where they were but they
had moved just in time, one may have been hit. (Carol McCafferty)
– … three Saracen armoured cars rushed up Rossville Street. We all moved
in behind the barricade – a small amount of rubble situated in front of
Rossville Flats… the Paras opened fire. We ran in the direction of Glenfada
Park. As we reached here, two young men fell behind the barricade… another
youth who had sought shelter was calling on help to recover the two other
bodies from behind the barricade. As he ran out, he was shot down by a volley
of gunfire… (M.J.J.)
204. The Breglio and McClean reports and the material offered in the Channel
Four News broadcasts offer compelling evidence that supports the many eyewitness
accounts of shooting from the Walls. The clear possibility that Young, Nash and
McDaid died as a result of this fire was never properly considered in the course
of the Inquiry and does not feature in the Widgery Report. This clearly
represents a significant and fundamental flaw.
205. Lord Widgery asserted that there were grounds for “a strong
suspicion that one or more of Young, Nash and McDaid was using a firearm.”
This ran counter to the three civilian eyewitnesses who testified at the Inquiry
that no guns, petrol bombs or nail bombs were used by any people around the
Rossville Street barricade. One of those who testified was Mr. James Chapman, a
civil servant in the employ of the Army and previously a Warrant Officer in the
Royal Regiment of Wales. He stated that the paratroopers opened fire without
anybody at the barricade having fired at them or having thrown nail bombs.
Another eyewitness, Mr. Ronald Wood, who was English born and had served twelve
years in the Royal Navy, testified in similar terms. The eyewitness statements
that are in the Government’s possession bear out the accounts of Mr. Chapman and
Mr. Wood. Only stones and similar debris were thrown.
206. Additionally, the reliability of the soldiers’ evidence has been
seriously undermined in the light of Prof. Walsh’s report. Lord Widgery’s
judgement therefore about Young, Nash and McDaid must be clearly set aside since
it was based in part on the evidence of the soldiers about the threat emanating
from the barricade, a perception uniformly contradicted by the civilian
eyewitnesses whose accounts were supported by the photographic evidence. Lord
Widgery’s speculation that some of those shot at the barricade were carrying
weapons is revealed as a wholly unwarranted and, arguably, wilfully unfair
imputation.
207. A disturbing feature concerning the deaths of Young, Nash and McDaid is
the manner in which the bodies were treated by the soldiers. The appalling lack
of respect, to put it mildly, in the manner in which they were treated is well
illustrated by the following eyewitness accounts.
– … a saracen came through the barricade near the boys who lay there. The
boys were pulled by their arms and clothing off the barricade. At no time did
the soldiers examine them to ascertain if they were dead. The elderly man was
trying to reason with the soldiers but was butted and pushed away… The
soldiers took arms and legs and threw the young men’s bodies one after the
other into the saracen. After this I was sick.
– I watched while the military dragged two of these three victims (I don’t
know if they were dead) to the second Saracen. They came back then for the
third boy and dragged him over also. Six soldiers lifted the first two boys
and threw them into the car just as if they were pigs. The third they lifted
to throw him in too when to my horror I saw an officer with two epaulettes of
two pips plus a crown (a Lieutenant-Colonel) kick this boy with his right boot
as the men threw him into the car….
– .. A saracen tank approached the bodies. Soldiers got out and tossed the
bodies into the back of the saracen like coal into a bunker, showing no
respect for the dead. I could see soldiers smiling over their dead. (William
Bridge)
208. In addition to the disrespect, there was a complete failure to take any
cognisance of the removal of the bodies in terms of the integrity of forensic
evidence. The nature of the removal almost certainly contaminated the bodies
with lead and completely undermined any possible inference on this score. A BBC
1 television documentary entitled “Remember Bloody Sunday”, broadcast
on 28 January 1992, recreated the forensic tests used at the time on the bodies
of Nash, Young and McDaid and established that the nature of the removal by the
Paras would result in a positive test for lead. Don Mullan has made the point
that despite the presence of other bodies close by, only the bodies of Nash,
Young and McDaid were retrieved by 1 Para and that they were only brought to
Altnagelvin Hospital after 6.00pm. The particular treatment of these remains,
considered in conjunction with the suggestion that they were killed by shots
fired from the vicinity of the Walls, not only undermines Lord Widgery’s
assertions based on forensic tests carried out on the victims but also raises
legitimate questions about why they were selected for such prompt removal.
209. Perhaps most disturbing of all was the failure to check if in fact the
victims were actually deceased at the time of their removal by the British Army.
It does not appear that any medical assistance was readily available from the
British Army if the victims were still alive as claimed in the case of McDaid
(see account of John Gorman below). This failure was compounded by the
widespread and at times violent hindrance on the part of the soldiers to the
Order of Malta when its uniformed members were attempting to render assistance.
210. In the statements given to the Government in 1972, there are numerous
emphatic assertions that there were no guns or nail bombs being used against the
British Army. They confirm the version of events given by the civilians to Lord
Widgery that no firearms, petrol bombs or nail bombs were used in the vicinity
of the Rossville Street barricade and that only stones and other such debris
were used against the Army.
211. Lord Widgery’s almost exclusive reliance – in his finding – on highly
dubious forensic evidence which he invoked as supporting the soldiers’ versions
of events creates very strong grounds to contend that Lord Widgery consciously
chose to accept a version of events at odds with the evidence. In contrast to
the military eyewitnesses (who were in any event implicated in unlawful
killings), the civilian eyewitness statements were internally consistent,
mutually corroborating, and remained fully uniform in substance as between the
versions given to NICRA/NCCL and later to the Widgery Tribunal. The civilian
eyewitnesses all attested to the fact that at the time of their deaths, neither
Young, McDaid nor Nash was using a firearm. Their evidence is all one way in
that regard and is in direct conflict with the soldiers’ versions of events.
Lord Widgery’s implicit judgement that all of the civilians erred or were lying
beggars belief.
212. In addition, Denis Patrick McLaughlin stated that a short time after the
shootings at the barricade, soldiers appeared and moved the civilians present
on. Having regard to the unique circumstances of the situation and the
eyewitness accounts of them, serious doubt is cast on Lord Widgery’s finding
that there was sufficient opportunity for firearms to have been removed by
others. The evidence points to a virtual improbability that the soldiers who
arrested the people sheltering against the wall could possibly have failed to
see, and recover, a firearm at the barricade if one was there – especially if
the weapon was a sub-machine gun as alleged by Captain 028 (paragraph 52 of the
Widgery Report). Not one of the many eyewitnesses, including soldiers and
photographers, in the vicinity of that barricade saw that machine gun.
213. Finally, one might usefully recall the conclusion of Prof. Dash that
“since the testimony of the civilian witnesses and Army witnesses is so
irreconcilably conflicting as to these deaths, one of these groups of witnesses
must have testified falsely. It would appear that there was a greater motive for
paratroopers to lie in defence of their shooting and killing of civilians, than
for the civilian witnesses. The civilian witnesses who actually came to the
Inquiry to give testimony were exceptional, in light of the general reluctance
of civilian eyewitnesses in Londonderry to cooperate with an English
Inquiry.” The new material – given very shortly after the Widgery Report
was issued and based on the same evidence as that presented to Lord Widgery –
emphatically endorses this conclusion.
Michael McDaid
Para 77. Age 20. This man was shot when close to Young at the Rossville
Street barricade. The bullet struck him in the front in the left cheek. The
paraffin test disclosed abnormal lead particle density on his jacket and one
large particle of lead on the back of the right hand. Any of the soldiers
considered in connection with the death of Young might equally well have shot
McDaid. Dr Martin thought that the lead density was consistent with McDaid
having handled a firearm, but I think it more consistent with his having been in
close proximity to someone firing.
214. The observations regarding the death of Young in terms of the allegation
of the use of firearms, the quality of the forensic tests, the reliability of
soldiers’ statements and the evidently partisan conclusion of Lord Widgery apply
equally to the death of Michael McDaid. The photographic evidence (as published
in Eyewitness Bloody Sunday) moments before his death clearly demonstrate that
McDaid, dressed in his Sunday best, was unarmed and moving away from the
advancing soldiers in Rossville Street. Far from being aggressive, his
expression is one of concern and anxiety as he glances at the dying Michael
Kelly being ministered to by other civilians, including Don Mullan himself.
Moments later, McDaid is shot through the left cheek.
215. Lord Widgery referred to the entry wound in his finding but failed to
refer to the exit wound which was below the right scapula – the line of
trajectory being clearly downwards. Had Lord Widgery done so and had he not
ignored the medical evidence of the Assistant State Pathologist (Dr. John
Press), he would have had to acknowledge and explain how McDaid was shot from an
elevated position. Had he heeded civilians who had witnessed his death, he would
have had to acknowledge also that McDaid was shot while facing the vicinity of
the Derry Walls. Had Lord Widgery done that, he would consequently have had to
explain how McDaid was shot in the head, from an elevated position, and while
facing toward the vicinity of Derry Walls. Had he come to this point, he would
certainly have had to abandon – at least in part – the very narrow geographical
limits he had imposed on the Inquiry to include the activity of the British Army
on the Walls.
216. Even on his own terms, while Lord Widgery accepted that McDaid himself
was not handling a weapon, he failed to make any comment whatsoever on the fact
that McDaid was, therefore, unlawfully killed by the British Army.
217. Alice Long, a Superintendent with the Order of Malta, says this about
the removal of bodies from the area of the barricade:
– Captain Day noticed three soldiers guarding a Saracen. An officer
appeared and shouted not to let anyone come near the Saracen. The soldier
closed the door again. I got a glimpse inside and saw three bodies lying in a
heap. The one on top was wearing a light coloured coat and seemed to have a
wound in the face.
218. A particularly disturbing, not to say grisly, feature of the death of
Michael McDaid, is claimed in the account related by one of the eyewitnesses, Mr
John Gorman: “When I was at the wall at Glenfada Park, I saw Michael McDaid
alive being put into a Saracen by Paratroopers in Rossville Street. Later that
night, I learned that he was dead…”
219. Neither Captain Day nor Alice Long were called to testify at the Widgery
Tribunal. If they had been, Counsel for the next of kin would have been able, on
the basis of Long’s statement alone, to cross-examine Army witnesses more fully
on the forensic evidence relating to Young, Nash and McDaid – particularly, the
whole question of forensic contamination and possibly on whether McDaid was
alive when he was removed from the barricade.
220. While Mr. Gorman, an ex-serviceman with the Royal Enniskillen Fusiliers
and the Ulster Defence Regiment, did testify at the Widgery Tribunal, it was not
adjudged serious enough to warrant mention in the Report. That in itself is a
reflection not only of the quality of the Report but the quality of justice
which informed its authorship.
William Noel Nash
Para 78. Age 19. He also was close to Young and McDaid at the Rossville
Street barricade and the three men were shot almost simultaneously. The bullet
entered his chest from the front and particles of lead were detected on the web,
back and palm of his left hand with a distribution consistent with his having
used a firearm. Soldier P (who can be seen in Mr Mailey’s photographs EP 23/7
and 8; he is looking up the alleyway in No 7) spoke of seeing a man firing a
pistol from the barricade and said that he fired four shots at this man, one of
which hit him in the chest. He thought that the pistol was removed by other
civilians. In view of the site of the injury it is possible that soldier P has
given an accurate account of the death of Nash.
221. The following eyewitness accounts which appear to describe the death of
William Nash are drawn from those given to the Government in 1972 and do not
appear in Eyewitness Bloody Sunday. Had a reasonable number of the civilian
eyewitnesses been called and had their accounts been subjected to
cross-examination and corroboration by comparison with other sources of
evidence, it would in all likelihood have been possible to clarify the exact
circumstances of his death.
– I saw two soldiers, one with an SLR and one with a rubber bullet gun
firing them in the direction of Free Derry Corner…. I moved around the back
of Columcille Court to cross over to the Flats… when I moved across the
street at the barricades, I saw two lads lying on top…. another lad moved
over beside me at the barricade… Just then the lad I was with fell backwards
and said “I am hit”… I saw a hole in his stomach…. He just lay
still… I lay flat on my stomach just behind the three bodies…. I took
refuge in a house and lay on the floor behind the back room window…. After
several minutes I could hear English voices outside the window. I heard
soldiers laughing and one made the remark to the effect “how many did we
get”?… I can quite definitely say that I heard no shots before the Army
fired. I can tell the difference between Army shots and other gun shots….
222. The following statement was published by Mullan.
– … I saw a man dressed in a brown suit and with black hair running over
the loose stones of the barricade towards Free Derry Corner. As I caught sight
of him, he fell back and rolled over on his mouth and nose on the Free Derry
side of the barricade. He was no more than three to four yards from me. He was
unarmed in any way. He began screaming and I realised he had been shot. I then
saw a friend of mine, George Roberts,… crawl over to his side… and he told
me the man was dead. (Denis McLaughlin)
223. The civilian eyewitness evidence is emphatic on the point that Mr.
William Noel Nash, and those in proximity to him, were not using firearms or
bombs when the Army opened fire. Lord Widgery failed to give due weight to this
compelling body of eyewitness material. William Nash is one of the three victims
identified in Mullan’s thesis as having been shot from the vicinity of Derry
Walls. The observations made in relation to the deaths of Young and McDaid apply
therefore equally to him in terms of the entry and exit wound, the line of
trajectory, the direction and source of fire, the removal of his remains and the
likelihood of contamination. The new material, particularly that provided by
Breglio, McClean and Thomas, are all highly relevant to any consideration of the
manner in which Nash was killed. Lord Widgery’s findings in regard to Nash,
therefore, must be set aside as fundamentally flawed.
224. Lord Widgery’s reliance on the testimony of soldier P has been
completely undermined by the revelations contained in Prof. Walsh’s report. The
various statements made by him not alone were at variance with the facts but
were riven with a litany of contradictions and substantive discrepancies. Had
they been revealed at the time, they would have thoroughly discredited him as a
witness. On this ground alone, Lord Widgery’s pronouncements on the death of
William Nash were wholly unreliable and must be deemed wilfully misleading.
225. Dr. McClean notes that Lord Widgery accepted that Nash was shot in the
chest from the front but then directly moves to the alleged presence of lead
particles on Nash’s left hand to suggest that Nash had been using a firearm. As
Dr. McClean points out, Lord Widgery “disregards any discussion relating to
the exit wound and thereby discounts any discussion relating to the trajectory
line through the body.” He goes on: “The post mortem evidence
indicates quite clearly that the angle of the bullet through the body was
approximately 45 degrees [to the horizontal plane]. If William Nash was standing
upright or nearly upright, then he must have been shot from above. He could not
have been shot from ground level.”
226. Dr. McClean also notes that in his evidence to the Tribunal, Dr. John
Press, the Assistant State Pathologist who carried out the official post-mortem
examinations of William Nash, Michael McDaid and John Young, stated that
“both Michael McDaid and John Young were shot in the left cheek and would
have died almost instantly. Had they been standing upright when they were shot,
then the shot must have been fired from above and slightly to the left. It was
possible that the two men were shot from the same position.” Yet Lord
Widgery took no account of this in his Report and suggested instead that any one
of a number of soldiers in the Kells Walk area could have shot any or all of
these men. As Dr. McClean concludes, “the similarity of the trajectory
lines through the three bodies would suggest that this was not haphazard
shooting from different soldiers, at different angles, at ground level. The
evidence as established, would indicate that these men were shot from a location
above them, and possibly by a marksman or marksmen, firing from the same
position.”
Para 79. Mr Alexander Nash, father of William Nash, was wounded at the
barricade. From a position of cover he saw that his son had been hit and went to
help him. As he did so he himself was hit in the left arm. The medical opinion
was that the bullet came from a low velocity weapon and Soldier U described
seeing Mr Nash senior hit by a revolver shot fired from the entrance to the
Rossville Flats. The soldier saw no more than the weapon and the hand holding
it. I think that the most probable explanation of this injury is that it was
inflicted by a civilian firing haphazardly in the general direction of the
soldiers without exposing himself enough to take proper aim.
227. Alexander Nash described the circumstances in which he was wounded in
the following account.
– I heard shooting and thought it was gas and rubber bullets, so I turned
and went back to see what was happening. I saw three men lying on the small
stone barricade in Rossville St. I looked and saw that one of the men was my
son William… I ran across to help him… I put my left hand in the air to
signal that the shooting should stop. I was shot in that arm and was hit in
the ribs also. When I was hit, I was fired at four or five times. I dropped
down beside Willie and the other two men. I put my hand on my son’s back and
said “Willie!”. His eyes were wide open but I knew straight away
that he was dead and that the other two were dead too…. I wish to state
further that my son Willie had £3 with him and was wearing a distinctive
signet ring when he left the house on Sunday. When his clothes were returned
to us, the money and the ring were missing. (Alexander Nash)
228. The following eyewitness accounts starkly describe this poignant event
involving Alexander Nash and his son William.
– … Soldiers stood in the back gates of the Chamberlain Street house and
behind a burned out van near what was once Eden Place and continued to shoot
in the courtyard of the flats…. I saw an elderly man take cover on the
barricade. He wore a blue suit and cap. He raised himself to a kneeling
position and put his hand up in a waving gesture towards the soldiers. I saw
him put up three fingers and I understood he was telling the soldiers that
there were three bodies there who need medical or spiritual attention.
Immediately he was shot. I saw him clutch his arm. He lay down but made an
effort to get up again. More shots were fired at him. One hit a lamp standard
just in front of him, the others hit the barricade near his head…. My
husband recognised the elderly man wounded at the barricade as Alex Nash, but
at the time we did not know that his son William was one of the three young
men shot there.
– … Three boys fell beside a home-made barricade outside the Flats. I
heard a man call “That’s my son…” It was Mr. Nash. As he raised
both hands to show he was unarmed more shots came from the Army and he was
wounded. One of the three boys at the barricade was Mr. Nash’s son William. He
was dead…(Mary Harkin)
– Three fellows were lying against the barricade when a man came along and
started to shake them. He realised they were dead so he tried to wave to the
soldiers… I saw soldiers with steel helmets on their heads. They shot at him
and he was wounded on the arm. He raised his arm and they shot again. The man
fell down.(B. Marie)
229. Since Lord Widgery was not disputing Alexander Nash’s claim to have been
fired at a number of times, he was therefore in effect proposing that a civilian
first fired a haphazard shot at soldiers, accidentally hitting Mr. Nash yards in
front of him at the barricade; and that either the same civilian then fired
haphazardly four or five times almost hitting the same victim again; or that the
Army perhaps fired three or four times at the civilian with a revolver but they
could only manage to nearly shoot again the victim whom the alleged gunman had
just hit. In other words, Lord Widgery would have us believe that Alexander Nash
was the inadvertent target of both a civilian gunman and the British Army. Yet
the civilian eyewitness statements contain no reference to a civilian gunman and
all agree that the British Army shot Mr. Alexander Nash while he was signaling
that fire should cease while he made a futile attempt to help his dying or dead
son. Alexander Nash’s hurt and grief were to be compounded further by the
British Army when ‘an R.S.M. of the paratroopers’ denied for some time the
administration of spiritual assistance to Young, Nash and McDaid while their
remains were inside a Saracen.
230. The eyewitness statements directly contradict soldier U’s account of a
revolver having been fired from the entrance to Rossville Flats. Prof. Walsh
makes clear that soldier U failed to make any reference to this incident in his
original statement. Combined with other changes, this clearly makes him
unreliable. However, as Prof. Walsh also points out, soldier U’s subsequent
testimony at the Tribunal was inconsistent and contradicted known facts (e.g.
soldier U claimed to have seen William Nash struck on the head; William Nash was
not struck on the head). Furthermore, Prof. Walsh points out that the bullet
which wounded Alexander Nash was not recovered and the medical evidence was
based only on the notion that an Army bullet could normally be expected to cause
more damage. The Tribunal, he writes, “ignored the fact that U’s account
was patently wrong as far as William Nash was concerned”. Yet Lord Widgery
was content to rely on it regarding the cause of Alexander Nash’s wound. The new
material dictates that Lord Widgery’s judgement on how Alexander Nash came to be
wounded must be set aside.
Michael Kelly
Para 80. Age 17. Kelly was shot while standing at the Rossville Street
barricade in circumstances similar to those already described in the cases of
Young, Nash and McDaid. The bullet entered his abdomen from the front which
disposes of a suggestion in the evidence that he was running away at the time.
The bullet was recovered and proved that Kelly was shot by Soldier F, who
described having fired one shot from the Kells Walk area at a man at the
barricade who was attempting to throw what appeared to be a nail bomb…..
Para 81. The lead particle density on Kelly’s right cuff was above normal and
was, I think, consistent with his having been close to someone using a firearm.
This lends further support to the view that someone was firing at the soldiers
from the barricade, but I do not think that this was Kelly nor am I satisfied
that he was throwing a bomb at the time when he was shot.
Points 230-275
231. The following eyewitness accounts appear to attest to how Michael Kelly
died.
– … I was at the barricade at St. Columb’s Court. I attended to a man who
was hit by a rubber bullet when the Army opened up. I took him around the
corner for shelter from the bullets. The man then said not to worry about him
but to see to a man who was shot and bleeding to death just around the corner.
We went over and picked him up. He had no weapons whatsoever on him or near
him. His name is Michael Kelly. As we were running for cover with him the Army
fired after us. We then took him into a house and attended to his wounds… We
stayed there until the shooting had stopped. We then waited for an ambulance
which was prevented from coming in, by which time young Kelly was in a bad
state. He might have lived if we had got him to hospital.
– We ran in the direction of Glenfada Park. As we reached here, two young
men fell behind the barricade. There had been at least a dozen shots fired by
the Paras as we made for cover. A few seconds later, a youth was shot at the
entrance to Glenfada Park. We rushed out and carried him towards the flats for
shelter. We came under fire from the direction of Derry Walls, as we sought
shelter. In my opinion, the youth was dead and I said an Act of Contrition in
his ear. As I looked up, the late Gerry McKinney was also kneeling beside me
and a Priest (Fr. Bradley) who was giving the Last Rites to the youth…
(M.J.J.)
– I saw people running into Glenfada Park and was told that the army was
coming into Rossville Street. Almost immediately, I heard the sound of
gunfire. Within seconds of the gunfire commencing, I observed the body of a
man lying in the entrance to Glenfada Park immediately opposite the main
entrance to Rossville Street flats. I know now that this man was Michael
Kelly, aged 17. I made my way to him and knelt down beside him. I noticed
immediately that he had been shot. He was carrying no weapon of any kind. I
…..then asked four people to carry him into a house to get medical
attention. They raised him on their shoulders and headed for the far corner of
Glenfada Park. Throughout all this time the shooting by the British soldiers
continued.
232. The civilian eyewitness evidence is absolutely clear that nobody at the
Rossville Street barricade was using firearms or bombs of any kind. Lord Widgery
found that Kelly was not firing at the soldiers from the barricade and that he
was not throwing a bomb at the time he was shot. Soldier F however testified
that he shot a man at the barricade who was about to throw a nail bomb which was
fizzing or smoking. Lord Widgery accepted that the bullet which killed Kelly was
fired by soldier F. In other words, he found that soldier F shot and killed
Kelly, an unarmed civilian. Rather than drawing the obvious conclusion, Lord
Widgery opted to imply that Kelly was shot in the company of others using nail
bombs at the barricade, thus attempting to infer a degree of justification for
soldier F’s action. Lord Widgery yet again offered no explanation for soldier
F’s action in shooting Kelly or in making a claim which was directly
contradicted by eyewitnesses and for which no corroboration could be found.
233. The scant treatment of Kelly’s death is itself revealing. Lord Widgery
failed to make any reference to the eyewitness statements refuting the notion
that guns or nail bombs were being used by civilians on the barricade. Rather,
he chose to support the contention of soldier F that hostile fire prompted
return fire. Yet according to Prof. Walsh, soldier F made no mention of the
shooting of a nail bomber on the barricade either in his original statement or
in a supplementary one. This compounds Lord Widgery’s decision not to indict in
some manner the actions of soldier F. Once again, the new material has revealed
that Lord Widgery’s finding on the context in which Kelly was shot dead was
based on a demonstrably unreliable and implicated witness, one who was known as
such to the Tribunal but not made known to Counsel for the next of kin in the
course of the adversarial proceedings. Lord Widgery’s finding therefore is
unreliable and misleading.
Kevin McElhinney
Para 82. Age 17. He was shot whilst crawling southwards along the pavement
on the west side of No 1 Block of Rossville Flats at a point between the
barricade and the entrance to the Flats. The bullet entered his buttock so that
it is clear that he was shot from behind by a soldier in the area of Kells Walk.
Lead particles were detected on the back of the left hand and the quantity of
particles on the back of his jacket was significantly above normal, but this may
have been due to the fact that the bullet had been damaged. Dr Martin thought
the lead test inconclusive on this account. Although McElhinney may have been
hit by any of the rounds fired from Kells Walk in the direction of the
barricade- eg by Soldiers L and M, who are to be seen in Mr Morris’s photograph
EP 2/8- it seems probable that the firer was Sergeant K. This senior NCO was a
qualified marksman whose rifle was fitted with a telescopic sight and who fired
only one round in the course of the afternoon. He described two men crawling
from the barricade in the direction of the door of the flats and said that the
rear man was carrying a rifle. He fired one aimed shot but could not say whether
it hit. Sergeant K obviously acted with responsibility and restraint. Though I
hesitate to make a positive finding against a deceased man, I was much impressed
by Sergeant K’s evidence.
234. The following eyewitness statements, drawn from Mullan and the
statements given to the Government in 1972, record the following about the death
of Kevin McElhinny.
– When the soldiers entered Rossville Street…. One of these soldiers ran
towards a wall at the maisonettes opposite the High Flats – he aimed the rifle
at a group of young boys who were standing on the Free Derry Corner side of a
barricade of rubble which is directly outside the main doors of the High
Flats…. I saw one of these boys fall just as a soldier fired from his
position at the maisonettes … Immediately I heard further shots … directed
at the other boys at the barricade of rubble. We retreated immediately to the
doors of the flats. Kevin McElhinney was running alongside me. We were
crouched and running at the same time – making for the main door of the flats.
As I entered, I heard Kevin – who was now just behind me – shout “I’m
hit…. I’m hit….”. I dived on in the door and went up the stairs
thinking that Kevin was behind me. I realised that no one was behind me so I
ran back and saw Kevin lying dead just inside the door. Kevin was beside me
for the few moments before he was shot. At no time had [he] a nail bomb,
petrol bomb, gun or any other lethal weapon.
– … I saw a youth running towards the entrance to the high Rossville
flats. He was shot down from behind. Lying on the ground, he grabbed one of
the canopy entrance supports. He dragged himself approx. one foot when two
shots rang out in rapid succession. The youth appeared to loose his grip on
the canopy support and his body went completely limp…. People who were in
the entrance to the flats dragged him in…(M.J.J.)
– … I then took refuge in a house in Glenfada Park… Looking out of the
window… I saw a soldier in a kneeling position. He was approached by another
soldier who seemed to be in a position of authority and his attention was
drawn to a young boy who was crawling along the ground. The soldier who had
been kneeling rose to his feet, took aim at the boy and pulled the trigger….
The boy stopped moving and someone from the flats pulled him into the doorway.
The soldier who fired the shot followed the instructions given him by the
other soldier and fired at targets as he was told….
235. The civilian eyewitness evidence contradicts directly Sergeant’s K’s
account of McElhinney carrying a rifle when shot. The statement of eyewitness
no. 50 is quite significant. Having regard to the eyewitness’s proximity to
McElhinney during the latter’s last moments, the eyewitness directly contradicts
in an unambiguous way Sergeant K’s testimony that McElhinney was armed. There is
little room for any uncertainty that the same incident is being related; at the
moment of the shooting, eyewitness no. 50 states that he was indeed in front of
McElhinney which matches Sergeant K’s description. The account of eyewitness no.
50 corroborates the accounts given by two civilian eyewitnesses who testified
before Lord Widgery. The clear burden of evidence, then as now, was that Kevin
McElhinney was unarmed and that he was seeking refuge from the firing when he
was shot dead.
236. Since Sergeant K was a qualified marksman whose rifle was fitted with a
telescopic sight, it is highly unlikely that he could have hit his target and
failed to see that the target was not carrying a rifle. Moreover, if Sergeant K
was so experienced a marksman (using a telescopic sight), logically it is
difficult to see how he could fail to have known whether he had hit his target.
Nor does the shooting from behind of a crawling figure – irrespective of whether
or not he was armed – resonate of “responsibility and restraint”. In
this case, these words lose all true meaning when set against the unequivocal
civilian eyewitness evidence that Kevin McElhinney was not armed when shot dead
from behind.
237. Prof. Walsh’s report reveals that, taken together, the statements by
Sergeant K, soldier L and soldier M made variously to the Military Police, the
Treasury Solicitors and the Inquiry are so replete with contradictions and
discrepancies that they cannot be reconciled to each other, let alone the facts
as decided by Lord Widgery. Lord Widgery’s cavalier equivocation as between the
guilt of McElhinney and the character of Sergeant K was unacceptable then and is
clearly unsustainable now.
238. It is difficult not to draw attention to the description provided by the
eyewitnesses of the chilling deliberation which preceded Kevin McElhinney’s
death. This was not death by accident. It was not death in the heat of battle.
It was death through calculated selection by a supervisor to a marksman of a
target who was clearly not presenting a threat but striving like his other
fellow citizens to find shelter from a fusillade of Army fire. Indeed, so
evidently calculated was the fatal shot directed at McElhinney that it might
indicate the basis on which targets were selected. The evidence regarding the
fatalities indicates that the injunction “move and you’re dead”, heard
so often, supports a suspicion that this may have been a contributory factor in
the soldiers’ decisions of whom to shoot. (If this were true, it meant those who
sought to render assistance to the dying and the wounded were particularly
susceptible to becoming a target.)
James Joseph Wray, Gerald McKinney, Gerald Donaghy and William McKinney
Para 83. These four men were all shot somewhere near the south-west corner
of the more northerly of the two courtyards of the flats at Glenfada Park. Their
respective ages were 22, 35, 17 and 26. The two McKinneys were not related.
Three other men wounded in the same area were Quinn, O’Donnell and Friel. I deal
with the cases of these four deceased together because I find the evidence too
confused and too contradictory to make separate consideration possible. One
important respect in which the shooting in Glenfada Park differs from that at
the Rossville Street barricade and in the forecourt of the Rossville Flats is
that there is no photographic evidence.
239. In the scale of inadequate and unsatisfactory treatment represented by
the Widgery Report, Lord Widgery’s account of the four deaths in and around
Glenfada Park was particularly abysmal. Seven people in all were hit by Army
fire from just four soldiers within a tiny geographical area and under the eyes
of numerous eyewitnesses, including the three survivors. Lord Widgery’s findings
on this carnage, inflicted with such apparent ease, by members of 1 Para on
innocent civilians, merited just three paragraphs; equal to the number he
devoted to defending the Army’s spurious claim that one of the deceased, Gerard
Donaghy, was carrying nail bombs.
240. Lord Widgery failed to locate precisely (or even roughly) where they
died, how they died and who shot them (the one exception was based on forensic
evidence). Despite the plethora of evidence, Lord Widgery took refuge in a
confusion that was only evident to him and which it was surely his remit to end.
Despite the Tribunal’s knowledge that the implicated soldiers provided
contradictory and highly dubious accounts which could not be matched with those
of civilian (i.e. non-implicated) eyewitnesses, Lord Widgery wilfully failed to
adjudicate on the credibility of the contending versions and claimed without
justification that contradictions occluded a definite conclusion. Lord Widgery
chose only to hear the testimony of the soldiers who actually fired rather than
seeking the views of non-implicated soldiers who were present but did not fire.
In short, Lord Widgery again failed inexplicably to reasonably and fairly
consider all of the relevant evidence available to him.
Para 84. Four soldiers, all from the Anti-Tank Platoon, fired in this
area, namely E, F, G and H. Initially the Platoon deployed in the Kells Walk
area and was involved in the firing at the Rossville Street barricade. It will
be remembered that at this time some 30 or 40 people were in the region of the
barricade, of whom some were engaging the soldiers whilst others were taking
cover behind the nearby gable end of the flats in Glenfada Park. (Mr Mailey’s
photographs EP 23/10, 11 and 12.) Corporal E described how he saw civilians
firing from the barricade and then noticed some people move towards the
courtyard of Glenfada Park. He said that on his own initiative he accordingly
led a small group of soldiers into the courtyard from the north-east corner to
cut these people off. The recollection of the Platoon Commander (Lieutenant 119)
was somewhat different; he said that he sent Soldiers E and F into the courtyard
of Glenfada Park to cut off a particular gunman who had been firing from the
barricade. The result in any event was that Soldiers E and F advanced into the
courtyard and Soldiers G and H followed shortly afterwards. In the next few
minutes there was a very confused scene in which according to civilian evidence
some of the people who had been sheltering near the gable end of Glenfada Park
sought to escape by running through the courtyard in the direction of Abbey Park
and the soldiers fired upon them killing the four men named at the head of this
paragraph. Soldiers E, F and G gave an account of having been attacked by the
civilians in this group and having fired in reply. Soldier H gave an account of
his activities with which I deal later. From the forensic evidence about a
bullet recovered from the body it is known that Soldier G shot Donaghy. It is
clear that the other three were shot by Soldiers E, F, G or H. Although several
witnesses spoke of having seen the bodies there was a conflict of evidence as to
whether they fell in the courtyard of Glenfada Park or between Glenfada Park and
Abbey Park. The incident ended when the 20 to 30 civilians remaining in the
courtyard were arrested on the orders of the Platoon Commander, who came into
Glenfada Park just as the shooting finished.
Para 85. In the face of such confused and conflicting testimony it is
difficult to reach firm conclusions but it seems to me more probable that the
civilians in Glenfada Park were running away than that they were seeking a
battle with the soldiers in such a confined space. It may well be that some of
them had been attacking the soldiers from the barricade, a possibility somewhat
strengthened by the forensic evidence. The paraffin tests on the hand swabs and
clothing of Gerald McKinney and William McKinney were negative. Dr. Martin did
not regard the result of the tests on Donaghy as positive but Professor Simpson
did. The two experts agreed that the results of the tests on Wray were
consistent with his having used a firearm. However, the balance of probability
suggests that at the time when these four men were shot the group of civilians
was not acting aggressively and that the shots were fired without justification.
I am fortified in this view by the account given by Soldier H, who spoke of
seeing a rifleman firing from a window of a flat on the south side of the
Glenfada Park courtyard. Soldier H said that he fired an aimed shot at the man,
who withdrew but returned a few moments later, whereupon Soldier H fired again.
This process was repeated until Soldier H had fired 19 shots, with a break for a
change of magazine. It is highly improbable that this cycle of events should
repeat itself 19 times; and indeed it did not. I accepted evidence subsequently
given, supported by photographs, which showed that no shot at all had been fired
through the window in question. So 19 of the 22 shots fired by Soldier H were
wholly unaccounted for.
241. The following is a selection of eyewitness accounts of the events in
Glenfada Park as published in Eyewitness Bloody Sunday.
– I got only as far as Glenfada Park when I heard people shouting and
squealing ‘There’s the army. There’s the Saracens’. I stopped and looked to my
left and saw a group of people running through an arch in front of me. A young
man in the group wearing a blue suit had an injury and lacerations to the side
of his head… I ran in the door [of No 7] … I kept the door slightly open
and looked through the slip-way between the houses in front of me. I saw a
young man falling and as he fell he hit his head on the side walk… His head
was raised up looking towards me and I saw a cut above his left eye. He tried
to raise himself up but failed and then I saw blood on his wrist…. I ran out
towards the man…. As I was running I saw one of the men make an effort to go
towards the injured man. I then heard three bullets hitting the wall between
myself and the injured man…. I ran back to No. 7… I saw an elderly man
lying face up on the ground. He was not moving…. I then saw a young man run
from the right towards the man waving a white handkerchief. He stopped between
the corner and the man and shouted “Don’t shoot, don’t shoot”. The
next I saw he was knocked off his feet onto the ground… [Later] I saw the
first para of the second group fire four shots from the hip position and
fanned the rifle as he did so…. I moved to the centre of the window and
still observed the man I had tried to rescue. I saw him lift his head off the
ground… I then saw the back of the man’s coat jump twice about 4 or 5 inches
in the air and I said ‘Good God, that man’s just been shot twice in the back
at close range’. I saw some smoke rise from where he had been shot….(John
P.)
– Some soldiers crossed Glenfada car park and started shooting at the men
who were at the corner of Glenfada Park opposite my house (8 Abbey Park)…. a
soldier.. ran forward towards several men at the corner of the house and
stopped 15-20 yds from them – the men ran except one man who put his hands
above his head and faced the soldier. The soldier put the gun to his shoulder
and shot at this man who fell on his face and turned over. Another man ran to
him from the next house – the soldier was still standing there and as the man
bent over the injured man, the soldier shot him too and he fell. The soldier
then ran away back through Glenfada Park…(John Carr)
– I went back home [Abbey Park] and I had just arrived there when the
shooting started… The firing ceased for a few minutes and I went to the
window and saw the legs of a man lying outside. There were five or six people
across from him and a youth lying in Glenfada Park. The shooting started
again. The boys across the street had their hands above their heads. A man
stepped over a low wall to reach the man who was lying down. He had his hands
above his head. At this point I saw the man lying in Glenfada Park raise
himself from the ground. I saw a soldier run up to him and shoot him again. He
fell in the road again. This same soldier then fired at the man who had
stepped over the [low] wall and this man fell. He crawled and the soldier shot
him again. A girl from the First Aid post ran to him and a shot was fired at
her… People brought the last man who was shot into my home. He was not
dead…. the ambulance came to take the man. This man is now dead. I now know
that he was William McKinney. I can state with absolute certainty that Mr.
McKinney had no weapon of any kind.(Bridget O’Reilly).
– I then made my way to Glenfada Park. Suddenly, fire sounded to my right.
Shots then came from the direction of the walled part of the city, which are
patrolled solely by the security forces. I saw two men running towards where I
was taking cover. One of them I knew personally. His name is Gerard McKinney.
He was running across an open courtyard in Glenfada Park. I saw him stop and
fling his arms in the air. He shouted “No, No”, and was shot by a
soldier who appeared at the corner. McKinney fell to the ground on his back
and lay still. The other who fell was moving, tried to pull himself towards
us, but seemed to lose consciousness. Several attempts were made to get to the
fallen men, but each time anyone exposed himself he was fired on…(Charles M,
a former RUC officer)
242. These statements are supported by other statements made to the
Government in 1972.
– I then ran down to my own gate [Abbey Park] and some men were with me and
I brought them into the house with me. I went to my front window and I saw a
youth fall at Glenfada Park – his head was on the kerb and his body on the
street. He moved slightly – and just as I was going to go out to him more
shots rang out, the youth’s body jerked and lay still. A soldier jumped over
his body and then stood at the Housing Trust Office – a youth in blue denims
ran with his hands above his head towards the steps – the soldier took aim and
shot – the youth fell, tried to rise on his elbow and another lad with hands
above his head ran towards the wounded youth – he fell shot beside this youth.
He also moved and the soldier shot twice at him again…. men were able to
lift the three bodies and bring one to my house and two next door. These three
youths died.
– More shots rang out and my friend ran across to Glenfada Park and I stood
behind a car. Then, I saw a man running out holding his arm. Another three
shots rang out and this man fell. A soldier appeared and ran forward and shot
this man at point blank range in the lung…. I and a few others went to this
man’s aid…. we heard that there was another body at the back of the block of
flats. We walked round with our hands on our heads and then three shots rang
out, two hitting the wall beside us. The bloke in front of us was hit in the
head…. We went back to the man who had been shot three times and we took him
to a nearby house and I stayed with him until he died about half an hour
later.
– I saw two men [from Abbey Park], one young man, the other about middle
aged, and one soldier. The two men were walking towards the soldier who had a
gun trained on them. One was dressed in brown clothes, brown suit, brown socks
and brown shoes. This man was the older of the two men. The younger man was
dressed in a white shirt and dark coat and dark trousers. He had thick black
hair. The two men were walking, with their hands on the crown of their heads,
from Abbey Park out towards Glenfada Park… just outside Mrs O’Reilly’s
window the soldier fired his rifle. He had his rifle against his chest and the
two men fell.
– Near Columcille Court, the shooting started in earnest… A youth (aged
about 16) was shot in the side and Gerry (McKinney) knelt to try and assist
the young fellow. Along with a couple of other boys we tried to lift him out
of danger but the retreating crowd knocked him from our grasp…. Gunfire was
heavy when I suggested that we try to cross the Court in the direction of
Butcher Street… Gerry decided after a few minutes to take a chance and
accompanied by a youth, whom I don’t know, he led us out across the Court…
At a stage when I can only assume he was visible from the other side of the
entrance Gerry turned, shouted “No, No” and put his hands in the
air. A shot rang out which caught Gerry in the chest and he fell forward. A
second shot rang out and the youth who was leading the way along with him fell
to the ground… The Army shot them in cold blood….
243. The civilian eyewitness accounts are clear, internally consistent and
mutually corroborating. Even without the elucidation of cross examination,
information available from military sources and the support of forensic and
ballistics evidence, it is quite possible to draw some conclusions as to what
happened in Glenfada Park and Abbey Park. There was little or no justification
for Lord Widgery’s confusion and his inability to locate where each of the
victims was located as between Glenfada and Abbey Parks. John P. – a
quartermaster with the Irish Army – describes the killings of James Joseph Wray,
and either Gerard McKinney or Gerard Donaghy.
244. Like other eyewitnesses, John P. also described the efforts to assist
the wounded being thwarted and, particularly disturbingly, of the coup de grace
administered to James Wray who was injured but clearly alive when he was again
shot in the back at close range by a soldier. This eyewitness account is
remarkably accurate on points of detail – for example, the medical evidence
shows that Wray did indeed have a laceration above the left eye and an abrasion
in the region of one of his wrists. Eyewitness no. 26 confirmed the account that
Wray was shot while lying injured on the ground. Dr. McClean, on the treatment
of the killing of James Wray in the Report, says the following:
– No reference was made to the very clear forensic evidence produced at post
mortem. No reference was made to the fact that the forensic evidence was
consistent with several eye-witness accounts which stated that Jim Wray was shot
[dead] in the back as he lay on the ground. Several eye-witnesses stated that
they called to Jim Wray as he lay on the ground. He replied that he was all
right but that he couldn’t move his legs. This was consistent with the lower
entry and exit wounds, caused by a bullet travelling across the lumbar region
superficially.
245. Eyewitness no. 26 also describes the shootings of Gerard McKinney and
Gerard Donaghy, noting that Donaghy was running with his hands above his head
when he was shot. The other person, Gerard McKinney, was shot immediately
afterwards while he too had his arms raised. In his book, The Road to Bloody
Sunday, Dr. McClean states: ‘It was very clear from the trajectory line of this
bullet that this man must have had both arms raised, otherwise the fatal bullet
must have penetrated one or both arms. No reference to this very clear evidence
was made anywhere in the Widgery Report’. According to eyewitnesses, the last
words of Gerard McKinney were: “Don’t Shoot! Don’t Shoot!’ or ‘No! No!’.
246. Eyewitness Bridget O’Reilly gives a very moving account in Eyewitness
Bloody Sunday of the death of William McKinney. Her account is very clear on the
point that this man was shot while selflessly and courageousely going to the
assistance of another. Indeed, when shot, other eyewitnesses support her account
that the injured McKinney still persisted with his efforts at assistance. As
Bridget O’Reilly states in her account: ‘This same soldier then fired at the man
who had stepped over the [low] wall and this man fell. He crawled and the
soldier shot him again. A girl from the First Aid post ran to him and a shot was
fired at her’. This account does not necessarily conflict with the medical
evidence because McKinney had two entry wounds: one on the left wrist and one on
the right side of the back. Lord Widgery’s delicately chosen words that the
shooting in Glenfada Park ‘bordered on the reckless’ amounted to a gross
distortion of the accounts offered by civilian eyewitnesses.
247. Based on the foregoing, the following assertions can reasonably be made:
– that paratroopers of the anti-tank unit entered Glenfada Park and that
four of them opened fire on a panic stricken group of civilians who were
attempting to flee both the shooting in Rossville Street and the members of 1
Para who had appeared in Glenfada.
– that none of these civilians was armed or hostile.
– that one of the paratroopers shot and wounded James Wray and that the
same or another paratrooper then shot him dead at close range.
– that William McKinney, when going to the assistance of another injured
man, was wounded and died, his death possibly caused by a second bullet fired
from close proximity.
– that a paratrooper stood at the entrance to Abbey Park and shot and
perhaps killed two of the victims.
– that Gerard Donaghy and Gerard McKinney were shot and killed at close
range or at almost point blank range while indicating that they were unarmed
and/or pleading to live.
248. Particularly within the context of eyewitness accounts of the killings
and injuries in Glenfada Park, it is important to note that, throughout his
entire Report, Lord Widgery did not refer to any detailed forensic examination
of the clothing of the deceased with reference to bullet entry wounds. The
records of the Inquests, which took place on 21 August 1973, do not indicate
that any such examinations took place. In the case of James Wray, for example,
it was noted that forensic swabs were taken from his hands but there was no
indication that his clothes were subject to detailed forensic examination by
reference to the entry wounds on his back. Such examinations, set within the
context of the bullet entry wounds of the deceased, could have provided crucial
assistance to establishing the veracity or otherwise of eyewitness accounts that
some of the victims were shot dead at close range or point blank range.
249. When set, for example, against the emphasis given to dubious forensic
evidence regarding the scarf in Bernard McGuigan’s case, the absence of any
reference in the Widgery Report to proper forensic testing on clothing relative
to bullet entry wounds reinforces the assertion that the Tribunal, on the one
hand, selectively invoked dubious forensic evidence in defence of the Army’s
claims and, on the other hand, wilfully ignored potentially valuable sources of
evidentiary material with the effect of grossly and perversely distorting the
case regarding the deceased.
250. Lord Widgery’s findings on the actions of 1 Para in Glenfada Park were
also woefully inadequate and misleading. Not only is there no finding produced
on the three wounded men, but the treatment of the circumstances surrounding the
four dead is banal in the extreme. For example, the post-mortem reports show
clearly that James Wray was shot twice in the back and that William McKinney was
shot once in the back. In this as in other instances, what Lord Widgery chose to
ignore was more revealing than what he chose to write about in his finding.
251. The accounts provided by the civilian eyewitnesses have been
considerably enhanced by the emergence of the Para AA statement. There is an
eerie correlation between the civilian eyewitness accounts here and that
provided in the Para AA document which described in vivid and compelling detail
the anti-tank platoon’s action in Glenfada Park thus:
– Para DD, Para CC, Para EE and myself then leapt the wall, turned right
and ran down Kells Walk into Glenfada Park, a small triangular car park within
the complex of flats. A group of 40 civilians were there running in an effort
to get away. Para CC fired from the hip at a range of 20 yards. The bullet
passed through one man and into another and they both fell, one dead and one
wounded. He then moved forward and fired again, killing the wounded man. They
lay sprawled together half on the pavement and half in the gutter. Para DD
shot another man at the entrance of the Park who also fell on the pavement. A
fourth man was killed by either Para EE or Para FF. I must point out that this
whole incident in Glenfada Park occurred in fleeting seconds and I can no
longer recall the order of fire or who fell first but I do remember that when
we first appeared darkened faces, sweat and aggression, brandishing rifles,
the crowd stopped immediately in their tracks, turned to face us and raised
their hands. This is the way they were standing when they were shot.
252. The Para AA document bears a striking and detailed similarity to the
versions offered by civilian eyewitnesses from the perspective of a soldier. In
and of itself, it is a compelling and horrifying account of how four of the
fatalities of Bloody Sunday met their end. It is a highly significant
corroboration of the events as related by the civilian eyewitnesses from the
soldier’s perspective.
253. As a non-implicated military eyewitness, Para AA might have been
prepared to give a more candid account of the actions of his colleagues had he
been called to testify. However, Para AA alleges that his attempt at candour was
frustrated by the Tribunal staff:
– “Disguised and escorted I was led hunched up through a lot of
waiting pressmen and reporters and shown into some offices within the
building. Here there were a number of soldiers from my Platoon, all disguised
as I was and we spent some time pouring over airxxx [aerial?] photographs with
the S.I.B.[Special Investigations Branch] trying to establish which shots had
been fired by whom and from where – what a farce, we were all grinning at each
other and drawing lines haphazardly all over the place with the result that
the authorities finished up with a series of photographs of sophisticated
looking spider webs which bore no relation to fact. I was then interviewed in
an office by two Crown lawyers on Lord Widgery’s team. I rattled off
everything I had seen and had done. The only thing I omitted were names and
the manner in which people had been shot, apart from that I told the truth
which I wanted to convey. Then to my utter surprise one of these doddering
gentlemen said ‘dear me Private 027, you make it sound as though shots were
being fired at the crowd, we can’t have that can we?’ And then proceeded to
tear up my statement. He left the room and returned ten minutes later with
another statement which bore no relation to fact and was [sic] told with a
smile that this is the statement I would use when going on the stand.
254. Para AA’s allegation that the staff of the Widgery Tribunal colluded to
present distorted and inaccurate statements by soldiers to the Inquiry is
particularly damning for the Inquiry as a whole. If substantiated, it would
thoroughly discredit not just Lord Widgery’s account of the killings in Glenfada
but the whole exercise of the Inquiry itself and the Report which issued from
it.
255. Para AA’s allegation may help explain the pattern of alterations in the
statements of the soldiers revealed by Prof. Walsh’s Report. Prof. Walsh’s
analysis of the original statements by soldiers E, F, G, and H reveals that none
of their versions matched and that major discrepancies existed both between each
other and between different statements made by the same soldier. None of their
versions of what happened actually matched. Soldier E claimed he entered on his
own initiative and was bombarded with nail bombs; he subsequently revised this
to one or two nail bombs. Soldier F claimed he was ordered to go there by E
(Lieutenant 119 also claimed to have given the order). He originally claimed
that 30 to 40 rioters left the barricade and went to Glenfada Park but later
dropped this. The lines of fire marked on the map did not match his evidence
(not surprisingly, if Para AA is to be believed). In his original statement,
soldier G claimed to have shot a gunman and pursued two others who had picked up
the weapons but later dropped this. None of the discrepancies and alterations
were revealed to Counsel for the next of kin. Soldier H’s evidence was so
bizarre that even Lord Widgery discounted it. As Prof. Dash pointed out,
“this soldier’s multiple falsehoods deserved more emphasis than the
delicate mention Lord Widgery made of them.”
256. In the light of the eyewitness statements, the account by Para AA and
the report of Prof. Walsh, the conclusion that Soldiers E, F, G and H were lying
proves inescapable.
257. Prof. Walsh also refers to the inadequacy of Lord Widgery’s finding that
the shots were fired without justification on “the balance of
probability”. As he puts it, “the nature of evidence offered was such
that any impartial judicial body should have been satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt that the soldiers’ firing in Glenfada/Abbey Park was unjustifiable.”
Para 86. A special feature of Gerald Donaghy’s case has some relevance to
his activities in the course of the afternoon although it does not directly bear
on the circumstances in which he was shot.
Para 87. After Donaghy fell he was taken into the house of Mr. Raymond
Rogan at 10 Abbey Park. He had been shot in the abdomen. He was wearing a blue
denim blouse and trousers with pockets of the kind that open to the front rather
than to the side. The evidence was that some at least of his pockets were
examined for evidence of his identity and that his body was examined by Dr.
Kevin Swords, who normally worked in a hospital in Lincoln. Dr. Swords’ opinion
was that Donaghy was alive but should go to hospital immediately. Mr. Rogan
volunteered to drive him there in his car. Mr. Leo Young went with him to help.
The car was stopped at a military check-point in Barrack Street, where Mr. Rogan
and Mr. Young were made to get out. The car was then driven by a soldier to the
Regimental Aid Post of 1st Battalion Royal Anglian Regiment, where Donaghy was
examined by the Medical Officer (Soldier 138) who pronounced him dead. The
Medical Officer made a more detailed examination shortly afterwards but on
neither occasion did he notice anything unusual in Donaghy’s pockets. After
another short interval, and whilst Donaghy’s body still lay on the back seat of
Mr. Rogan’s car, it was noticed that he had a nail bomb in one of his trouser
pockets (as photographed in RUC photographs EP 5A/26 and 27). An Ammunition
Technical Officer (Bomb Disposal Officer, Soldier 127) was sent for and found
four nail bombs in Donaghy’s pockets.
Para 88. There are two possible explanations of this evidence. First, that
the bombs had been in Donaghy’s pockets throughout and had passed unnoticed by
the Royal Anglians’ Medical Officer, Dr. Swords, and others who had examined the
body; secondly that the bombs had been deliberately planted on the body by some
unknown person after the Medical Officer’s examination. These possibilities were
exhaustively examined in evidence because, although the matter is a relatively
unimportant detail of the events of the afternoon, it is no doubt of great
concern to Donaghy’s family. I think that on a balance of probabilities the
bombs were in Donaghy’s pockets throughout. His jacket and trousers were not
removed but were merely opened as he lay on his back in the car. It seems likely
that these relatively bulky objects would have been noticed when Donaghy’s body
was examined; but it is conceivable that they were not and the alternative
explanation of a plant is mere speculation. No evidence was offered as to where
the bombs might have come from, who might have placed them or why Donaghy should
have been singled out for this treatment.
258. The following accounts appear in Eyewitness Bloody Sunday regarding the
death of Gerard Donaghy and the allegation that he was carrying nail bombs.
– A young man whose name I later learnt was Gerard Donaghy was brought into
my sitting room. He was unconscious and badly wounded in the lower left
abdomen. A man who said he was a doctor was present. The doctor told me that
he would have a chance of living if he was got to hospital soon. I volunteered
to take him in my car and I set off for Altanagelvin Hospital with the wounded
man in the back seat. Mr. Leo Young accompanied me… I drove… into Barrack
Street where I was stopped at an army barricade by the Royal Anglian Regiment.
I was immediately pulled out at gunpoint, thrown against a fence. I attempted
to protest as I had a wounded man but was told to shut up or I would be shot.
After half an hour I was made to sit down and after another half hour we were
taken to an army compound on the Craigavon Bridge. My car had been driven away
but I didn’t see this being done. I had asked an officer to contact the RUC
but he told me he was contacting nobody and also a soldier told me that if I
made a move I was dead as one stiff wasn’t enough for them… At the army
compound, I was searched… I was then told by [Detective Sergeant] Mactaggert
that a bomb had been found on the wounded man in my car… There was then an
explosion and Mactaggert indicated, but didn’t actually say, that it was of
the bomb found on the wounded man being detonated…(Raymond Rogan)
– I took one man to the house of Mr Rogan in 10 Abbey Park. He was
unconscious and his intestines seemed to be protruding out of his stomach. I
tried to find his identification from anything in the two top pockets of his
blue denim jacket but found nothing. Mr. Rogan got in his car in order to take
the man to hospital. I went in the car with Mr Rogan driving… In Barrack
Street, we were stopped at an army barricade and pulled out of the car. I said
to a soldier ‘What about that dying young fellow?’ and he said, ‘Let the
bastard die’. I said, ‘You are just an animal’. He then put me up against some
railings, pointed his gun at me and told me that if I blinked he would blow my
head off. There was another private car there with the wounded Joe Friel in
it. I didn’t actually see Friel but the men who got out of the car told me
that it was him. Two soldiers drove these cars away and I never saw the
wounded men again. We were taken to an army post in Foyle Road near Craigavon
Bridge and kept for an hour and a half… I was then taken to Victoria
Barracks and then to Ballykelly and not released until the following Monday.
It was only then that I heard my brother John had been killed. At no time did
I see any civilians carrying a weapon and I never heard the explosion of nail
bombs or petrol bombs…(Hugh Leo Young)
259. Donaghy was wearing tight denim jeans and jacket. A man who helped carry
him into Mr. Rogan’s house testified that so tight were the jeans, ‘a thin
chocolate bar’ in any of the pockets would have been noticed. Dr. Swords
testified that he could not possibly have failed to observe nail bombs in
Donaghy’s pockets when brought to the house. He had thoroughly examined
Donaghy’s body and practically every part of his clothing before recommending
that he be taken to hospital immediately. Young testified that he checked the
two top pockets of Donaghy’s denim jacket and found nothing. Soldier 138, a
British Army Captain and Medical Officer, carried out two examinations of
Donaghy’s body. The purpose of the first examination was to determine if Donaghy
was alive. The purpose of the second, after finding Donaghy dead, was to explore
the nature of the wounds. This latter examination was more detailed. The Army
Medical Officer opened Donaghy’s jeans and examined most of his body, including
adjusting his jeans and jacket. He testified that he did not see any nail bombs
in Donaghy’s possession during either examination.
260. Yet an RUC officer and Army witnesses testified that shortly afterwards,
they found four nail bombs in Donaghy’s clothing – one in each of his jeans
pockets and one in each of his jacket pockets. Having regard to the evidence
before Lord Widgery, his finding that on a balance of probabilities the bombs
were in Donaghy’s pockets throughout is so extraordinary as to border on the
farcical. Nail bombs, which are bulky (weighing about half a pound and measuring
roughly 4.5 by 2 inches) could not conceivably have escaped the notice of
civilians, medical experts and military personnel. If they were present, they
would have been removed in any case by those civilians who had brought him to
shelter. Nail bombs were not noticed by either Soldier 138 or any of the
civilians who were with Donaghy during the last minutes of his life – one of
whom, Young, actually stated that he searched Donaghy’s jacket pockets.
261. The logic of the evidence presented to Lord Widgery is that the nail
bombs were not in Donaghy’s pockets until they were placed there while his body
was in the custody of the authorities. Lord Widgery claimed that “no
evidence was offered as to where the bombs might have come from, who might have
placed them or why Donaghy should have been singled out for this
treatment.” However, the testimonies of the Royal Anglians’ Medical Officer
and the civilian eyewitnesses all agree fully on the point that Donaghy was not
carrying nail bombs prior to his death; and the evidence clearly shows that the
RUC and Army had the opportunity to plant them. Evidence was therefore offered
as to where the bombs might have come from and who might have placed them there.
The motive for planting nail bombs on Donaghy is clear since even Lord Widgery
found that the shooting was without justification. Lord Widgery’s attempt to
besmirch Gerard Donaghy emerges as transparent as it was tawdry.
262. Finally, mention must be made yet again of Lord Widgery’s marked failure
to have at least admonished the Army for forcing out the driver of the car
carrying the seriously injured Donaghy. The resultant delay, for an unspecified
amount of time, in the administration of urgent medical assistance might
possibly have been a significant contributory factor to his death.
B. Were the Soldiers Justified in Firing?
Para 89. Troops on duty in Northern Ireland have standing instructions for
opening fire. These instructions are set out upon the Yellow Card which every
soldier is required to carry. Soldiers operating collectively-a term which is
not itself defined-are not to open fire without an order from the Commander on
the spot. Soldiers acting individually are generally required to give warning
before opening fire and are subject to other general rules which provide inter
alia:
“2. Never use more force than the minimum necessary to enable you to
carry out your duties.
3. Always first try to handle the situation by other means than opening
fire. If you have to fire:
(a) Fire only aimed shots.
(b) Do not fire more rounds than are absolutely necessary to achieve your
aim”.
Para 90. Other stringent restrictions apply to soldiers
who have given warning of intention to fire. But the rule of principal
significance to the events of 30 January is that which contemplates a situation
in which it is not practicable to give a warning. It provides:
“You may fire without warning
13. Either when hostile firing is taking place in your area, and a warning
is impracticable, or when any delay could lead to death or serious injury to
people whom it is your duty to protect or to yourself; and then only:
(a) against a person using a firearm against members of the security forces
or people whom it is your duty to protect; or
(b) against a person carrying a firearm if you have reason to think he is
about to use it for offensive purposes.”
Para 94. Soldiers will react to the situations in which they find
themselves in different ways according to their temperament and to the
prevailing circumstances. The more intensive the shooting or stone-throwing
which is going on the more ready will they be to interpret the Yellow Card as
permitting them to open fire. The individual soldier’s reaction may also be
affected by the general understanding of these problems which prevails in his
unit. In the Parachute Regiment, at any rate in the 1st Battalion, the soldiers
are trained to take what may be described as a hard line upon these questions.
The events of 30 January and the attitude of individual soldiers whilst giving
evidence suggest that when engaging an identified gunman or bomb-thrower they
shoot to kill and continue to fire until the target disappears or falls. When
under attack and returning fire they show no particular concern for the safety
of others in the vicinity of the target. They are aware that civilians who do
not wish to be associated with violence tend to make themselves scarce at the
first alarm and they know that it is the deliberate policy of gunmen to use
civilians as cover. Further, when hostile firing is taking place the soldiers of
1 Para will fire on a person who appears to be using a firearm against them
without always waiting until they can positively identify the weapon. A more
restrictive interpretation of the terms of the Yellow Card by 1 Para might have
saved some of the casualties on 30 January, but with correspondingly increased
risk to the soldiers themselves.
263. Lord Widgery opens these paragraphs with the very pertinent question:
Were the soldiers justified in firing? The evidence is compelling that they
certainly were not justified. Indeed, the claim can credibly be made that the
more horrific and deliberate the killing and the more pressing the need for
concealment of evidentiary material of benefit to Counsel for the next of kin,
the greater was the propensity on Lord Widgery’s part to have found that the
victim was armed or in close proximity to someone who had fired.
264. Lord Widgery produced findings on just two of the thirteen wounded
(fourteen including John Johnson who died shortly afterwards). He claimed that
every soldier was looking for and firing at a gunman. He found that John Young
and William Nash, shot at the Rossville Street barricade (and now understood to
have been shot from the vicinity of the Walls) were armed, that Kevin
McElhinney, shot from behind while seeking cover by Sergeant K, was armed with a
rifle and that James Wray, shot twice in the back at close range while lying
injured on the ground had been armed at some point during the day. Lord Widgery
found that Bernard McGuigan, Michael McDaid and Michael Kelly were shot dead
when standing close to gunmen who had fired. There was no credible evidence to
support any of these findings.
265. On the basis of Lord Widgery’s view that the soldiers were looking for
and firing at gunmen and that many of those shot and killed by them were
implicated as gunmen or close to gunmen when they were shot, Lord Widgery was in
effect putting forward the proposition indirectly and by implication that a mini
arsenal comprising sub-machine guns, rifles, revolvers, pistols, petrol bombs,
acid bombs and nail bombs had been used against the British Army, that the use
of all of these weapons had singularly failed to hit or injure a single soldier
or civilian, that this arsenal simply disappeared through some ingenious
recovery operation implemented by civilians, and that these gunmen (save for
those fatalities Lord Widgery was content to consider gunmen, contrary to all
the evidence) and those removing the weapons escaped death, injury or arrest.
Not alone therefore is the answer to Lord Widgery’s question self-evidently
clear but the scenario he proposed as a credible one to explain and justify the
actions of the British Army can only be considered incredible and unsustainable.
266. McMahon legitimately asks why Lord Widgery “constitutes the
soldiers as the interpreters of their own orders.” He writes, “it is
no more the soldier’s right to interpret the rules on the Yellow Card than it is
the citizen’s right to interpret for himself the law of the land.”
Furthermore, “not only were there to be different interpretations in
different units but different interpretations by different soldiers….The
introduction of this degree of subjectivity on the part of the unit and the
soldier diminishes drastically the objective importance of the Yellow Card and
runs counter to the general attitude taken by the law to rules and
interpretations.” McMahon demonstrates in a very compelling manner that
Lord Widgery, despite his office, his experience, even his prior rulings, failed
to give due consideration to whether the Yellow Card rules had been breached by
the soldiers acting by an objective standard of reasonableness. Not only was
this unusual in the common law but was “almost unheard of in the
interpretation of non-discretionary rules in any jurisprudence.”
267. This is but one of many salient points made by McMahon in the course of
his legal commentary on the Widgery Report. He submits that Lord Widgery, in his
consideration of the actions of the soldiers “was applying a quasi-moral
[standard] where he was more concerned with the morality of the soldiers’ acts
than with either the Yellow Card or the law of the land. Legally speaking, the
soldiers’ moral problems were not at issue. The question was a legal
one….” It should be borne in mind that McMahon based his argument on the
facts as presented in the Widgery Report and, even on these terms, he found
seriously wanting Lord Widgery’s application of the law and standards.
268. On the basis of paragraph 94 of the Widgery Report, McMahon posed the
very relevant question of whether it was reasonable to send in 1 Para, given
their reputation and training. As he puts it, the ostensible object of the
security forces was to avoid confrontation. Having achieved that end, they then
courted the very confrontation they had avoided through launching an arrest
operation by one of the most aggressive units in the British Army which not only
breached the geographic confines set by the Operation Order but failed to
disengage when, as was claimed, they came under fire. No order was given to
disengage and the Paras penetrated deeper into built up areas. The only logical
conclusion to be drawn is that 1 Para, in penetrating up Rossville Street, were
acting according to a set of instructions other than that offered in the
Operation Order.
Para 95. In the events which took place on 30 January the soldiers were
entitled to regard themselves as acting individually and thus entitled to fire
under the terms of Rule 13 without waiting for orders. Although it is true that
Support Company operated as a Company with all its officers present, in the
prevailing noise and confusion it was not practicable for officers or NCOs
always to control the fire of individual soldiers. The soldiers’ training
certainly required them to act individually in such circumstances and no breach
of discipline was thereby involved. I have already stated that in my view the
initial firing by civilians in the courtyard of Rossville Flats was not heavy;
but the immediate response of the soldiers produced a brisk and noisy engagement
which must have had its effect on troops and civilians in Rossville Street.
Civilian, as well as Army, evidence made it clear that there was a substantial
number of civilians in the area who were armed with firearms. I would not be
surprised if in the relevant half hour as many rounds were fired at the troops
as were fired by them. The soldiers escaped injury by reason of their superior
field-craft and training.
269. The new material clearly undermines any suggestion that the soldiers
came under any sustained gunfire as claimed by Lord Widgery. Even without this
evidence, Lord Widgery’s claim that the soldiers escaped injury by reason of
superior field-craft and training is difficult to sustain. Since no gunmen were
discovered amongst the dead, the wounded or the arrested, did these civilian
gunmen also possess superior field-craft and training in managing to avoid the
aimed shots of the paratroopers? Were the paratroopers superior merely to the
civilians who were killed and injured? This paragraph is revealed by the new
material to be close to fiction; it purports to describe an event that never
happened – an intense exchange of gunfire between 1 Para and gunmen operating
amongst innocent civilians.
Para 96. When the shooting began every soldier was looking for a gunman
and he was his own judge of whether he had identified one or not. I have the
explanation on oath of every soldier who fired for every round for which he was
required to account. Were they truthfully recounting the facts as they saw them?
If so, did those facts justify the action taken?
270. The new material, particularly the report of Prof. Walsh, demonstrates
the unreliability of the testimony of the soldiers. The civilian eyewitness
evidence, combined with the Para AA document, undermines the claim that the
soldiers were looking for gunmen. Taken together, the new material undermines
Lord Widgery’s assertion to have had a credible account of every round shot by
the soldiers. By implication, therefore, it appears that not only were soldiers
not telling the truth about how many rounds they fired and why, but they were
evidently concealing the actions they had undertaken in expending the ammunition
for which they did not account to the Tribunal.
Para 97. Those accustomed to listening to witnesses could not fail to be
impressed by the demeanour of the soldiers of 1 Para. They gave their evidence
with confidence and without hesitation or prevarication and withstood a rigorous
cross-examination without contradicting themselves or each other. With one or
two exceptions I accept that they were telling the truth as they remembered it.
But did they take sufficient care before firing and was their conduct justified
even if the circumstances were as they described them?
271. Since the Tribunal staff was aware of the inaccuracies, inconsistencies
and alterations made by the soldiers to the statements they had variously made
to the Military Police, Treasury Solicitors and the Inquiry and since the
Tribunal staff was equally aware of the substance of the statements submitted by
the NICRA/NCCL, it is very difficult to explain how Lord Widgery could have made
this assertion. If he was unaware of the information available to the Tribunal
staff, then he was ipso facto not qualified to make any judgements on the events
he was charged with investigating. If he was aware of them, his confidence in
the testimony of the men of 1 Para can only be considered a triumph of loyalty
over the obvious.
Para 98. There were infringements of the rules of the Yellow Card.
Lieutenant N fired three rounds over the heads of a threatening crowd and
dispersed it. Corporal P did likewise. Soldier T, on the authority of Sergeant
O, fired at a person whom he believed to be throwing acid bombs and Soldier V
said he fired on a petrol bomber. Although these actions were not authorised by
the Yellow Card they do not seem to point to a breakdown in discipline or to
require censure. Indeed in three of the four cases it could be held that the
person firing was, as the senior officer or NCO on the spot, the person entitled
to give orders for such firing.
Para 99. Grounds put forward for identifying gunmen at windows were
sometimes flimsy…….
Para 100. The identification of supposed nail bombers was equally
nebulous- perhaps necessarily so. A nail bomb looks very much like half a
brick……
Para 101. Even assuming a legitimate target, the number of rounds fired
was sometimes excessive……
272. The inadequacy of these paragraphs can only be gauged against the
background painted by the civilian eyewitnesses. To suggest that there were but
a handful of infringements of the Yellow Card, when Lord Widgery had failed to
establish that any of the dead or wounded possessed weapons much less were
threatening to use them, was patently absurd. The use of nail bombs was never
corroborated by any reliable source of evidence and none were recovered in the
killing zones. Lord Widgery’s precision as to how they are thrown is not only
redundant but absurdly specific. No firearm was recovered from the dead, wounded
or arrested.
Para 102. Nevertheless in the majority of cases the soldier gave an
explanation which, if true, justified his action…… In the main I accept
these accounts as a faithful reflection of the soldier’s recollection of the
incident; but there is no simple way of deciding whether his judgment was at
fault or whether his decision was conscientiously made…..where soldiers are
required to engage gunmen who are in close proximity to innocent civilians they
are set an impossible task. Either they must go all out for the gunmen, in which
case the innocent suffer; or they must put the safety of the innocent first, in
which case many gunmen will escape and the risk to themselves will be increased.
The only unit whose attitude to this problem I have examined is 1 Para. Other
units may or may not be the same. In 1 Para the soldiers are trained to go for
the gunmen and make their decisions quickly. In these circumstances it is not
remarkable that mistakes were made and some innocent civilians hit.
273. Lord Widgery’s failure to come to a conclusion on the core issue of
whether or not 1 Para acted within the law, despite his professed faith in the
reliability of the soldiers’ statements, would appear to be an abrogation of the
very remit under which he was appointed, as well as an astonishing act of
omission from a man at the pinnacle of his profession and occupying the
pre-eminent legal office of Lord Chief Justice.
Para 103. In reaching these conclusions I have not been unmindful of the
numerous allegations of misconduct by individual soldiers which were made in the
course of the evidence. I considered that allegations of brutality by the
soldiers in the course of making arrests were outside my terms of reference.
There is no doubt that people who resisted or tried to avoid arrest were apt to
be roughly handled; but whether excessive force was used is something which I
have not investigated.
274. The nature and extent of the allegations which Lord Widgery considered
beyond his remit and therefore, apparently, beyond official accountability can
be judged by the following eyewitness accounts, all of which were given to the
Irish Government in 1972. A particularly striking feature of the behaviour of
the soldiers was their obstruction of those attempting to render medical
assistance and the specific instances of brutality shown toward uniformed
members of the Order of Malta.
– As I arrived in William Street I saw the man who had been shot in the
shoulder leaning with his hands against the wall. He half turned and was
batoned on the head by a soldier…
– I looked back and saw two soldiers severely beat an elderly grey-haired
man…
– They were squealing and shouting and they said “Move you Irish
bastard”. They marched [us] in single file with our hands on our heads
through an opening. As we reached the opening they shot a fellow with a rubber
bullet in the leg, from about two yards…
– A Knight of Malta (female) ran towards them [three shot men], more shots
rang out and she had to dive on her mouth and nose…
– … While one soldier was attacking a middle-aged man, a member of the
Order of Malta attempted to intervene. The soldier turned and struck the
first-aid man (dressed in the usual grey uniform) first with the butt of the
rifle on both body and face and kicked him. The Order of Malta man collapsed
and disappeared from view behind a wall…
– I entered the (High Flats) courtyard with the rest of the fleeing crowd,
a Humber A.C. entered and knocked down a youth…. I then saw a paratrooper
grab an old man who had been left behind by the crowd and flail him about the
head with an SLR. I shouted to him and ordered him to stop. He threw the old
man to one side, took up a firing position and prepared to fire. I stood stock
still and then was hit by a rifle butt in the chest and knocked to one side
and as I fell I heard a shot close to my left ear. I was stunned… At the
corner of Francis Street, there were paratroopers who called us down. We were
roughly searched and generally insulted when I said I was in the Order of
Malta, the one in charge said “Those bastards!” We were then
taken… to an armoured car where we got more rough treatment. Every time they
heard of another death, they came to me and said: “that’s another fucker
you won’t be able to help out”…. We were driven to the R.N. Maintenance
Base… taken out of the lorry… and made to run a gauntlet of Paras who beat
me with their rifles… The RUC and Coldstream Guards inside the buildings
must have known this was going on… Under the noses of the RUC and the other
guards, they [the Paras] insulted, punched and generally harassed the
prisoners.
– We were driven a short distance to the Strand Road Naval Yard. When the
lorry stopped two soldiers at the back of it took us individually and threw us
off the back of the lorry. I landed between two lines of soldiers and I had to
run between them while they struck wildly at me with their batons and boots…
Once inside we were made to stand for about three hours with hands on a
wall…
– I saw one boy about 15 or 16 years fall, blood gushing down his leg… a
bald headed civilian ran to pick him up but before he got touching him, a
soldier came running at him and using the butt of a rifle, struck the man
three or four times over the head….
– Knights of Malta were trying to bring out the bodies to an ambulance.
When they got out into the open, the army fired….
– … several attempts had already been made by people and myself, carrying
and waving white handkerchiefs, to get to the fallen men, but these earlier
attempts were repulsed by rifle fire…
– I said to a paratrooper there were seven innocent people shot down in
cold blood, he cocked his rifle at me and threatened to shoot me and make me
the eighth. When he cocked the rifle, he put my children into hysterics and
while my children were upset the Paras started to cheer and crack obscenity…
– … At Rossville Flats, an elderly man was thrown against the wall and
beaten with a rifle and batons by three soldiers. Whilst the first aid man and
priest was administering to a man who had been shot, the first aid man showed
a white flag and he had to dive to the ground as the army shot at him. He then
dipped the hankie in the man’s blood and showed it but the army continued to
fire…
– I witnessed a colleague being fired on by the army as she went to the aid
of a wounded man. A man who followed behind her was shot and wounded.
– “We waved our hands to show the troops that we were First Aiders.
When we got as far as a Saracen which was parked in Chamberlain St., we were
told that we were going to be searched. Sgt. Alice Long [First Aider] said,
“For Christ’s sake, there are 3 men lying dead in the Square”. The
officer replied, “So what! Before nightfall there’ll be many more
dead”. At this, he began laughing. One of the soldiers said, “Hip,
Hip, Hooray”, and he began laughing. At this stage we were put up against
the wall with guns pointed at us. Sgt. Long said: “We need an
ambulance”, and the officer said “There’s an ambulance”, and he
pointed to an empty ambulance. He started laughing again. I went to the back
of the ambulance, looking for the driver who wasn’t to be found…. The
officer pointed to the far end of Chamberlain St… Sgt. Long and myself ran
to the end of Chamberlain St. looking for the ambulance driver… It is my
belief that the officer sent us on a wild goose chase…
Para 104. There have also been numerous allegations of soldiers firing
carelessly from the hip or shooting deliberately at individuals who were clearly
unarmed. These were all isolated allegations in which the soldier was not
identified and which I could not investigate further. If, and insofar as, such
incidents occurred the soldier in question must have accounted for the rounds
fired by giving some different and lying story of how they were expended. Though
such a possibility cannot be excluded, in general the accounts given by the
soldiers of the circumstances in which they fired and the reasons why they did
so were, in my opinion, truthful.
275. The eyewitness accounts, the report of Prof. Walsh and the statement of
Para AA, demonstrate that the allegations referred to here by Lord Widgery were
common to every death and injury that occurred and that those allegations were
well founded in evidence available to Lord Widgery at the time. The allegations
– based on evidence provided by eyewitnesses and photographs and by medical,
ballistics and forensic sources – were anything but isolated: they were uniform
and mutually corroborating. The new material further demonstrates that the
possibility of implicated soldiers lying, so cavalierly dismissed, was not only
real but self -evident from the testimony of civilian witnesses, from the
pattern of discrepancies and alterations in the written statements of the
soldiers and from the sheer inability to match the claims the soldiers had made
to the facts as they were known. Lord Widgery chose to believe the soldiers’
testimony in the face of reason, logic and the mountain of overwhelming oral,
written, photographic, ballistics, forensic and medical evidence.
Summary of [Widgery’s] conclusions
276. A notable feature of Lord Widgery’s conclusions is that they could not
be readily matched with the accounts and findings reached in the course of his
Report. A dramatically different set of conclusions could have been set out
based on the findings, such as they were. On the basis of his own Report, Lord
Widgery could have found that a number of identifiable soldiers had shot dead
one or more civilians without justification, that all of the individuals were
shot dead contrary to the Yellow Card, that it was an error of judgement to have
used 1 Para and that it was courting disaster to have launched the arrest
operation.
277. Beyond this, the new material has completely and fatally undermined the
Widgery Report, its findings and conclusions. As with the Report in general,
Lord Widgery’s conclusions emerge as inadequate, inaccurate, unfair, wholly
unwarranted and wilfully misleading.
1. There would have been no deaths in Londonderry on 30 January if those
who organised the illegal march had not thereby created a highly dangerous
situation in which a clash between demonstrators and the security forces was
almost inevitable.
278. Lord Widgery never sought to determine the intentions and plans of the
march organisers and was not therefore entitled or positioned to render this
unequivocal judgement. Had he done so, he would have discovered that efforts had
been made to ensure that the march was free of the presence of IRA gunmen. No
weapons were recovered from the dead, wounded or arrested. That the organisers
of the march were successful in this is patently attested to by the failure of
any significant or effective IRA presence to emerge in the face of the sustained
and prolonged use of lethal force by the British Army against unarmed civilians.
As the new material confirms, the responsibility for the deaths and injuries
sustained on Bloody Sunday lay in the first instance and throughout the day with
the British Army.
2. The decision to contain the march within the Bogside and Creggan had
been opposed by the Chief Superintendent of Police in Londonderry but was fully
justified by events and was successfully carried out.
279. It would have been more accurate to conclude that the actions of the
marchers, in turning away from the disturbances at the junction of Rossville and
William Streets, and complying with their prior commitments to avoid
confrontation, completely validated the judgement of the Chief Superintendent.
3. If the Army had persisted in its “low key” attitude and had
not launched a large scale operation to arrest hooligans the day might have
passed off without serious incident.
280. The new material calls into question the relevance of the arrest
operation as a sufficient explanation for the actions of the British Army.
Rather, it points to an account of the actions of 1 Para which is directly at
odds with the Operation Order for the day and for which a satisfactory
explanation has yet to be offered.
4. The intention of the senior Army officers to use 1 Para as an arrest
force and not for other offensive purposes was sincere.
281. The facts as they were known, particularly the reputation of the Paras
and their characterisation in the Widgery Report itself, combined with the
accounts of their actions and behaviour in the new material render this
conclusion wholly unsound and misleading.
5. An arrest operation carried out in Battalion strength in circumstances
in which the troops were likely to come under fire involved hazard to civilians
in the area which Commander 8 Brigade may have under-estimated.
282. As has been noted in the foregoing, there is a serious question mark
over Brigadier McLellan’s role in and culpability for the actions of 1 Para.
Until that is resolved, this conclusion is unfounded. Furthermore, it is clear
that effective steps had been taken by the march organisers to ensure that there
would be no significant IRA presence during the march, that these assurances
were accepted by the RUC and were made known to and apparently accepted by
Brigadier McLellan.
6. The order to launch the arrest operation was given by Commander 8
Brigade. The tactical details were properly left to CO 1 Para who did not exceed
his orders. In view of the experience of the unit in operations of this kind it
was not necessary for CO 1 Para to give orders in greater detail than he did.
283. There is no credible proof that Brigadier McLellan gave the order or
that any order was in fact given to mount an arrest operation as envisaged in
the Operation Order. There is ample evidence, not least the deaths and injuries
inflicted on innocent civilians, that 1 Para exceeded the Operation Order. Some
of what happened on the ground has been clarified by the emergence of the new
material: why it happened remains an open question.
7. When the vehicles and soldiers of Support Company appeared in Rossville
Street they came under fire. Arrests were made; but in a very short time the
arrest operation took second place and the soldiers turned to engage their
assailants. There is no reason to suppose that the soldiers would have opened
fire if they had not been fired upon first.
284. The new material demonstrates that this is a fiction; the army did not
come under fire and there was no engagement with assailants. Why the soldiers
opened fire remains unknown.
8. Soldiers who identified armed gunmen fired upon them in accordance with
the standing orders in the Yellow Card. Each soldier was his own judge of
whether he had identified a gunman. Their training made them aggressive and
quick in decision and some showed more restraint in opening fire than others. At
one end of the scale some soldiers showed a high degree of responsibility; at
the other, notably in Glenfada Park, firing bordered on the reckless. These
distinctions reflect differences in the character and temperament of the
soldiers concerned.
285. Soldiers never identified gunmen, much less engaged them. Under the law,
soldiers are not the interpreters of the rules under which they operate. If
their training made them aggressive and quick in decision, they should not have
been used in the arrest operation. Rather than the actions of the soldiers
revealing a scale of responsibility, the eyewitness accounts demonstrate a
uniformity of behaviour by the soldiers. This uniformity was reflected in their
choice of target – all the fatalities being men (and all of the wounded, bar
one, also being men) of serviceable military age and most of them moving at the
time when they were shot dead. That some of their firing simply “bordered
on the reckless” in Glenfada Park is a characterisation of behaviour
distinctly, not to say bizarrely, at odds with the accounts provided in the new
material. This conclusion is unsustainable, inaccurate and highly misleading.
9. The standing orders contained in the Yellow Card are satisfactory. Any
further restrictions on opening fire would inhibit the soldier from taking
proper steps for his own safety and that of his comrades and unduly hamper the
engagement of gunmen.
286. Since the instructions contained in the Yellow Card were demonstrably
ignored, this opinion was moot, to say the least. This conclusion tends to add
to the sense that the Report was seeking to create an impression that the
actions of the British Army were characterised by military restraint and
probity.
10. None of the deceased or wounded is proved to have been shot whilst
handling a firearm or bomb. Some are wholly acquitted of complicity in such
action; but there is a strong suspicion that some others had been firing weapons
or handling bombs in the course of the afternoon and that yet others had been
closely supporting them.
287. The new material reveals overwhelmingly that there were no grounds for
any suspicions that some of the victims or as Lord Widgery put it “some
others” had been firing weapons or handling bombs and yet others were
closely supporting IRA gunmen. Lord Widgery failed to demonstrate credibly that
reasonable grounds existed for such a suspicion in even one case. The new
material and its assessment here reveals that this conclusion was a grotesque
and unjust assertion made contrary to the large body of credible evidence
available at the time. Lord Widgery’s conclusion was wholly unwarranted,
unsustained by the evidence then or now and an unjustified calumny against the
victims. The victims suffered the double injustice of being unlawfully killed
and having their reputations sullied for the purpose of exculpating the actions
of those responsible for their deaths.
11. There was no general breakdown in discipline. For the most part the
soldiers acted as they did because they thought their orders required it. No
order and no training can ensure that a soldier will always act wisely, as well
as bravely and with initiative. The individual soldier ought not to have to bear
the burden of deciding whether to open fire in confusion such as prevailed on 30
January. In the conditions prevailing in Northern Ireland, however, this is
often inescapable.
288. The new material indicates that no faith could be attached to the
testimony and claims of the soldiers. Furthermore, it suggests that there was
either a break-down in discipline, or that soldiers were operating under a
general licence of some description to operate as they did (bearing in mind that
none were subject to any form of discipline), or that they were operating as
part of a preconceived and coordinated plan which was not reflected in the
Operation Order, or that some or all of these factors played a part in
determining the soldiers’ actions on Bloody Sunday. If, as Lord Widgery
concluded, the soldiers followed their orders, the unresolved question of Bloody
Sunday is what they thought those orders were.
Conclusions
The Widgery Report has been the basis of the British Government’s response to
the events of Bloody Sunday since its publication on 18 April 1972. As a
credible version of events, it has long been widely regarded as seriously flawed
by many sections of opinion in Ireland and abroad. Indeed, it has been viewed by
many as an attempt to present an “acceptable” official version of
events, the purpose of which was not to establish the truth but to exculpate the
actions of the British Army. The grounds for these suspicions were many and
obvious; the highly constrained terms of reference of the Inquiry itself, the
speed with which the Inquiry’s proceedings were concluded, the nature of the
proceedings and the manifold failures to consider the evidence either fairly or
comprehensively. The most telling feature of the Widgery Report, however, was
that it failed to hold any individual or agency accountable for the deaths of
thirteen innocent people.
In the wake of Bloody Sunday, a clear chasm rapidly emerged between the
version of events put forward by the authorities and the many accounts offered
by civilian eyewitnesses. The Army offered that its soldiers had come under a
sustained gun and nail-bomb attack and lists were circulated by the authorities
citing the weapons allegedly found on the victims. The civilian eyewitnesses
attested to a largely peaceful event, albeit with some stone throwing on the
fringes, the absence of IRA gun fire, nail bombs or petrol bombs, and the sudden
arrival at speed of British soldiers who opened fire immediately on debussing,
shooting into the backs of fleeing civilians. Rather than resolving how such a
stark, not to say startling, contrast could exist between the British Army’s
version of events and that of the many civilian eyewitnesses, the Widgery Report
opted, contrary to what many at the time believed was the weight of the
evidence, for the version put forward by those who were implicated in the deaths
and injuries, particularly the soldiers of 1 Para.
The new material which emerged recently provided a fresh platform on which to
mount a reconsideration of the events of Bloody Sunday and the Widgery Report.
It reinforced the original doubts about the completeness of the official version
of events, particularly through the strong evidence that shots were fired into
the Bogside by the British Army from the vicinity of Derry Walls. It provided
fresh grounds for the belief that members of 1 Para wilfully shot and killed
unarmed civilians. It suggested that the approach and conduct of the Widgery
Inquiry was informed by ulterior political motivation from its inception. It
demonstrated that the Widgery Inquiry was inherently flawed by the failure to
reveal or acknowledge that the testimony of the implicated soldiers had been
altered in successive statements to the Military Police, Treasury Solicitors and
to the Inquiry itself. Furthermore, it suggested an increasingly detailed –
though obviously incomplete – picture of what happened on Bloody Sunday which
was radically different from that offered by Lord Widgery. The new material
offered little on why Bloody Sunday occurred; the answer to that question
undoubtedly lies in large part in official British archives and the memory of
those involved on the British side.
The material emerged from many different sources, including published
contemporary eyewitness accounts, recent releases from official British archives
and academic analyses of them, and ongoing investigative reports by the press
and media. To draw these strands together, the Government decided to assess the
new material and focus in particular on what significance could be attached to
it vis-à- vis the Widgery Report. To do this effectively required a detailed
analysis of the Widgery Report in which virtually every paragraph was considered
afresh in light of the new material.
As is evident from the foregoing assessment, it can be concluded that the
Widgery Report was fundamentally flawed. It was incomplete in terms of its
description of the events on the day and in terms of how those events were
apparently shaped by the prior intentions and decisions of the authorities. It
was a startlingly inaccurate and partisan version of events, dramatically at
odds with the experiences and observations of civilian eyewitnesses. It failed
to provide a credible explanation for the actions of the British Army,
particularly the actions of 1 Para and of the other British Army units in and
around Derry. It was inherently and apparently wilfully flawed, selective and
unbalanced in its handling of the evidence to hand at the time. It effectively
rejected the many hundreds of civilian testimonies submitted to it and opted
instead for the unreliable accounts proffered by the implicated soldiers.
Contrary to the weight of evidence and even its own findings, it exculpated the
individual soldiers who used lethal force and thereby exonerated those who were
responsible for their deployment and actions.
Above all it was unjust to the victims of Bloody Sunday and to those who
participated in the anti-internment march that day in suggesting they had
handled fire-arms or nail-bombs or were in the company of those who did. It made
misleading judgements about how victims met their death. The tenacity with which
these suggestions were pursued, often on flimsy or downright implausible
grounds, is in marked contrast to the many points where significant and obvious
questions about the soldiers’ behaviour, arising from the Report’s own
narrative, are evaded or glossed over.
There have been many atrocities in Northern Ireland since Bloody Sunday.
Other innocent victims have suffered grievously at various hands. The victims of
Bloody Sunday met their fate at the hands of those whose duty it was to respect
as well as uphold the rule of law. However what sets this case apart from other
tragedies which might rival it in bloodshed, is not the identity of those
killing or killed, or even the horrendous circumstances of the day. It is rather
that the victims of Bloody Sunday suffered a second injustice, this time at the
hands of Lord Widgery, the pivotal trustee of the rule of law, who sought to
taint them with responsibility for their own deaths in order to exonerate, even
at that great moral cost, those he found it inexpedient to blame.
The new material fatally undermines and discredits the Widgery Report. A debt
of justice is owed to the victims and their relatives to set it unambiguously
aside as the official version of events. It must be replaced by a clear and
truthful account of events on that day, so that its poisonous legacy can be set
aside and the wounds left by it can begin to be healed. Given the status and
currency which was accorded to the Widgery Report, the most appropriate and
convincing redress would be a new Report, based on a new independent inquiry.
The terms and powers of any new inquiry would need to be such as to inspire
widespread public confidence that it would have access to all the relevant
official material and otherwise enjoy full official support and cooperation,
that it would operate independently, that it would investigate thoroughly and
comprehensively, and would genuinely and impartially seek to establish what
happened on Bloody Sunday, why it happened and those who must bear the
responsibility for it.