AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 20478/92
by Martina ANDERSON, Elizabeth ANDERSON,
Helen DUFFY and Sharon ANDERSON
against the United Kingdom
The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting
in private on 1 September 1993, the following members being present:
MM. A. WEITZEL, President
Mrs. J. LIDDY
MM. M.P. PELLONPÄÄ
Mrs. M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 3 July 1992 by
Martina Anderson, Elizabeth Anderson, Helen Duffy and Sharon Anderson
against the United Kingdom and registered on 12 August 1992 under file
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Commission;
Decides as follows:
The first applicant is an Irish citizen born in 1962 and
currently serving a prison sentence in Durham Prison, England.
The second applicant is the mother of the first applicant. She
is 67 years old. She is an Irish citizen and resides in Northern
The third applicant is the sister of the first applicant. She
is an Irish citizen born in 1949 and resides in Northern Ireland.
The fourth applicant is the younger sister of the first
applicant. She is an Irish citizen born in 1963 and also resides in
The applicants are represented by Peter Madden, a solicitor
practising in Belfast.
The facts of the present case, as submitted by the applicants,
may be summarised as follows:
The first applicant was arrested on 22 June 1985 in Scotland.
She was charged with conspiracy to cause explosions on mainland
Britain. She was sentenced to life imprisonment. The first applicant
has been classified as a category A (high security risk) prisoner.
The first applicant has requested that she serve her sentence of
imprisonment in a prison in Northern Ireland in order to be near to her
family and friends who all reside in Northern Ireland. The first
applicant was born in Northern Ireland and resided there all her life.
All family members reside in Northern Ireland. She has no relatives
in England. Her request for transfer has been refused by the British
Home Office by replies dated 25 October 1989, 31 August 1990,
13 December 1990 and 25 May 1991. The refusals were based on security
grounds as “the Secretary of State has fully considered the petition
but … he is not satisfied that if transferred, (the applicant) would
not disrupt or attempt to disrupt the prison regime of Northern
Ireland”. Two further petitions of the applicant, of 2 January 1992
and 8 February 1992, are still pending before the authorities. She was
given an interim reply on 21 February 1992 advising her that the
“request for a transfer to Northern Ireland remains under consideration
in consultation with the Northern Ireland Office”.
The first applicant married Paul Kavanagh in May 1989. He is
also serving a life sentence of imprisonment in England and has also
requested a transfer to a prison in Northern Ireland. His request for
transfer has been also refused by the Home Office. His application
was declared inadmissible by the Commission concerning the same
questions (No. 19085/91, Dec. 9.12.92, to be published in D.R.). If
the first applicant and her husband were transferred to a prison in
Northern Ireland then the distance between prisons would not be as
great and it may be that they could in fact be held at the same prison.
The first applicant’s father died in 1973. The second applicant
suffers from a serious heart condition, vertigo and is deaf in both
ears. Due to her medical condition she was advised by her doctor that
journeys to England are dangerous to her health. Although she is
provided with airfare paid by the Department of Health and Social
Services to those on State benefit, she can only avail herself of three
visits per year. She must always be accompanied on her journeys as she
is unable to travel alone.
The third applicant is separated from her husband with four
children and is not in paid employment. When she accompanies the
second applicant she must make alternative arrangements for the
children or pay the extra cost of taking them with her.
The fourth applicant is a single woman who is in paid employment.
When she accompanies the second applicant she must forfeit five days’
work. She is not entitled to State assistance and therefore must pay
her own travel, accommodation, and subsistence expenses. When she
travels she must seek accommodation.
The first applicant has three brothers, none of whom has seen her
since her arrest in 1985. All are married with families, and they are
under pressure not to travel to England for fear of being detained and
held under the Prevention of Terrorism Act. These fears are very real
as the first applicant’s mother, sisters and one brother have been
detained and held on several occasions while travelling or even
attempting to travel to see the first applicant. The length of the
detention varied between one hour and two days.
Since the first applicant and her husband were married in May
1989, they have only had three visits together.
The first applicant also submits that the conditions of detention
for Irish Republican prisoners in England are considerably worse than
those for their counterparts in Northern Ireland. Unlike the position
in Northern Ireland, the applicant and other Irish Republican prisoners
are completely segregated from each other unless one or two prisoners
are in the same establishment due to the fact that there are no other
prisons available. Irish Republican prisoners are generally held in
solitary confinement, in isolation, and dispersed throughout as many
available prison establishments as are in existence throughout England.
There is a policy of regular transfer from prison to prison, resulting
in the prisoners being unable to settle into familiar surroundings,
which has an adverse effect on health for prisoners serving lengthy
RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
a) Visit entitlement
The Prison Rules 1964 (S.I. 1964/388), made by statutory
instrument under the Prison Act 1952, Sections 47 and 52, contain,
inter alia, the following provisions:
“31.(1) Special attention shall be paid to the maintenance of
such relations between a prisoner and his family as are
desirable in the best interests of both.
(2) A prisoner shall be encouraged and assisted to establish and
maintain such relations with persons and agencies outside prison
as may, in the opinion of the governor, best promote the
interests of his family and his own social rehabilitation…
34(1) An unconvicted prisoner may … receive as many visits as
he wishes within such limits and subject to such conditions as
the Secretary of State may direct, either generally or in a
(2) A convicted prisoner shall be entitled –
…(b) To receive a visit once in four weeks …”
From April 1992, the normal visit entitlement was increased to
two visits in every period of four weeks.
Accumulated Visits (Standing Order):
“Subject to the provisions of Orders 5A 12-18 … convicted
inmates may be allowed to accumulate visits up to a maximum
of 12 and apply … to be temporarily transferred to any
local prison to take their visits. Category A inmates …
must petition for temporary transfer … An inmate must
have accumulated at least 3 visits before he can be
transferred to take accumulated visits.”
b) Temporary transfer
The Criminal Justice Act 1961 and Standing Order 5A provide that
a prisoner may apply for temporary transfer to another prison to
receive visits. These may be from a close relative or relatives who
may also be in custody. “Close relative” is defined so as to include
“mother” and “sister”. The material provision is Section 27(1) of the
Criminal Justice Act 1961 which provides that:
“The responsible minister may, on the application of a
person serving a sentence of imprisonment or detention in
any part of the United Kingdom, make an order for his
temporary transfer to another part of the United Kingdom…
and for his removal to an appropriate institution there.”
c) Permanent transfer
Section 26 of the Criminal Justice Act 1961 provides inter alia:
“(1) The responsible Minister may, on the application of
a person serving a sentence of imprisonment or detention in
any part of the United Kingdom, make an order for his
transfer to another part of the United Kingdom, there to
serve the remainder of his sentence, and for his removal to
an appropriate institution [there]…
(4) Subject to the following provisions of this section, a
person transferred under this section to any part of the United
Kingdom there to serve his sentence or the remainder of his
sentence shall be treated for purposes of detention, release,
supervision, recall and otherwise as if that sentence (and any
other sentence to which he may be subject) had been an equivalent
sentence passed by a court in the place to which he is
In a written decision relating to a request by a prisoner for
permanent transfer from the United Kingdom to Northern Ireland the
Secretary of State indicated the criteria he would apply in exercising
his discretion to transfer prisoners. That decision reads, in part,
“Revised criteria governing the transfer of prisoners to
another jurisdiction in the United Kingdom were announced
in reply to a Parliamentary question on 23 June 1989.
These provide that an inmate’s request to be transferred
will, normally, be granted provided that all the following
conditions are met:
(i) the inmate would have at least six months left to
serve in the receiving jurisdiction before his or her date
(ii) the inmate was ordinarily resident in the receiving
jurisdiction prior to the current sentence or his or her
close family currently reside there and there are
reasonable grounds for believing that it is the inmate’s
firm intention to take up residence there on release; and
(iii) both departments concerned are reasonably satisfied
that the inmate will not, if transferred, disrupt or
attempt to disrupt any prison establishment or otherwise
pose an unacceptable risk to security.
It was also stated, however, that even if these criteria
were met, transfer may be refused if it is considered that
the inmate’s crimes were so serious as to render him or her
undeserving of any degree of public sympathy or to make it
inappropriate that the inmate should benefit from a
substantial reduction in the time left to serve if that
would be a consequence of transfer.
Similarly, transfers may be refused if there are reasonable
grounds for believing that the inmate’s primary intention
in making the application is to secure a reduction in the
time left to serve. On the other hand, an application that
does not meet these conditions may, nevertheless, be
granted where there are strong compassionate or other
compelling grounds for transfer”.
d) Differences in release policies and procedures
The law and practice relating to the proportion of a sentence
which must be served before release differs between the three United
Kingdom jurisdictions. Prisoners serving determinate sentences in
England and Wales are entitled to one-third remission of their
sentence. Prisoners in Northern Ireland are generally entitled to
remission of one half of their sentence. There are also differences
in the administration of life sentences so that those serving sentences
for comparable offences are generally released earlier in Northern
Ireland than they would be if they were sentenced in England and Wales.
e) Categorisation of prisoners
Category A prisoners are defined as those whose escape would be
highly dangerous to the public, or to the police, or to the security
of the State, no matter how unlikely that escape might be. Category
A prisoners are further classified as presenting either a standard,
high, or an exceptional escape risk. Prisoners assessed as Category
A (Exceptional Risk) are located in Special Security Units within
prisons. In deciding on a prisoner’s categorisation, account is taken
of the nature and circumstances of the offence, details of any previous
convictions, where appropriate, the prisoner’s mental state and reports
from police, prison and other sources. The need to continue to hold
a confirmed Category A inmate in the highest security category is
reviewed at least once every 12 months on the basis of up to date
Category A prisoners are subject to certain restrictions. Their
movements within the prison are escorted and are closely monitored and
recorded. Their visitors have to be approved and their photographs
verified by the police under special arrangements known as the Approved
Visitors Scheme. They are subject to frequent cell changes. They are
not permitted to work in the prison kitchen. In addition, prisoners
in Special Security Units do not have access to prison workshops.
The applicants complain that the refusal of a transfer is in
violation of their right to respect for their private and family life
as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. They submit that
alternative prison accommodation is available in Northern Ireland and
that there is no valid reason for refusing the transfer. The denial
of a transfer is deliberately and unnecessarily punitive.
The applicants also complain that they are discriminated against
on the grounds of political or other opinion, national origin and
association with a national minority, contrary to Article 14 of the
Convention. In particular, they submit that Irish Republican prisoners
are discriminated against as a class in that they are treated less
favourably than other prisoners in relation to questions of transfer.
The applicants further submit that they have no effective remedy
as required by Article 13 of the Convention.
1. The applicants complain that the refusal to transfer the first
applicant permanently to a prison in Northern Ireland to facilitate
visits from her family is a violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the
Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention provides as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and
family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority
with the exercise of this right except such as in
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security, public
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others.”
The Commission has considered whether the relationship between
the applicants constitutes family life within the meaning of Article 8
(Art. 8) of the Convention. It notes that the second applicant is the
mother, and that the third and fourth applicants are the sisters of the
first applicant. It recalls that it has held that in the context of
prisoners or other persons who are detained the concept of “family
life” must be given a wider scope than in other situations. It has
held in the similar case of the applicant’s husband that: “Prisoners
generally have limited means of contact with the outside community and
of maintaining relationships with family members. ‘Family life’ for
prisoners is inevitably restricted to visits, correspondence and
possibly other forms of communication such as telephone calls.
Emotional dependency between, for example, parents and adult children,
or siblings is even enhanced in these circumstances. The Commission
recalls in this context that the European Prison Rules emphasise the
need to encourage these links:
’65. Every effort shall be made to ensure that the regimes of
the institutions are designed and managed so as:
(c) to sustain and strengthen those links with relatives and
the outside community that will promote the best interests of
prisoners and their families.'”
(No. 19085/91, Dec. 9.12.92, to be published in D.R.).
The Commission has also stated the opinion that Article 8
(Art. 8) requires the State to assist prisoners as far as possible to
create and sustain ties with people outside prison in order to
facilitate prisoners’ social rehabilitation (e.g. No. 9054/80, Dec.
8.10.82, D.R. 30 p. 113, and No. 15817/89, Dec. 1.10.90, to be
published in D.R.).
In light of these factors, the Commission finds that the
applicants’ complaints must be held as falling within the scope of
Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention.
The applicants have submitted that the refusal of permanent
transfer constitutes an interference with their right to respect for
their family life. The Commission considers, however, that the
applicants are arguing in effect not that the State should refrain from
acting but rather that it should take steps to implement a particular
policy. Although the essential object of Article 8 (Art. 8) is to
protect the individual against arbitrary interference by public
authorities, there may be positive obligations inherent in an effective
“respect” for family life (see e.g. Eur. Court H.R., Marckx judgment
of 13 June 1979, Series A no. 31, p. 14 para. 31). In this context,
the notion of “respect” is not clear-cut and its requirements will vary
considerably from case to case according to the practices followed and
the situations obtaining in Contracting States. In determining whether
or not such an obligation exists, regard must be had to the fair
balance which has to be struck between the general interest and the
interests of the individual (see e.g. Eur. Court H. R., Abdulaziz,
Cabales and Balkandali judgment of 28 May 1985, Series A no. 94, p. 33
para. 67, and the B. v. France judgment of 25 March 1992, to be
published in Series A no. 232-C, para. 44).
The Commission recalls that in the present case the first
applicant, who is from Northern Ireland, is detained in a prison in
England and that she has requested a transfer to facilitate visits from
her family, including the second, third and fourth applicants. The
Commission notes that the first applicant is serving a long term of
imprisonment and that the considerable distance involved imposes
difficulties in utilising visit entitlements which cannot be said to
The Commission notes, however, that the first applicant is
lawfully detained for serious offences committed against the background
of a terrorist campaign. The applicant is detained as a Category A
(High Security Risk) prisoner. Any transfer would arguably be highly
dangerous, increasing greatly the risk of escape.
The Commission also refers to its constant case-law according to
which a prisoner has no right as such under the Convention to choose
the place of his confinement and that a separation of a detained person
from his family and the hardship resulting from it are the inevitable
consequences of detention (see e.g. No. 5229/71, Dec. 5.10.72,
Collection 42 p. 14, and No. 5712/72, Dec. 18.7.74, Collection 46 p.
112). The Commission considers that only in exceptional circumstances
will the detention of a prisoner a long way from her home or family
infringe the requirements of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention (see
e.g. No. 5712/72, Dec. 18.7.74 loc. cit., and No. 7819/77, Dec. 6.5.78,
published in part, D.R. 14, p. 186).
The Commission finds that no exceptional circumstances arise in
this case. It notes that the first applicant is detained in England
since she was arrested and tried there in respect of offences committed
as part of an alleged terrorist campaign in England. As a prisoner,
the applicant is subject to the normal regime applicable to her
category as regards correspondence and visits. The second applicant
is entitled to State financial assistance to cover thirteen visits per
year although she is only able to make three visits due to her health.
The Commission also recalls that the first applicant was able to marry
Paul Kavanagh while both were detained in prison and that they are in
regular contact by telephone and have had three visits together since
their marriage in May 1989. The third and fourth applicants
accompanied the second applicant on visits to the first applicant.
Having regard to the above circumstances, the Commission finds
that the decision of the United Kingdom Government to refuse permanent
transfer arrangements to Northern Ireland discloses no lack of respect
for the applicants’ family life within the meaning of Article 8
(Art. 8) of the Convention.
It follows that the complaint is manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
2. The applicants also complain that they are discriminated against,
contrary to Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 (Art. 14+8) of the
Convention, since Irish Republican prisoners in the United Kingdom are
treated less favourably than other prisoners as regards transfer.
Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention provides as follows:
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground
such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, association with a national
minority, property, birth or other status.”
The Commission notes that the applicants do not contend that
there is a blanket prohibition on transfer of Irish Republican
prisoners to Northern Ireland. In the present case, the Commission
recalls that the first applicant was refused transfer on security
grounds. Insofar as this refusal can be said to be motivated by the
first applicant’s status as an Irish Republican prisoner, the
Commission considers that different considerations concerning security
apply to different prisoners. It recalls that the first applicant is
a Category A (High Security Risk) prisoner convicted in relation to
terrorist offences. In these circumstances, her position cannot be
considered as analogous to that of other prisoners for the purposes of
Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention.
It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
3. The applicants also complain under Article 13 (Art. 13) of the
Convention that they have no effective remedy in respect of their
Article 13 (Art. 13), however, does not require a remedy under
domestic law in respect of any alleged violation of the Convention.
It only applies if the individual can be said to have an “arguable
claim” of a violation of the Convention (Eur. Court H.R., Boyle and
Rice judgment of 27 April 1988, Series A no. 131, p. 23 para. 52).
The Commission recalls that it has rejected the applicants’
complaints under Articles 8 and 14 (Art. 8, 14) of the Convention, no
lack of respect for the applicants’ family life or unlawful
discrimination having been disclosed. In these circumstances, the
Commission also finds that the applicants cannot be said to have an
“arguable claim” of a violation of the Convention necessitating an
Article 13 (Art. 13) remedy.
It follows that this part of the application must also be
rejected as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article
27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission by a majority
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
Secretary to the First Chamber President of the First Chamber
(M. F. BUQUICCHIO) (A. WEITZEL)